CENTRAL ASIAN SURVEY

Volume 1 Number 1
July 1982

CENTRAL ASIAN SURVEY

The Journal of
The Society for Central Asian Studies,
P.O. Box 131, Oxford OX1 2NJ, England

Published by
Oxford Microform Publications
19a Paradise Street
Oxford OX1 1LD
England

 ISSN 0263 4937
Typeset and produced by Oxford Print Associates

CENTRAL ASIAN SURVEY VOLUME 1 NUMBER 1 JULY 1982

Contents

Introduction 1

ARTICLES

Islam Under Communist Rule: Volga-Ural Muslims
Azade-Ayse Rorlich 5

The USSR and The Middle East
Chantal Lemercier-Quelquejay 43

The Government of Muhammad Moussa Shafiq: The Last Chapter of Afghan Liberalism
Richard S. Newell 53

CHRONICLES

Soviet Islam Since the Invasion of Afghanistan
Alexandre Bennigsen 65

The Present Situation in the Hazarajat
"B.M." 79

TRIBUTE

Sir Olaf Caroe (1892-1981)
George Chowdharay-Best 93

RESEARCH AND BIBLIOGRAPHY

Recent Chinese Research in Turkic Studies
Geng Shimin 105

Non-Russian Education in Central Asia: An Annotated Bibliography
Isabelle Kriendler 111

REVIEW AND COMMENTARY

From the Turkmen Press
David Morison 125

Crisis in Afghanistan: A Review Article
Anthony Hyman 133

Book Reviews 141
List of Contributors

Notes for contributors can be found at the back of the journal. 153

Introduction

Central Asian Survey has been created to fill what we believe to be a very pressing need: a medium of information and analysis about the history, politics, cultures, and economies of the peoples inhabiting the huge land mass lying among the Soviet Union to the north and west, the Peoples Republic of China to the east, Afghanistan and Iran to the south. Currently no such medium exists in the West; for some time, Central Asian studies have been included, sparsely, on the agenda of other research and area studies groups, usually under the aegis of Slavic studies. We believe that the historical and strategic importance of the Central Asian region, the uniqueness and beauty of Central Asian cultures, recent unsettling political and military events in the region, and the significant number of new and resurgent problems attending the presence of Central Asians in the several multi-ethnic states that embrace them, give more than sufficient reason to treat Central Asian studies as an area of distinct and separate interest.

Our efforts over the last several years to reach specialists and non-specialists of Central Asian studies through a series of newsletters indicate a sizable potential international audience for the new journal. In Great Britain, a renaissance of sorts has taken place in this area, with interest stronger now than at any time since the exciting days of the renowned British soldier-explorer-scholar, an intrepid breed that for decades supplied most of what the West knew of Central Asia, while simultaneously establishing an aura of intrigue and adventure around such places as Bukhara, Samarkand, Kashgar, Urumchi, Meshed, and the Northwest Frontier—an aura that remains to this day. In the United States and in Western Europe, a new generation of students of Central Asia has emerged, trained mostly by a handful of well-known specialists who have dominated the field for years. In Turkey, with its long tradition of Central Asian research, new projects are being undertaken, often by the sons and

daughters, grandsons and granddaughters, of illustrious Turkestani emigres. But this is only part of the picture. Few of us in the West know of the research efforts in the East: in Pakistan, India, Indonesia, Taiwan, Australia, or Japan, for example. Nor do we know much about the apparently sizable scholarly undertakings to put Central Asian studies on a new footing in the Peoples Republic of China. Many of the best Soviet studies on Central Asia seldom circulate outside of that state beyond a small group of specialists.

Central Asian Survey is intended to assist in bridging the gaps in our knowledge about our colleagues and their research, about our different analytical, regional, political, and social viewpoints, and about our interpretations of Central Asia's past and our forecasts for her future. Ours is a search for links to connect the heterogeneous disciplines that comprise Central Asian studies. But we aim not to become another arcane forum in which specialists can speak to one another in language only they understand. Rather, we seek to appeal to specialists and non-specialists alike, to highly trained professionals, to students, to policy-makers, to interested laymen. From time to time this may appear to be an elusive goal, for these can be exclusive constituencies; yet, we are bound together by our common interest in learning more about Central Asia.

But what is Central Asia, exactly? We doubt that anyone can say with great precision, for the overlapping forces of history and culture have left quite a task for even the most ambitious lexicographer. One well-known geographer, Douglas Carruthers, has made a good try:

> The term "Central Asia" is sometimes used rather loosely. Its true boundaries, if it be possible to define them, should enclose all that area which lies within the region limited by the Oxus river, the Karakorum and the Kunlun ranges on the south; the Syr Darya and the Tian Shan mountains on the north; the Gobi Desert on the east, and the Kizil Kum on the west. This is the kernel of the nut. Tibet is an entity to itself, and is not Central Asia, nor is Dzungaria, the region to the other of the Tian Shan. East and west, it is true, the boundaries are somewhat vague, there being no special land features to decide them.

Carruthers goes on to say that one can make good arguments for extending the definition somewhat farther on the basis of ethnological spillover, Thus, Afghanistan, north of the Hindu Kush, definitely qualifies as should the Turkmen areas of northeastern Iran, although Carruthers is silent on this point.

With apologies to the great geographer, we are prepared to extend the definition rather more, for reasons which we shall explain, while admitting that we may be taking considerable liberty in doing so. To

those of us at *Central Asian Survey*, Central Asia does indeed include all of those regions tagged by Carruthers, and we would equate his definition to the present-day Soviet republics of Uzbekistan, Tadzhikistan, Turkmenistan, Kirghizia, and Kazakhstan, as well as the Turkic-Muslim and Iranic-Muslim territories of China's Xinjiang province, Afghanistan north of the Hindu Kush, and northeastern Iran, as already mentioned. But there is reason, we believe, for going beyond this to include the Muslim territories of the North Caucasus and Azerbaidzhan, as well as the Tatar-Bashkir region of the Middle Volga. These outlying populations, after all, are bound to the main Central Asian populations by language, religion, and culture, and more recently, by the fate of history and the caprice of politics. A strong and, in some cases, thorough intermingling of these cultures has been going on for some decades, indeed, for some centuries, suggesting to us that it would be ridiculously pedantic to treat, for example, the Uzbeks while ignoring the Volga Tatars. Both are Muslim peoples and share a Muslim culture; both speak a Turkic language; both have been subjected to policies, at least under Soviet rule, which were intended to address these similarities and others. Thus, *Central Asian Survey* will treat these peoples in the ethnically and religiously contiguous regions. Strictly speaking they are not Central Asia; realistically they are parts of a whole, the forces affecting one part having implications for all.

In each issue of the new journal, we shall offer a wide variety of articles, chronicles, and research aids. Historical analysis is high on our list of priorities. In this issue, Ayse Rorlich opens with a thorough presentation of the development and maintenance of Islam among the Volga Tatars and Bashkirs, addressing through her analysis fundamental ethnographic questions and a recurring problem: the defence of Islam against larger external forces intent on reducing it. Richard S. Newell analyses one of the lesser discussed interludes in Afghanistan politics, the short-lived government and reforms of Muhammed Moussa Shafiq.

More contemporary chronicles are provided by Alexandre Bennigsen, Chantal Lemercier-Quelquejay, and "B. M." Bennigsen and Lemercier-Quelquejay in separate articles take up the issue of Soviet Islam since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the former considering the domestic impact of the military adventure on the Islamic peoples of the USSR, the latter the changes in the official external presentation of the Soviet state as an Islamic power in the aftermath of the invasion. "B. M." offers an insider's look at the impact of the war in Afghanistan on the people of Hazarajat, analysing efforts to resist among the local population and the impact of war on civil organization in the region.

To aid the researcher, Isabelle Kreindler contributes to the first issue an annotated bibliography of sources devoted to non-Russian education in Central Asia in the pre-Soviet period. Of course, knowing what to read is always valuable but so is how to read it. David Morison makes a strong case in his analysis of the Turkmen press for routine comparisons of the Russian and native-language media in Central Asia, noting interesting and significant differences in substance and tone in the reporting of the same events. Geng Shimin opens a small but tantalizing door on recent efforts in the Peoples Republic of China to establish new institutions and to revivify old ones dedicated to Central Asian studies.

Book reviews in *Central Asian Survey*, for the most part, will be longer and more detailed than those found in similar journals. The editorial board has asked reviewers to write without fear of unduly restrictive guidelines on the length of reviews; by doing so, we hope to allow reviewers to express their own ideas more fully, not simply to regurgitate the main themes of the books under discussion. This should encourage a more far-reaching dialogue with our readers. Anthony Hyman offers a good example of what we have in mind in his comprehensive review and analysis of a number of recent books on the crisis of Afghanistan.

Although usually implicit in journals of this kind, it bears repeating that the ideas of our authors are theirs alone; they have received neither encouragement nor guidance from *Central Asian Survey* in their various points of view. We reserve only the right to provide a forum for the discussion of past and current issues of import. However, to make sure that fair play is observed, beginning with the second issue we shall include a correspondence section. Readers who wish to compliment, condemn, correct, or clarify are requested to write to the Editor.

It is ironic, perhaps, that our beginning should coincide with the passing of Sir Olaf Caroe, one of the most influential men to write on Central Asia in the last century. George Chowdharay-Best pays tribute to Sir Olaf in this issue and in the next one to come. Yet, we can offer no greater tribute to Sir Olaf than to observe the high standards of thorough scholarship and penetrating analysis for which he stood so nobly, so long. We are all in his debt; and it is this sentiment with which we go to press.

S. Enders Wimbush

Islam under Communist Rule: Volga-Ural Muslims

AZADE-AYSE RORLICH

> "This day are those who disbelieve in despair of (ever harming) your religion; so fear them not, fear Me! This day have I perfected your religion for you and completed My favour unto you, and have chosen for you as religion AL-ISLAM."
>
> (Koran 5:3)

The era of wrongly identifying Islam with the Arab world, or at least with the Middle and Near East may now have been brought to an end, perhaps less by the shattering events of a socio-political revolution then by the equally stark results of statisticians.

When the preliminary results of the 1979 census of the population of the Soviet Union were published, the specialist and non-specialist alike were able to appreciate the social, cultural, and political implications of the fact that of a total population of 262,442,000, over 43 million of the people living in the USSR were Muslim. Of these, the Turkic nationalities are the most numerous; albeit bound by community of race and religion, they are products of different historical experiences.

The westernmost branch of the Turkic peoples of the USSR is represented by the Volga Tatars and Bashkirs. Soviet official sources employ the term "Tatar," making no distinction between the Crimean and Volga Tatars. Although related and bound by a common culture, Crimean and Volga Tatars have developed along distinct historical paths and should be differentiated accordingly. In 1979, there were 6,317,000 Tatars (perhaps as many as 400,000–500,000 of whom are Crimean Tatars) and 1,317,000 Bashkirs in the Soviet state.[1]

ORIGINS OF THE VOLGA TATARS AND THE BASHKIRS

Volga Tatars and Bashkirs share the same historic homeland (Khanates of Kazan, Astrakhan and Kingdom of Sibir) which occupied the upper,

middle and lower Volga lands, extended westward into the Oka-Don lowlands, incorporated the western Siberian regions beyond the Urals and stretched northward to the Viatka river basin. Throughout their history, Tatars and Bashkirs have enjoyed an impressive demographic and cultural contiguity, thus making it very difficult to draw a clear line distinguishing between their cultures.

The ethnogenesis of the Tatars and Bashkirs is the result of an ethnic synthesis which occurred between the incoming Turkic element and the local Finno-Ugric substratum. The process which began with the settlement of the Bulgar Turks in the woodlands between the Volga (Idil) and the Kama (Chulman) rivers between 670 and 740, continued with the arrival of the Kypchak Turks (who reached the zenith of their political power in the 11-12th centuries) and entered into a new phase when the Mongols conquered the area in the 13th century.[2]

There is evidence indicating that the Bulgar Turks came to the Volga-Kama region as early as the fifth or sixth centuries. It can be assumed that the geographic features of this land between rivers imposed a settled way of life on the Bulgar Turks, thus making them the first Turkic group to abandon a nomadic way of life.[3] Trade became the economic specialty of the Bulgar Turks as early as the 8th and 9th centuries because their land was covered with forests and did not offer the best conditions for agriculture or cattle breeding. Theirs was mainly a transit trade, capitalizing upon the advantages offered by the Volga and Kama rivers located at the crossroads between Asia and northern Europe.[4]

It is as traders that the Bulgar Turks came into contact with Arab traders, whose impact as carriers of an Islamic civilization was so significant as to prompt some historians to argue that "from the viewpoint of its culture, the Bulgar state was a true colony of the Muslim East; the adoption of Islam only completed a process which had begun earlier through trade relations".[5]

On 12 May, 922 the Bulgar state parted with its polytheistic past and adopted Islam. The descendants of the Bulgars are quick to point out that it was neither the sword nor diplomacy that prompted their ancestors to join the Islamic *umma* (community of believers). Of his free will the Bulgar Khan Almas sent messengers to Baghdad in 921 to ask Caliph Al-Muktadir for assistance in bringing the teachings of the prophet to his lands. He specifically asked for scholars, as well as architects and artists who could erect mosques and instruct his people in the new religion.

In 921 Caliph Al-Muktadir sent a sizeable embassy to the Bulgar lands. One of its members was Ahmed ibn Fadlan, whose detailed travel accounts provide valuable information about the lands and people he visited. The Khan adopted Islam officially on 12 May, 922, changing his name to Jafar-ibn-Abdallah; in his notes Ibn Fadlan

mentions encounters with individuals who had adopted Islam even prior to this date.[6]

Islam, and the use of the Arabic script, spread so rapidly that toward the end of the 10th century, "most of the Bulgars observed Islam, and there were mosques and schools in their villages".[7] The Russian historian S. M. Soloviev noted that:

> For a long time Asia, Muslim Asia, built here a home; a home not for nomadic hordes but for its civilization; for a long time, a commercial and industrial people, the Bulgars, had been established here. When the Bulgar was already listening to the Koran on the shores of the Volga and the Kama, the Russian Slav had not started yet to build Christian churches on the Oka, and had not yet conquered these places in the name of European civilization.[8]

Islam became the nucleus around which the spiritual life of the Bulgar state developed, while trade still continued to remain the backbone of its economic life.

In the 13th century, the spiritual and economic life of the Bulgars was disrupted by Mongol conquest. The Bulgar Khanate enjoyed a considerable degree of autonomy within the Golden Horde for some fifty years; in 1395, however, it was conquered by Timur who destroyed completely the capital city of Bulgar.

The population which survived the devastation of this conquest left the shattered villages and cities around the Kama river and settled on the right bank of the Volga. The economic and political centre of these new settlements became Kazan or *Bulgar al-jadid* (the new Bulgar).[9] The people of this new political centre were "new Bulgars" too, for they represented the product of the biological and cultural synthesis that had taken place between the Bulgars and the Mongol Tatars. In fact, the Mongol Tatars underwent a process of assimilation by the Turkic peoples (Bulgars included) of the Golden Horde. This was both a biological and cultural assimilation of a nomadic people by the sedentary people whose language and customs they adopted. The process of assimilation was facilitated by the fact that in 1273 the Golden Horde as a whole adopted Islam. Although assimilated by the Turkic peoples whose lands they had conquered, the Mongol Tatars were to leave, among other things, a most enduring reminder of their role in the socio-cultural and racial amalgamation which had taken place: their name. "Tatar", the name of the conqueror, gradually replaced "Bulgar", which by the 15th century had almost disappeared from use.[10]

Kazan emerged as the centre of a centralized Tatar Khanate in 1445 under Ulu-Muhammed. Its existence as an independent Khanate

ended on 2 October 1552. The economic and social troubles which Kazan had been encountering, combined with internal feuding, increased its vulnerability and made resistance to the armies of Ivan IV impossible.[11]

The Kazan Khanate had endured for only 107 years. Despite its brief existence, however, the Khanate left a strong mark on the history of the Volga Tatars, for it was during this period that their national identity and national awareness developed within the framework of a centralized state enjoying an intense cultural life. "As the heir of the old Bulgar, Kazan was not only a wealthy, but also a civilized city".[12] Education and literature developed in the spirit of Islam. *Mektebs* and *medreses* (elementary and secondary Muslim schools) enjoyed the support of the Khans and pious foundations, as did Kazan's libraries and archives.[13]

When in 1552 Kazan was conquered and destroyed by the armies of Ivan IV, the very existence of its Islamic civilization, of its people, as a different national, cultural, and religious entity was in danger. This idea was nowhere better illustrated than by Ivan IV's own statement: "Let the unbelievers receive the True God, the new subjects of Russia, and let them with us praise the Holy Trinity for ages unto ages".[14]

If the Kazan Khanate was the first Muslim principality conquered by the Great Russian and Orthodox Christian Muscovite state of Ivan the Terrible, it was not to be the only one: the Muslim Khanate of Astrakhan on the lower Volga, and the Kingdom of Sibir beyond the Urals, which, like Kazan, had become independent after the disintegration of the Golden Horde, were conquered by Ivan IV in 1554 and 1598 respectively.

The number of the new subjects of Muscovy grew: the Muslim Bashkirs and Tatars of the Kazan Khanate were joined by those of Astrakhan, Sibir, as well as by a considerable number of animist *inorodtsy* such as the Chuvash, Mordvinians, Cheremis and Votiaks.[15] The most urgent task confronting Russian rulers was the absorption of these new elements into the fabric of the exclusively Great Russian and Orthodox Christian society of Muscovy. Religious, legal, educational, and economic policies were designed and strictly enforced in a concerted effort to transform the *inorodtsy* into better Russian subjects by making them Christian first.

Missionary activities represented one of the major channels through which the Russian state exercised religious pressure upon its Muslim and animist *inorodtsy*. Although the goal of the Russian missionaries remained unchanged until the 1917 Revolution, the scope of their activities and the methods which they employed between the 16th and early 20th centuries varied.

Archbishop Gurii's arrival in Kazan in the summer of 1555 marked the beginning of the first campaign of forced conversions, a campaign which extended from 1555 to 1576. Although it failed to convert *en masse* the Muslims and the animists, this first concerted effort resulted in the emergence of the oldest Christian Tatar group, *Starokreshchennye*. Resentment of the conversion campaign grew strong enough to push the Tatars into open rebellion in 1556. Their revolt was suppressed, and those Tatars who still refused to convert were forbidden to live within the walls of the city. Consequently, the overwhelming majority of the Tatars who had chosen to remain Muslim had to move outside the fortress where they founded a new district, which came to be known as Staraia Tatarskaia Sloboda (Old Tatar Settlement).[16]

During the Time of Troubles (1584–1613), missionary activity ceased. It was replaced by civil measures which combined economic coercion and rewards in order to attract the Muslims of the Volga-Ural area to Christianity. Neither punitive nor conciliatory measures, however, did much to increase the number of Tatar converts. If anything, the measures against Islam acted as a catalyst to the simmering discontent of the Tatars, who in 1669–70 eagerly joined Stepan Razin's revolt.

Missionaries renewed their activities in the Volga area in the 18th century. However, at this time a new dimension in the approach to conversion was introduced: alongside economic measures, education became an instrument to increase the number of converts.[17] It seems that this combined policy of proselytism and education yielded better results: by 1725 some 40,000 new converts (*Novokreshchennye*) had joined those who had become Christian after the conquest of Kazan.

Anti-Muslim policies reached a climax in the mid-18th century under Empress Anna Ivanovna. On 11 September, 1740, she issued an *ukaz* for the organization of the Office for the Affairs of the New Converts (*Kontora Novokreshchenskikh Del*) which sponsored missionary activities of varying degrees of sophistication. In addition to coercive educational and economic policies, this new organization encouraged physical attacks on Islam. Between 1740 and 1743, 418 of the 536 mosques in the Volga area were destroyed, and on 8 August, 1750, the Senate issued an *ukaz* which ordered the Tatars to leave Staraia Tatarskaia Sloboda where they had settled after being ousted from the fortress in 1555. They left and founded another settlement near Kazan, Novaia Tatarskaia Sloboda (New Tatar Settlement) where some nine years later the Tatars were allowed to erect two mosques.[18]

Mosques were not the only targets of the anti-Muslim policies of the Russian government. *Mullahs* (Muslim teachers), in particular,

were held responsible for the "stubborness of the Tatars" and thus became targets of attacks as well. *Kontora Novokreshchenskikh Del* opened schools for the new converts, aimed specifically at training a generation of Christian teachers from among the Tatars who, in time, would replace the *mullahs* and who would also serve as a unifying force for the new converts.[19] What the missionaries and government authorities could not grasp at the time was that *mullahs* owed their special place in the Muslim communities of the Volga-Ural area (where they served as teachers, clergymen, judges, and even doctors) not so much to scholastic or bureaucratic prestige as to the nature of Islam as religion. Islam not only regulates the spiritual life of the believer but it is an all-encompassing way of life governing the totality of a believer's being. The *mullah* is not the member of an organized clergy. He represents a focal point around whom individual and communal interests coalesce although not because of any implicit institutional authority.

Catherine II's reign offered a breathing space for the Muslims. Her expansionist policies toward the East could succeed only if the persecution of Muslims was stopped and the Russian state achieved a *modus vivendi* - even if a fragile one - with its Muslim subjects. The decree of 1773, granting freedom to all religious beliefs, and the establishment of the Muftiat (Muslim Ecclesiastical Council) in 1782 may have been the result of Catherine II's shrewd political calculations, but they had a catalytic effect upon the Muslims. The establishment of the Muftiat, which was invested with authority in all purely religious matters affecting Muslims, meant above all that for the first time the Islamic *umma* of Russia was being recognized as a religious entity. This awareness enhanced the sense of unity and self-confidence of the Volga-Ural Muslims.[20]

Although missionary activity was resumed in the 19th century, it failed to increase the number of converts from among Volga-Ural Muslims. Even more, those who had converted during the previous centuries and had been nominal Christians all along, by choice, began to return to Islam in large numbers. The mass return to Islam, as well as the stubborness with which the overwhelming majority of the Muslims had resisted russification, reflected Islam's unique strength in the Volga-Ural area and explains to a large extent why Islam survived the political disintegration of the Tatar polity. In response to this situation, on 21 May 1849, Nicholas I approved a resolution of the State Council restricting the control of the Orenburg Muftiat over the appointment of *mullahs*.[21] This suggests that the government was concerned with the strong influence which *mullahs* continued to exercise over Muslim communities throughout the empire. It also indicates that the mass return to Islam was perhaps partly the result

Table 1. Muslims under the jurisdiction of the Muftiat of Orenburg/Ufa in 1889

Province or area	*Male*	*Female*	*Parishes (mahalle)*
Astrakhan	32,851	24,545	77
Ekaterinoslav	296	155	?
Irkutsk	2,947	869	
Kazan	321,968	287,610	845
Kirghiz Council	29,576	29,400	59
Kostroma	189	176	1
Moscow	2,513	716	1
N. Novgorod	22,515	23,399	57
Orenburg	165,334	153,988	500
Penza	32,329	32,349	121
Perm'	82,152	69,635	197
Riazan'	3,317	3,449	15
Rostov	176	85	1
Samara	83,739	86,652	676
Saratov	32,204	41,614	151
Semipalatinsk	276,747	257,206	14
Siberia: Akmolinsk	5,685	3,989	9
: Nis	2,947	869	2
Simbirsk	61,587	59,543	169
St. Petersburg	2,800	150	3
Tambov	11,440	9,854	27
Tobolsk	41,273	27,322	133
Tomsk	16,753	16,456	27
Ufa	495,768	489,117	1,396
Uralsk	9,605	7,677	14
Viatka	68,380	59,995	150
	1,805,091	1,666,820	4,645
		Total: 3,471,911	

Source: A. Ibrahimof, *Chulpan Yuldizi* (Tatar, Arabic script) (St. Petersburg, 1907), p. 28.

of a revival and strengthening of the Muslim community around the Muftiat.

To counteract these setbacks, Nicholas I ordered the resettlement of Christian Tatars, both *Staro-* and *Novokreshchennye*, in Russian villages; in addition, the anti-Muslim department, which had been organized in 1854 by the Kazan Theological Academy, received special attention and support.[22] The setback to missionary work, however, seemed irreversible.

Against the background of this stalemate, a professor of Turkic languages at the Kazan Theological Academy and Kazan University, N. I. Il'minskii, advanced a programme which rested on the theory that missionary efforts should concentrate on enlisting the help of the school and the teacher and should be conducted in the local language.

On 26 March, 1870, the Ministry of Public Instruction approved the *Rules Concerning Measures for the Education of* Inorodtsy *(Pravila o merakh k obrazovaniiu inorodtsev).*[23] Il'minskii built his school system on the basis of these rules, which stressed the importance of native teachers and the use of indigenous languages. Tatars criticized Il'minskii's school system, as they feared its potential for russification. The Russians, on the other hand, were frightened by the implications of Il'minskii's emphasis on native languages: the emergence of nationalism and separatism among the *inorodtsy*. Il'minskii, however, confronted his fellow Russians with the following dilemma:

> If, from fear of separate nationalities, we do not allow the non-Russians to use their language in schools and Churches on a sufficient scale to ensure a solid, complete, convinced adoption of the Christian faith, then all non-Russians will be fused into single race by language and by faith - the Tatar and Mohammedan.[24]

Il'minskii's warning is an indirect testimony to the vitality of the Muslim Tatar culture; not only had it endured centuries of conquest and russification attempts but it had grown into a magnet for the smaller non-Russian ethnic groups of the area which were slowly assimilating into it.

Despite this vitality, Tatars were divided over Il'minskii's policies: Some Muslims perceived bilingualism as a means of facilitating russification, while others saw in it the passport to full participation of Muslims in the life of the Russian state and an end to their isolation and socio-cultural and political discrimination.

The heated discussions which the issue of bilingualism and the education of children triggered among the Muslims of the Volga-Ural area became a part of the ongoing, fundamental debate about the place of Islam in a modern society, of its compatibility with a rapidly changing way of life.

The debate embracing education, culture, and secularism marked a turning point in the Islamic revival of the Volga-Ural Muslims, a revival which had begun as early as the end of the 18th century. Abu Nasr al-Kursav (1783-1813), Shihabeddin Merjani (1819-1889), Rizaeddin Fahreddin (1859-1936) and Musa Jarullah Bigi (1875-1949) made particularly valuable contributions to a reassessment of religious thinking. They declared war on established dogma and committed themselves to revitalizing Islam through a return to its pristine purity. Their efforts made possible an interplay of orthodoxy and heterodoxy in the reshaping of the Islamic identity of the Tatars and the Bashkirs.

The firm belief of the Tatar *jadid* (reformist) thinkers in the inner

Table 2. Muslims in the Volga-Ural and Western Siberian Provinces of the Russian Empire in 1897

Ethnic Group	*Province*	*Population*	*Urban*
Tatars	*Volga-Ural region*:		
	Astrakhan	52,799	16,137
	Kazan	675,419	35,252
	N. Novgorod	41,339	
	Orenburg	92,926	25,764
	Penza	58,530	
	Perm'	46,711	3,896
	Samara	165,191	6,536
	Saratov	94,693	4,296
	Simbirsk	133,977	4,123
	Ufa	184,817	8,030
	Viatka	125,514	1,838
	West Siberia:		
	Tobolsk	56,957	1,573
	Tomsk	95,153	2,321
Bashkirs	*Volga-Ural region*:		
	Orenburg	254,561	3,382
	Perm'	85,395	
	Samara	57,242	
	Ufa	899,910	5,671
	TOTAL:	3,121,034	207,819

Source: N. A. Troinitskii, ed., *Pervaia Vseobshchaia perepis' naseleniia Rossiiskoi Imperii. 1897. Nalichnoe naselenie oboego pola po uezdam, s ukazaniem chisla lits preobladaiushchikh rodnykh iazykov* (St. Petersburg, 1905), pp. 1–8.

strength and potential revival of Islam seems to have fostered their interest in the Russian schismatic sects and their tolerant view of the Shiite Muslims.[25] The Sunni Volga-Ural Muslims collected money which they sent to Bukhara to be distributed among all who had suffered during the violent clashes between Sunni and Shiite Muslims.[26] The Volga Tatars did not extend the same toleration to the puritanical Sufi sect of the Vaisites (*Vaisov Bozhii Polk*), which refused to recognize the authority of the Russian state and claimed to be the only true heirs of the ancient Bulgars. The followers of Bahaeddin Vaisi, who had founded the sect in 1862, always used the name "Bulgar" instead of "Tatar".

The Vaisites, chiefly peasants and poor craftsmen, argued that those who accepted the authority of the Russian infidels were no longer Muslims. They refused to pay taxes, perform military service, or attend mosques where the prayer was led by *mullahs* who conformed to the requirements of the Russian language examination.

Eventually they seceded from the Muftiat and organized their own autonomous religious leadership.

The rigidity of the Vaisites brought upon them coercive measures from the government; they became outcasts *vis-à-vis* the majority of the Volga-Ural Muslims, who favoured meeting the challenges of the modern world through reform rather than by retreating into the distant past.[27] The Vaisites were harassed and brought to trial several times, yet despite the general contempt and denunciation heaped upon them, they maintained a following until 1917, when they emerged on the national scene on the side of the Bolsheviks. The unorthodox *rapprochement* between the ultra-conservative Vaisites and the Bolsheviks was possible not because they shared a common ideology but because the Bolshevik promises of self-determination were particularly attractive to Vaisites obsessed with the idea of restoring freedom to the Bulgar lands.

In fact, the Vaisites had merely stressed in a more dramatic and uncompromising manner what Tatar reformers had acknowledged all along: the need for a solution to the tension between Islam and its socio-political milieu. Unfortunately, however, enlightened *ulama* (the collective body of those knowledgeable in Islamic dogma and traditions) such as M. Bigi and R. Fahreddin, who had demonstrated originality and boldness in approaching the issue of religious reform, remained only marginally interested in politics. Political thought and political life, to the degree it developed among the Tatars and the Bashkirs between 1905 and 1917, were mainly the work of lay Muslims with a liberal education, most of them direct products of the *jadid* cultural revolution and education.

POLITICAL ORGANIZATION AND DISUNITY

The students of the Muhammedije *medrese* who in 1904 founded the society El Islah (the Reform) provided perhaps the first tangible sign that secularism had begun to transcend purely cultural matters. Islahist *shakirds* (*medrese* students) advanced the idea that cultural *jadidism* should grow into a struggle for political rights. Despite their militancy, however, the Islahists did not develop a well-defined programme for their society. They were receptive to socialist ideas but their concern with politics was more rhetorical than real. The biggest contribution which this student society may have made to Tatar politics was to create a "reservoir" from which emerged most of the intellectuals who became identified with the left wing of Tatar politics.[28]

The first Socialist party among the Volga-Ural Muslims was organized in the fall of 1905 by former students of the Teachers'

School. The Brek (Union) party endured only until the fall of 1906, but throughout its existence it published its own paper, first called *Azat* (Liberty) and then *Azat Halk* (The Free People).[29] The programme of Brek, with its vague emphasis on freedom for the people and land for the peasants, reflected the influence of the Russian Social Democrats and Socialist Revolutionaries, among other political tendencies.

In 1906, A. Ishaki and F. Tuktarov, two of the founders of Brek, together with the Islahists Sh. Muhammediarov and A. Davletshin, organized the Tangchi party; its programme echoed the programme of the Russian Socialist Revolutionary Party, and its press organ, *Tang Yulduzi* (the Morning Star) echoed the militancy of the Russian populists.[30] Despite their differences, Brek and Tangchi were much closer than their members may have realized or were ready to admit at the time; some of the programmatic and ideological lines that divided them were unequal to the nationalism that bound them together.

It was the same Islahist reservoir that provided the leadership for the first Muslim party to divorce itself from the philosophy of nationalism. Husein Yamashev, a talented *jadid* writer joined the Kazan branch of the Russian Social Democratic Party in 1902. By 1905, he had attracted nine more Tatars into the party. Although a small minority in the 250-member Kazan organization, the Tatars were of significant importance to the Russian Social Democratic Party whose efforts were geared toward bringing into the party non-Russians as a means of promoting class solidarity. The handful of Tatars whom Yamashev had attracted into the Social Democratic Party scattered throughout the Volga area when the police destroyed the Kazan branch of the party in December 1905.[31]

Yamashev himself, accompanied by a few of his friends, left for Orenburg, where in 1907 they organized a legal Tatar Social Democratic group called Uralchilar (The Uralists), which opened its membership to Bolsheviks and Mensheviks alike. This group, too, published its own newspaper; despite its short life (only 31 issues between January 4 and April 27, 1907), *Ural* did succeed in acquainting the Volga-Ural Muslims with the platform of the Tatar Social Democrats. Throughout its existence, *Ural* remained close to the internationalist line of the Bolsheviks, criticizing the liberal as well as revolutionary nationalist Muslim parties and emphasizing the need for class rather than national consciousness.[32]

The Uralchilar group of Tatar Social Democrats was dispersed by police in April 1907, before it had had any chance to convert a significant number of Tatars to its brand of internationalist socialism. The death of Yamashev in 1912 brought to an end the efforts to spread

Marxism among Volga-Ural Muslims and to organize them politically along class lines. Consequently, the liberal nationalists organized around the party Ittifak al-Muslimin (Muslim Union) which emerged between 1905 and 1917 as an almost unchallenged spokesman for the Muslims on the Russian political scene.

The demise of the Tatar Social Democratic party came at a time when *jadid* nationalism was growing stronger. This in itself meant that of the two ideologies, secular nationalism and atheistic communism, which were competing for the attention of the Islamic *umma* in Russia, secular nationalism represented a more serious rival to Islam. Furthermore, freed from the competition of rival Tatar Marxist organizations, *jadid* nationalists monopolized the political arena until 1917. On the eve of 1917, however, Marxism could probably have claimed one victory among the Muslims of the Volga-Ural area: *jadid* intelligentsia had now become familiar with socialist doctrines, if only to use them selectively in political battle against the Russian establishment.

The Russian Revolution of February 1917 raised hopes among the Muslims; it also tested the vigour of nationalism among Tatars. In February and March 1917, two bodies emerged to represent the interests of the Volga-Ural Muslims: the Muslim Committee, comprised of bourgeois nationalists and moderate revolutionaries, and the Muslim Socialist Committee, representing the left of the revolutionary spectrum. The acknowledged and most important feature of these bodies was their quality as *Muslim* committees; all else was of secondary value. As such, their main goal was to capitalize upon the demise of the Russian monarchy and secure rights for Muslims.

On 1 May, 1917, more than 900 delegates from throughout Russia representing every shade of political opinion met in Moscow for the first post-revolutionary Muslim Congress, which established the Mili Shura, a Muslim Central Agency responsible for planning joint political action. The Congress also tested the strength of the forces led by the Volga Tatars who favoured extra-territorial autonomy within a centralized Russian state, against those led by the Azeris, who advocated territorial autonomy within a federal Russian State. Those in favour of federalism won-by 446 to 271. The secular doctrine of nationalism had rendered a blow to the unity of Islam in Russia.

The strength of nationalism and its ability to overwhelm and efface the political differences of the Volga-Ural Muslims surfaced at the second Muslim Congress, which met in July 1917 in Kazan. There, the united front of the Tatar socialists and bourgeois liberals committed itself to the national and cultural autonomy of Muslims in the Volga-Ural area and Siberia. To achieve this goal, a military agency, Harbi Shura, and a National Board, Milli Idare, were organized.

The city of Ufa, already the seat of the Muftiat, became the headquarters of Milli Idare as well.[33]

When the Bolshevik Party emerged victorious in October 1917, it faced the formidable task of establishing and maintaining its control over the entire territory of the Russian state. In the Volga area, the Muslims represented a serious challenge to Soviet power. Milli Idare and Harbi Shura gave Volga-Ural Muslims the advantage of an administrative organization and a military force of their own. To counteract its weakness in this regard, the Council of the People's Commissars issued on 19 January 1918 a decree providing for the creation of a Central Commissariat for Muslim Affairs (Muskom). The leadership of this Commissariat was recruited from the *jadid* reservoir noted earlier: Mulla-Nur Vahitov (chairman), Galimjan Ibragimov, Sharif Manatov (deputy chairman), and Mirsaid Sultangaliev were all nationalists; Mulla-Nur Vahitov and Galimjan Ibraginov were left-wing socialists. Sultangaliev had been a member of the Russian Bolshevik Party since November 1917 and the only Tatar Communist co-opted to the eleven-member Council of the People's Commissars of Kazan.

The first clash between these parallel Muslim agencies, each competing for the allegiance of the Muslims, occurred at the second congress of Harbi Shura, which met in Kazan on 8 February 1918. When the Congress reiterated an earlier decision to create the Idel-Ural state as the national state of the Tatars and Bashkirs, some Muslim socialists registered their dissent openly, thus creating a serious rift in the Muslim *umma*. The nationalists who were determined to carry out the plan became involved in a futile effort to organize the nucleus of a national government in the "Trans-Bulak Republic" - the Tatar suburb of Kazan where they took refuge. The immediate result of this abortive attempt to secede from the Russian state was the liquidation by the Bolsheviks of all Tatar national agencies which had emerged since February 1917. During March and April 1918, the headquarters and regional branches of Harbi Shura and Milli Shura were closed and the Tatar nationalist press suspended. As a result, the only Muslim agency that had the blessing of the Bolshevik leadership, the Central Muslim Commissariat, emerged as the sole representative of the Muslims to the Soviet State; it was an agency which the Bolshevik leadership viewed as the most important vehicle for rallying Muslims around the Soviet regime.

The Central Muslim Commissariat had jurisdiction over all areas of Muslim economic, political, and cultural life. It also controlled the Muslim sections of the local Soviets and the Central Muslim Military College which was organized on 29 June 1918 under the leadership of Sultangaliev.

The existence of these Muslim agencies, in addition to the creation of the Russian Party of Muslim Communists, which was organizationally independent of the Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik), was a tangible sign of the independent course which Volga-Ural Muslims were favouring. They also indicated that national solidarity and national goals ranked higher than ideological orthodoxy to the Muslim Communists.[34]

The *modus vivendi* which was emerging between the Muslims of the Volga-Ural area and the Soviet State was upset drastically by the events of the Civil War, when the Muslims found themselves on territory contested by Red and White forces. Some Muslims rallied to the anti-Soviet camp hoping that it would be more responsive to their problems. Most Volga-Ural Muslims, disappointed with the chauvinism of the White monarchist forces and encouraged by the more conciliatory attitude of the Bolshevik government, severed their ties with the Whites and rallied around the Bolsheviks.

The tempest of the Civil War, however, washed away, one by one, the cornerstones upon which the Volga-Ural Muslims had hoped to build a new, independent life. In November, 1918, at the first Congress of Muslim Communists, the Muslim Communist Party was merged with the Russian Bolshevik Party; the Central Muslim Commissariat was abolished, thereby shattering for ever the hope for building a Tatar-Bashkir republic. Bolshevik leaders could not afford to allow a unified state of the Volga-Ural Muslims to emerge, a state comprising the historic territory of the Kazan Khanate, at a time when the vitality and boldness of Tatar nationalism had become alarming. Still, the Bolsheviks had committed themselves to the principle of self-determination. True to it, but with an obvious appreciation of the advantages of *divide et impera*, the decree of the Central Executive Committee of the Party and the Council of People's Commissars provided for the organization of an Autonomous Bashkir Republic on 23 March, 1919 and an Autonomous Tatar Republic on 27 May, 1920.[35]

SULTANGALIEV

The political and administrative foundations of what could have become the independent state of the Volga-Ural Muslims may have been washed away by the spring of 1920. The dream, however, endured stubbornly. It was nursed, paradoxically, by Tatar communists, whose *jadid* nationalism was responsible for their emergence as national communists, addressing themselves to the complex issue of the relationship between Communism and Islam, colonial nations, and peasant societies.

Tatar national communism found its most articulate spokesman and original thinker in Mirsaid Sultangaliev. A *jadid* teacher by training, a sincere communist by way of a rather late conversion to Marxism in November 1917, Sultangaliev had become the most influential Muslim communist in the party hierarchy by 1920. He was certainly one of the leading figures in the People's Commissariat of Nationalities (*Narkomnats*) and Stalin's expert on Islam in the Inner Collegium of the Commissariat. As chief editor of the journal *Zhizn' Natsional'nostei* (Life of the Nationalities) and professor at the Communist University of the Toilers of the East, Sultangaliev reached a considerable audience with his original interpretation of the relationship between Islam and Communism.

Sultangaliev argued that in the case of an overwhelmingly peasant and semi-colonial Muslim society the goal of national revolution was a higher priority than the goal of social revolution. This was, indeed, a departure from Marxist orthodoxy, but hardly surprising as it came from a *jadid* who was only projecting into the realms of theory the experience of the Islamic *umma* of Russia.

Until his purge as a nationalist at the Twelfth Party Congress in 1923, he developed a political programme which rested on his original thesis regarding the relationship between the national and social revolutions in the context of a Muslim society:

> The Muslim peoples are proletarian peoples. There is a great difference between the economic situation of the English, French proletariat and the proletariat of Morocco and Afghanistan. It should be stressed that national movements in Muslim countries have the characteristics of a socialist revolution. The national aspirations of the Muslims of Russia have the same characteristics.[36]

Russian conquest and rule had been equally devastating for the Tatar rich and poor; centuries of discriminatory policies had had a levelling effect, blurring class differences and providing the *umma* with at least one issue on which it stood firmly united, the defence of Islam.

Sultangaliev was an atheist. As such, and as a high-ranking official in the party bureaucracy he, too, was committed to the separation of church and state. He established, however, a direct link between the movements of national liberation and the role of religion in peoples' lives, arguing that "no anti-religious propaganda will succeed as long as the Eastern people remain exploited".[37] He warned his colleagues in the party bureaucracy to use extreme caution in dealing with Islam, given the special role it had played in the life of the Russian Muslims.[38]

Sultangaliev not only advocated a very careful approach toward the Muslims, but he urged his fellow Communists to make a distinction between anti-religious struggles and anti-religious propaganda. It would be unwise, he argued, to attack Islam openly since it represented the religion of an oppressed people, suffering (or having suffered, as was the case in Russia) from the economic and political encroachments of Western imperialism. Not religion, not Islam, but the cultural and political backwardness of the Muslims was their main evil. The chains of political backwardness could be broken not by anti-religious propaganda, but by political socialization, by drawing the Muslims into the leadership of the political, economic, administrative and cultural institutions.[39]

Sultangaliev also pointed out that in addition to political backwardness, what accounted for the strong commitment of the Muslims to Islam were some of its intrinsic positive characteristics, such as collectivism, egalitarianism, emphasis on education (according to prophetic tradition: "thirst for knowledge from cradle to grave"), industriousness, rejection of private property on land, water and forest, and the existence of a progressive tax system (*zakat*). In addition, Sultangaliev stressed the desirability of anti-religious propaganda which would convince the Muslim believer that "communists are not struggling against religion, but using their rights to be atheists". Sultangaliev's critics claimed that he waged propaganda for *jadidism* (i.e. secularism) not atheism, and criticized what they called his "vegetarian communism which had nothing in common with the idealogy of Marx, Engels, Lenin".[40]

Sultangaliev's words of caution, however, fell on less than receptive ears. Instead of using Sultangaliev's inside knowledge of Islam to build bridges between it and Communism, the party leadership in Moscow chose to silence him. Purged and arrested in 1923, Sultangaliev re-emerged briefly after his release, still the leader of the Tatar national communists. He was arrested again in 1928, this time bringing an end to his political career and sealing his personal fate.[41]

The Bolsheviks rejected Sultangaliev's warnings because they saw Marxism as an all-encompassing ideology, leaving no areas of private concern. Ironically, by this interpretation, Marxism was reminiscent of the all-encompassing nature of Islam which, not surprisingly, was viewed with added suspicion by the Bolshevik leadership.

THE ANTI-ISLAMIC OFFENSIVE

Departing from the programmatic postulates of the western Marxist parties, Lenin had stressed as early as 1909 that the Bolsheviks must subordinate their anti-religious work to the general political objectives of the party.[42] Yet, once in power, the Bolshevik party set forth to change the life of the Islamic *umma* of Russia by attacking the juridical and moral code of Islam, by depriving Islamic institutions of their means of subsistence, and by putting them under the control of a sophisticated and ever-growing network of state policing agencies. The decree of the Council of People's Commissars "on the Separation of Church and State, and School and Church" of 23 January 1918 defined the legal status of Islam as well as of all other religious bodies in Russia:

> 3. Every citizen may profess any religious belief, or profess no religious belief at all. All restrictions of rights, involved by professing one or another religious belief, or by professing no religious belief at all, are cancelled and void . . .
> 4. Free performance of religious rites is permissible as long as it does not disturb public order, or interfere with rights of the citizens of the Soviet Republic. The local authorities shall be entitled in such cases to adopt all necessary measures for maintenance of public order and safety. . . .
> 12. No church or religious associations have the right to own property. They do not possess the rights of juridical persons. . . .
> 15. The property of all church and relief associations existing in Russia is pronounced the property of the people. Buildings and objects especially used for the purposes of worship shall be let, free of charge, to the respective religious associations, by resolution of the local, or Central State authorities.[43]

The 1918 Constitution disenfranchized all clergymen; deprived of civil and economic rights, they became subject to economic coercion and political pressure. As a non-sacerdotal religion, Islam does not have an organized clergy. Its closest equivalent is the *mullahs*, who lead the congregational prayer but do not monopolize this position, since any believer with a basic knowledge of the fundamentals of his religion may perform the same function. Moreover, the activity of the *mullahs* is not limited to the performance of religious ceremonial worship. They are also in charge of the implementation of Islam's juridical code (*Shari'at*), its moral code, and perpetuation of education through mektebs and medreses.

Despite the freedom of religious as well as anti-religious propaganda which Soviet citizens were given by the 1918 constitution, *mullahs*, as well as other "servants of the cult", could be imprisoned for disseminating religion among minors and for trying to obtain advantages by exploiting the religious feelings of the people

The freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution were annihilated by the interpretation which the party leadership gave these articles and by the stifling effect which state policing agencies had upon the life of all religious communities. Hence, the religious life of all citizens of Soviet Russia, Muslims included, fell under the control of not one, but several administrative agencies. Between 1918 and 1924, P. A. Krasikov led the Department for the Implementation of the Separation of the Church from the State, which in fact was the Eighth (later, the Fifth) Department of the Commissariat of Justice. Sections for Ecclesiastical Affairs or Sections for Cults existed within the state secret police agencies, including the Cheka, GPU, OGPU, and NKVD. Higher level agencies were formed in 1924 and 1929 to co-ordinate governmental controls over religion: the Secretariat for the Affairs of the Cults and the Permanent Commission for the Affairs of the Cults which were both agencies of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of the Party.

By 1924, the basic framework of Soviet legislation on religion had emerged, making it clear that religious organizations ceased to exist as corporate entities. As another measure to ensure state control over religion, new religious entities were formed, such as the *dvadtsatki* - religious associations of at least twenty believers, which alone were recognized by the law. Only after registration with the local Soviets were they allowed to lease houses of worship and hire "servants of the cult", who in turn were required to register with state authorities.[44]

Muslims of the Volga-Ural area were subject to relatively few excesses in the early period of the implementation of the Decree on the Separation of Church and State. However, despite the fact that the zeal of government agencies was toned down by the realities of the Civil War, mosques were still closed, some were profaned, and often *mullahs*, who were labeled as counter-revolutionaries, were shot. Muslims were particularly distressed when initially, those in charge of anti-religious propaganda were almost exclusively Russians, many even former missionaries, leading to a rather unflattering comparison between Tsarist and Bolshevik policies towards Islam. Aware of this, Lenin supported wholeheartedly the proposal which G. V. Chicherin submitted to the Central Committee of the party in 1921 and which stressed the need for especially tactful anti-religious propaganda among Muslims.[45]

Chicherin's proposal may have come in response to the report on the progress of anti-religious propaganda by the head of the Department of the Implementation of the Separation of the Church from the State, P. A. Krasikov, which was presented in early 1921. According to Krasikov's report, between May 1918 and December 1920, 232,720 people had attended some 411 lectures, discussions and meetings on anti-religious themes; yet, there was no evidence of a special approach towards Muslims.[46] In fact, in his proposal, Chicherin singled out Islam as a specific "case study", for which the thirteenth point of the party programme adopted at the Eighth Party Congress in 1919 seemed particularly valid: "it is necessary to carefully avoid hurting the feelings of believers, which can only lead to a reinforcement of religious fanaticism".[47]

The uneasy relationship which existed between Russian Islam and the Soviet state in the early years of Soviet power was altered fundamentally by the mid-1920s. Determined to make maximum use of the right to anti-religious propaganda guaranteed by the constitution, the Soviet state embarked upon a concerted campaign to undermine all religions. Anti-religious activity received direction and coherence through the Union of Militant Godless (*Soiuz voinstvuiushchikh bezbozhnikov*, 1925–1947) and its counterparts among the Volga-Ural Muslims, Allahsizlar and Dinsizler.[48]

Between 1926 and 1931, the membership of the Union of Militant Godless increased from 4046 to 44,484 in the Tatar ASSR; the number of the Russians increased from 2164 to 12,627; whereas the number of Tatars rose from 2142 to 16,872. The initial success which the Union scored among the Tatars may be indicative of the strength of *jadidism* in the Volga-Ural area, where Muslims may have accepted anti-religious propaganda as pro-secularization propaganda as long as it did not touch the foundations of the faith.[49]

The assorted collection of anti-religious organizations launched a media campaign aimed at awakening believers to the truth that "religion is a bandage over the eyes of man, preventing him from seeing the world as it is".[50] The Volga-Ural Muslims were, in fact subjected to a multi-lingual media campaign: Russian as well as Tatar and Bashkir atheistic publications would set as their goals the "conversion to atheism" of the stubborn believer. Prominent periodicals included militant publications such as *Bezbozhnik* (newspaper, 1922-1941; journal, 1925-1941; *Ateist* (1922-1930); *Antireligioznik* (1926-1941); and the contemporary journals *Nauka i religiia* (since 1959) and *Chelovek i mir* (since 1965) which, while abandoning the openly propagandistic tone of earlier publications, still adheres to their goals. More scholarly and sophisticated in their approach, *Nauka*

i religiia and *Chelovek i mir* reflect a change in the educational level of the audience which they address.[51]

Russian specialists in Islam emerged in the pages of anti-religious publications: M. Kobetskii, L. Klimovich, and A. Arsharuni, stressed the class character of Islam as the religion of commercial capital. Thoughtfully, they pointed out that anti-religious propaganda among Muslims would be successful only when conducted by persons with a thorough knowledge of the *Shari'at* laws and of the customs and traditions of the people.[52]

The same specialists played an active role in the direct offensive which the government launched against Islam after 1928, when the main target became the very foundations of the faith and its basic rituals. [53] L. Klimovich attacked Muslim observance of the Ramadhan fast and the "backward ritual" of Kurban Bayram in the pages of *Antireligioznik*, while challenging the divine nature of the Koran and discussing the place of religion in a socialist society in a series of essays published in pamphlet and book form.[54]

By 1932 the number of native-language publications devoted solely to anti-religious propaganda in the Tatar and Bashkir republics had increased considerably: 10 newspapers and 23 journals now printed material on atheism. Among them, the best known were the Tatar journals *Fen hem Din*, *Dinsyzlar*, *Sugyshchan Allasyz* (formerly *Fen hem Din*) and the Bashkir *Degri*. In addition, Russian-language journals such as *Nash Put'*, *Kommunisticheskii Put'*, *Prosveshehenie*, *Put' revoliutsii, and Nauka i religiia* occasionally published Tatar-language issues with contributions by V. Saifi, M. Khyziev, V. Ishmegulov and other scholars.[55]

The publication of the first issue of *Fen hem Din* in September 1925 meant the beginning of the organized anti-religious press campaign in Tatar. Its initial circulation of only 3000 could suggest that it may have been aimed at propagandists; its editorial policy, however, leaves no doubt that *Fen hem Din* aimed at reaching the public at large. Between 1925 and 1926, 20 per cent of the material which the journal published dealt with the relationship between religion and its socio-political milieu; 20 per cent had an openly propagandistic character; 10 per cent was concerned with news from the Muslim East; three per cent consisted of materials for propagandists; 11 per cent represented anti-religious fiction and eight per cent articles on the history of Islam.[56]

When the frontal attack on Islam began in 1928, the relatively even-handed *Fen hem Din* underwent a metamorphosis and re-emerged as the more militant *Sugyshchan Allasyz*. The metamorphosis, however, seems to have been far from auspicious: the often tactless anti-religious zeal of the editorial board of the journal probably

harmed rather than helped the atheistic cause. Guilty of a similar mistake was the chief editor of *Dinsyzlar*, Akberdin, who argued that one is "either with religion and on the side of capitalism or without religion and on the side of socialism" thus probably alienating a good number of prospective converts.[57]

Under the circumstances, it is no surprise that the record of *Sugyshchan Allasyz* and the overall poor anti-religious propaganda among the Volga-Ural Muslims, was criticized in the pages of *Anti-religioznik*. By 1937, *Sugyschan Allasyz* was plagued by a myriad of problems ranging from poor translation, which distorted the original message of a given work, to erroneous, even offensive interpretations of the Tatar literary heritage, to senseless attacks on classics of Tatar literature - but above all, on the national poet Tukai, who was accused of religiosity, nationalism, and labelled as a counterrevolutionary. These attacks antagonized the Muslims of the Volga-Ural area, enhancing their suspicions regarding the validity of anti-religious propaganda.

Sugyshchan Allasyz was no more successful when it chose to launch indirect attacks upon religion by enlisting the help of literary fiction. The Muslim ritual of circumcision was attacked in E. Burkhan's play *He is Coming*; its plot was so naive and the characters so schematic, however, that the play could be considered a parody of the anti-religious effort itself.[58]

In addition to lectures, journal articles and pamphlets, such as S. Yamaliev's *Religiia i bor'ba za molodoe pokolenie*, were widely used in the anti-religious propaganda among Volga-Ural Muslims. Some of these materials had a small circulation, others were printed in tens of thousands of copies.[59] As a more subtle weapon against Islam, party officials and the anti-religious press seized upon the opportunity to use the example of Republican Turkey, which in the 1920s was experiencing its own painful secularization process; the replacement of *Shari'at* by a civil code in October 1926 received due coverage in the anti-religious press.[60]

Despite occasional shifts to more subtle approaches, anti-religious propaganda continued to unfold along the same loudly propagandistic lines until Krushchev's fall in 1964, and with particular energy after the promulgation of the 8 April 1929 law "on religious associations" which eliminated the right to religious propaganda while confirming the right of Soviet citizens to anti-religious propaganda. The Constitution was modified accordingly a month later, and the right of "religious profession" replaced the earlier right to "religious propaganda". In the present Constitution, the right of "religious profession" was trimmed to become only the "freedom to hold religious services."[61]

AFTER KHRUSHCHEV

The counterproductiveness of anti-religious excesses, however, became a major concern for party officials after Khrushchev's demise. The party was still committed to "the task of fully and completely overcoming religious prejudices", as outlined in the party programme at the Twenty-second Congress in 1961. After Khrushchev, however, the party was willing to give its approval to new approaches to anti-religious propaganda, heeding the advice of many atheist lecturers that anti-religious excesses "not only fail to reduce the number of believers, but they actually tend to increase their number, to make clandestine religious groups more widespread and to antagonize believers against the state".[62]

Consequently, since the mid-1960s, it is the scholar, not the zealous propagandist, who sets the tone of the on-going anti-religious crusade. In June 1973, Cheboksary, the capital of the Chuvash ASSR, hosted a conference on "Problems of Religious Syncretism" attended by scholars of the Volga-Ural republics. The papers of the Tatar and Bashkir scholars, Z. A. Ishmuhammetova and D. J. Vallev, dealt with the relationship between Islamic ideology, ritual and the polytheistic beliefs of Arabs, and the relationship between the polytheistic beliefs of the Bashkirs and ancient Turks and Zoroastrianism. Ishmuhammetova developed the thesis of Allah as the metamorphosis of the Sun God of the early Arabs; in doing so, she in fact challenged indirectly a most crucial point of Islamic doctrine: Allah's unity of being. By doing so, she provided a conceptual framework for questioning the basic elements of the orthodox Muslim (Sunni) conception of God, according to which, "God is one; ancient, having no beginning; everlasting, having no end; God is not a formed body; nor a measurable substance; neither does He resemble bodies, either in their being measurable or divisible."[63] A sophisticated approach such as this has a better chance of spreading if not atheism, at least secularism.

OFFICIAL ISLAM

The Central Muslim body which has authority over Russian Islam as a whole is the Congress of Community Representatives which has met in 1962 and 1970, both times in Tashkent.[64] Beneath the central body there are four territorial administrative districts, each controlled by a Spiritual Directorate, presided over by a Mufti (Sunni) or a Sheikh al-Islam (Shi'a) at the head of an executive committee elected by a regional congress of clergy and laymen.[65]

The Muslims of the Volga-Ural region, Siberia, and other areas of RSFSR are under the authority of the Directorate for Sunni Muslims

of European Russian and Siberia, which has its headquarters in Ufa, the capital of Bashkiria, and employs Kazan Tatar as the official language of communication with the *umma*. It was organized in 1941 at the time when the Soviet state had temporarily halted its persecution of religion in an effort to enlist the support of all its citizens, believers and non-believers alike, for the defence of the motherland. The Soviet press at that time published exchanges of a friendly nature between Stalin and church leaders and reported on the awards and medals given to church dignitaries to honour their patriotism.[66]

The Spiritual Directorate of 1941 was the descendant of the "revolutionary Muftiat" that emerged out of the First All-Russian Muslim Congress which opened on 1 May 1917 in Moscow. On 6 May 1917, S. Alkin and K. Tarjemani presented to the Congress their reports on the religious organization and cultural autonomy of the Muslims. The Congress decided to abolish the Tsarist practice whereby the Mufti was appointed by the Russian government and proceeded to elect the Mufti and the Kazis (judges) who were to become members of the executive committee of the Directorate. On 11 May 1917, at the session presided over by I. Alkin, the Congress elected the Spiritual Directorate of the Muslims of Inner Russia, Siberia, and Kazakhstan. The new Mufti was Galimjan Barudi, elected by 292 votes against 257, from a list of five candidates which featured names of prominent Tatar reformers and Islamic scholars, M. J. Bigi, A. Bubi, S. Maksudi and Kh. Gabashi. The membership of the Executive Committee was equally distinguished: G. Karashi, elected unanimously; S. Urmanov, 489 votes against 90; A. Suleiman, 423 votes against 116; K. Tarjemani, 354 votes against 213; Kh. Makhmudov, 364 votes against 219; and Muhlise Bubi, 307 votes against 280.[67]

The first notable feature of the "revolutionary Muftiat" was the fact that it was staffed by *jadid* reformers who before 1917 had led the efforts of the Volga-Ural Muslims to pull Islam out of its economic backwardness and stagnation. At the heart of their search for the purity of Islam, tarnished, they believed, by centuries of damaging scholasticism, was an emerging nationalism born of four centuries of Russian rule. The old *jadids* of the new revolutionary Muftiat set forth with renewed hope to restore the national pride of the Muslims by trying to reaffirm their right to maintain and enhance their Islamic identity. In the revolutionary euphoria of the Spring of 1917, they genuinely believed that theirs was a realistic dream.

The second feature of the revolutionary Muftiat, and an extraordinary one at that, was the fact that for the first time in the thirteen-century-old history of Islam a woman, Muhlise Bubi, the *jadid* teacher of the first secular school for Tatar girls in Izh-Bobi, was elected a Kazi, a member of the Executive Committee. She served

Table 3. Chronology of Muftis of Orenburg/Ufa since 1788

Name	*Tenure of Office*
1. Muhamedjan Huseinoglu	1788-1824
2. Abdulselam bin Abdurrahim	1825-1839
3. Abdulvahid bin Suleiman	1840-1862
4. Selim Giray bin Suleiman Giray Tevkelef	1863-1880
5. Muhammediar bin Muhammed Sherief Sultanof	1882-1914
6. Safa Bayazitov	1915-1917
7. Galimjan Barudi	1917-1921
8. Rizaeddin Fahreddin	1921-1936
9. Kashshaf Tarjemani	1936-1937
1937 - Purges, Muftiat Abolished	
10. Abdurahman Rasuli	1941-1952
11. Shakir Khayaliddinov	1953-1974
12. Akhmedzyan Mustafin (acting Mufti)	1974
13. Abdulbari Isaev	1974-1980
14. Talgat Taziev	1980-present

Sources: N. Ashirov, *Evoliutssia Islama v SSSR* (Moscow, 1972, p. 64; A. Ibrahimof, *Chulpan Yuldizi* (St. Petersburg, 1907) (Tatar, Arabic script), pp. 30-31. P. Babamuhamedov, "Muslims of Bashkiria", *Muslims of the Soviet East* No. 3 (1978), p. 12; T. Davletshin, *Sovetskii Tatarstan. Teoriia i praktika Leninskoi natsional'noi politiki* (London, 1974), p. 81; G. Kasymov, *Ocherki po religioznomu i antireligioznomu dvizheniiu sredi Tatar do i posle revoliutsii* (Moscow, 1931), pp. 11, 24-25; A. Sheehy, "Youthful New Mufti for Muslims of the European USSR and Siberia," *Radio Liberty Research* (26 September, 1980), RL 348/80, pp. 1-4.

in this capacity for two decades and was actively involved in the deliberations of the committee.[68]

The Civil War brought to an end the fragile *modus vivendi* between Russian Islam and the Soviet State. Muftis and Kazis of the Spiritual Directorate learned most painfully how wide the gap had become between their hopes and the realities of Soviet power. They had the power neither to propagate religion nor to offer religious education, for they were, in fact, only employees of the Soviet state whose services were enlisted whenever state interest required it.

The famine of 1920-1921 was just one of those occasions; it was particularly devastating in the Volga-Ural region. With the blessing of the government, the Muftiat of Ufa launched a fund-raising campaign to benefit the victims of the famine. Some of its members travelled to Central Asia, others to Poland, Latvia, Lithuania, and Turkey. The Mufti himself, G. Barudi, died in Moscow during one of his fund-raising trips.[69]

Barudi's successors, R. Fahreddin (1921-1936) and K. Tarjemani (1936-1937) headed the Muftiat during a period which was exception-

ally trying for Soviet Islam. It culminated with the arrest in 1937 of Tarjemani and 42 other prominent Muslim clergy, who were all accused of espionage for Japan - not an original accusation at all, at the height of the purges.[70] The arrest meant the *de facto* dissolution of the Muftiat. Throughout its existence, it had performed one main function: reiterating the loyalty of the Muslims to the Soviet State and hailing the religious liberties given to them, while growing increasingly helpless in the face of mounting attacks on Islam.

CO-EXISTENCE WITH THE SOVIET STATE

The members of the Spiritual Directorate which was organized in 1941 seemed to have learned from their predecessors. To be sure, this new Muftiat performs the same functions as its predecessor. Now, however, it responds to the on-going atheistic propaganda and to the more subtle attacks on Islam. The response is not in the form of a declaration of war - a *jihad* against the Soviet State - but it takes the shape of an equally subtle campaign aimed at demonstrating the compatibility of Islam with Communism and science, and thus implicitly, the futility of the anti-Islamic campaign.

In this respect, it is not the official declarations of the Ufa Mufti or the Kazis which are of particular significance but rather their *fatwas*, answers to the questions submitted to them by the believers during the Friday prayer, and their tacit encouragement of the *mullahs*, who, in the best *jadid* tradition, are trying to adapt Islam to the conditions of a modern communist society without harming its fundamental beliefs.

A collective leadership of five *mullahs* guides every Muslim parish. Among them, there is a senior *mullah*, who "holds the cane"; as a symbol of authority, the cane is passed on to another member of the collective leadership upon the death of the senior *mullah*, thus ensuring the continuity which is so important to all Islamic communities.[71] In addition, each parish elects an executive committee of laymen, *muta-valliat*, which does not confine itself to the administrative and financial affairs of the parish but inquires into the form and substance of religious practice as a whole. The parishioners of the main Leningrad mosque, for instance, asked that their new *imam*, a graduate of the Mir-i-Arab *medrese* of Bukhara, be replaced when they were confronted with his conservative ideas. The Muslims of Leningrad could not tolerate an *imam* who inaugurated his tenure by barring women from participation in funerals and by forbidding all believers to go to the theatre and cinema and to view television.[72]

The *imam* of the Leningrad mosque was an exception. The Kazis and the majority of *mullahs* under the jurisdiction of the Muftiat of

Ufa take great care in combating scholasticism and often address themselves to the issue of the relationship between Islam and science and Islam and Communism. When asked whether he could see a conflict between the belief in the existence of God and an acceptance of the discoveries of science, N. Mofluikhanov, the *mullah* of the Chistopol mosque answered in 1968: "As one cannot see Reason, one cannot hold it, or prove that it exists, one cannot see the Allmighty Allah; and the proof of the fact that he exists shall never be found."[73] The *mullah* of Osh was even bolder, addressing himself to the issue of compatibility of Islam and Communism:

> You, Marxists, simply do not understand the profoundly communist essence of Islam. If one reflects upon the teachings of Muhammad, then it becomes clear that we, the Muslims, and Communism are marching elbow to elbow toward the fulfillment of the ideals of Muhammad.[74]

His boldness was matched by A. Mustafin, the *imam* of the Moscow mosque who, arguing that "Islam gives the people the right to revolution", was in fact trying to provide an "Islamic justification" for the 1917 revolution.[75]

No statements, however, regardless how bold, can match the declarations of the *mullahs* regarding the role of women in an Islamic society as one of the most solid proofs that Soviet Islam is "modernizing", that it is using creatively the forces of revival unchained by *jadidism* and is adapting to the conditions of a rapidly changing world.

Tatar *jadids* defended the rights of women before 1917; they were pioneers in the campaign against the veil and seclusion of women. Today, the *mullahs* who argue that "to deny the rights of women in the conditions of contemporary reality ... would mean solidarity with reactionary and anti-popular forces", continue the *jadid* commitment to the emancipation of women. In doing so, they also reply indirectly to their atheistic critics who point out that the very nature of Islam makes it impossible for Muslim women to achieve liberation without detaching themselves from what Soviet Islamic scholars call a "medieval religion".

Soviet literature on Islam often presents a distorted picture of the status of Muslim women by portraying as uniquely Islamic features which are characteristic to all pre-industrial societies. M.V. Vagabov argues that the essence of the Islamic attitude toward women is revealed by the attitude toward the birth of a daughter, and in support of his statement, quotes a proverb: "A son is wealth; a daughter, a burden." Moreover, he points out that Muslim families consider the death of a daughter a "desirable misfortune". What Vagabov fails to mention is that attitudes such as these are hardly unique to the

Muslims. Russian folklore contains a wealth of material revealing similar attitudes among Russian peasants:

> "Feed a son - he will be of help to you; feed a daughter - she will benefit strangers;" "One son - is not a son; two sons - are a half son; three sons - are a son."[76]

Today, most *mullahs* do not concentrate their efforts on promoting the education or political socialization of women. Success in this area has been achieved and credit for it belongs to the Soviet government.[77] They are mainly concerned with "religious socialization," which would enable women to participate and share in all areas of the religious life of the community. *Mullahs* have opened the doors of mosques to women and encourage them to break with the old tradition of praying at home.

Praying together, as a congregation, Muslim men and women could add new meaning to the concept of *umma*, the community of believers, for manifest acts of common worship cement communal bonds and stimulate the individual's sense of belonging. *Mullahs* are also instrumental in moulding new attitudes toward women, the family and the traditional division of labour within the family. On 21 December 1968, on the day of the feast which ended the month of Ramadhan, one of the *imams* of Bashkiria ended his sermon by advising men to help their wives with household chores, arguing that not only would their deeds be pleasing to God, but that such deeds would be even worthier than prayers.[78] In order to make their point even stronger, mullahs often point to the example of the prophet who mended his own clothes and frequently helped his wives with their housework.[79]

In the secular Soviet state where religious education in schools is forbidden, religious literature is prohibited, and legislation renders it difficult (if not impossible) to fulfill the basic obligations of the faith, the *mullah* assists his fellow Muslims in reinterpreting the meaning of the concept "believer", "Good Muslim".

ISLAMIC DOCTRINE AND SOVIET LIFE

Theoretically, to be a practising Muslim a person must acknowledge and apply the two fundamental concepts in which Islam is anchored: *imam* (expression of faith) and *ihsan* (right doing). The most important of the five ceremonial duties of a Muslim is testimony to the unity of God: *Shahadah*. "There is no god but God and Muhammad is his prophet", are the first words that welcome a newborn child into this world, and the last ones on the lips of the dying. They are the words most often uttered by a believer, while also being the most private act of faith; as such *Shahadah* is immune to government controls and restrictions.

Salah, the ritual prayer, is not only an essential obligation but a supreme act of righteousness that should be performed five times a day. The nature of life in an industrialized and regimented society such as the USSR makes it difficult for Muslims to fulfill this obligation, except for the very old. There are signs, however, suggesting that *mullahs* are approaching the rules regarding *salah* with considerable imagination in an effort to make it possible for younger Muslims to fulfill this obligation. In many mosques prayers are scheduled in such a way as to avoid conflict with the working programme: before the beginning of the working day and during the lunch break.[80] Many of those who fail to observe *salah* make up for it by attending Friday congregational prayers, and even more Muslims attend prayers at holiday time. On such occasions, *mullahs* emphasize the role of the mosque not only as a place for prayer, for worshipping God, but as a place where people meet in friendship, equality, and happiness to further their moral improvement.[81]

The communal bonds, the feelings of belonging which are reinforced through the mosque are in danger of diminishing if the government continues to reduce the already shrinking number of mosques. In 1889, there were 4,645 parishes (*mahalle*) and probably at least as many mosques under the jurisdiction of the Muftiat of Orenburg/Ufa; some 7,497 clergy served these parishes.[82] In Tatarstan alone, there were 2,223 mosques and 3,683 *mullahs* before 1917; by 1931 their number had dropped to 980 and 625 respectively.[83] The number of *mullahs* or mosques which are open to worship today in the Volga-Ural area is not known. In 1966, in the entire USSR there were only 400 mosques and some 1,000 additional "unregistered congregations" that observed religious practices in their homes.[84]

Zakah, referred to as the "poor-due" and "almsgiving", literally means returning to God a portion of His bounty as an expiation for the worldly possessions a believer retains for himself. Legal observance of *zakah* is no longer possible for Soviet Muslims; the government prohibited it in the 1920s, at the same time that custom law (*adat*) and Koranic law (*Shariat*) were replaced by the civil code of the state. It is difficult to assess how many Muslims fulfill the obligation of *zakah*, although many believers may still observe it by making contributions to the mosque. Often *mullahs*, and even the Mufti sanction such reinterpretation of *zakah*. In the *fatwa* which he delivered on 18 June 1961, the Mufti for European SSSR, Khiyaletdinov, discusses the categories of believers who are exempted from the ritual of fasting, pointing out that prayer, good deeds, and charity to the poor may replace fasting. He also added that "since such (poor) people do not exist in our state, our *Shariat* prohibits making offerings to parasites and make-believers". The implied meaning of this statement

is that money contributions to the mosques are the equivalent of *zakah*.[85]

Sawm, or fasting, is another prerequisite of faith for every believer. The fast consists of abstention from food, drink, and sexual intercourse, from the time when a white thread may be distinguished from a black one before sunrise until sunset, for the duration of the month of Ramadhan in which the Koran was revealed. Kazi K. Bashirov of the Ufa Muftiat commented on the meaning of fasting for the benefit of the congregation assembled in prayer:

> During the month of fasting Muslims cease to submit to their own passions; they submit only to the will of God; during this month people are ruled not by passion but by reason.

The *mullah* of the Leningrad mosque addressed the same issue during one of his sermons in the winter of 1969 but added a political dimension to the meaning of fasting, in the hope perhaps of making this ritual obligation less vulnerable to the attacks of atheistic propaganda:

> The Prophet wanted the rich people to experience through fasting the hunger and cold of the poor ... but in our country there are no poor. Those who fast will understand the urgency of assistance to the working people of the capitalist and developing countries.[86]

Iftar, the festive dinner which begins at sunset, ends the day of fasting. Muslim clergy have a rather flexible attitude toward this aspect of ceremonial duties. When K. Iarullin, the *imam* of the Kazan mosque was asked by his parishioners whether it would be proper to invite to *iftar* atheists as well as people of other religious persuasions his answer was positive, provided "they do not hinder Muslims in their observance of *iftar* and prayer".[87] This ecumenical approach could be indicative of the efforts to "modernize" Islam as much as it could indicate a desire on the part of the clergy to allow even acknowledged atheists from among the Tatars and Bashkirs to share in some of the traditional rituals of their families. Criticisms of party organizations that "even tolerate the observance of religious practices by communists" suggest that such an assumption may be valid.[88]

Fasting has never been prohibited by law; despite this, it is difficult to assess with accuracy how many Muslims in the European SSSR observe it. Political pressures and economic conditions make it impossible, at least for urban dwellers, to fulfill religiously the obligation of fasting. In 1936 and 1937, newspapers published in the Volga-Ural area reported cases of parents who failed to send their children to school in order to allow them to observe Ramadhan, or *mullahs* who visited construction sites and urged Muslims to stop working and

fast.[89] Of the 396 Tatars who were interviewed in Kazan in 1969 and who declared themselves believers, 60 per cent of the men and 40 per cent of the women admitted a failure to observe the ritual obligation of fasting.[90] On the other hand, when a foreign visitor asked the *imam* of the Leningrad mosque whether atheistic propaganda hindered the practice of his faith, he reflected: "Things change, things change all over the world". When asked specifically if Muslims were forbidden to fast during the month of Ramadhan because fasting weakened the workers and consequently interferred with their productivity, the *imam* replied elusively: "We observe our Holy Ramadhan, of course we do".[91]

Hajj, or the pilgrimage to the sacred monuments of Mecca, is a religious duty which should be performed by a Muslim at least once in a lifetime. Performance of *hajj* by Soviet Muslims was impossible until 1945, when it was authorized again by the government but only for select groups of believers hand-picked by the authorities. Most of them are members of the Spiritual Directorates of the Muslims, and occasionally average Muslims of respectable old age are also included in the plane-load of Soviet Muslims headed for Mecca.[92]

The practice of Islam does not consist of the fulfillment of the five "pillars of the faith" alone; it blends a mosaic of rituals and social institutional observances which throughout centuries have played a major role in strengthening the feeling of belonging and common identity in Islam.

The feasts of Kurban Bayram (*'Id al-Adha*), which marks the end of the pilgrimage; Uraza Bayram (*'Id al-Fitr*), which marks the end of fasting; and Mavlud (*Mawlid*) which celebrates the birthday of the prophet are observed universally by all Muslims. Both Kurban Bayram and Uraza Bayram have been main targets of official anti-religious propaganda. They have been attacked as backward customs of an extremely reactionary nature. Judging from the persistence and virulence of the criticism of Islamic feasts it is reasonable to conclude that these feasts have not yet been eradicated and that the Soviet government is still compelled to combat them. Mosques attract the biggest crowds at feast celebrations. It is not uncommon for believers to assemble and pray in the courtyards of the mosques when mosques themselves become too small to accommodate everybody.[93]

Tradition requires that Mavlud be celebrated on the day of the Prophet's birthday (on the 10th of Rabi I) in prayer held at the mosque. Muslims under the jurisdiction of the Muftiat of Ufa have been allowed to celebrate Mavlud at home throughout that month to enable a greater number of Muslims to observe the feast. In 1968, during the month of Mavlud the imams of the Marjani mosque of Kazan were invited to 80 homes to lead the prayers of celebration. In

each home, they had a large audience which prompted some Soviet Islamic "observers" to conclude worriedly that *imams* had an opportunity to deliver in that month more sermons than throughout a whole year, reaching a similarly large audience.[94]

Circumcision, observance of religious rituals connected with the life cycle (birth, marriage, burial), as well as dietary restrictions, are other expressions of faith which still apply to a considerable number of Muslims in the Soviet Union. Failure to observe any of these rites, however, does not necessarily exclude a person from the community of believers. When asked about the obligatory nature of the rite of circumcision, the Mufti of Ufa replied in one of his *fatwas* in 1963 that it was not compulsory; in doing so, he probably had in mind those Muslims who lived mainly in non-Muslim areas where not even "sanitary mullahs" (laymen who specialized in performing the ceremony) were available to perform the rite. Moreover, when questioned whether it would be acceptable to marry men who have not undergone circumcision but who claim to be Muslim, the same Mufti replied that "since lack of circumcision does not indicate that a man is not a believer," such a marriage would be allowed. Yet a recent ethno-sociological study of the rural population of Tatarstan revealed that 50.9 per cent of the Tatars had undergone circumcision as compared to only 35.8 per cent of the Russian population which had received Christian baptism.[95]

Of the life cycle rituals, the burial ritual is the one most universally and persistently observed, and compared to the birth and marriage rituals, its structure is free of any "innovations".[96] Even in the Baltic region, where Muslim communities are smaller and live isolated in a non-Muslim area, burial rituals and memorial services for the dead are observed by the majority of Muslims.[97] If data collected for Siberian Tatars has any relevance at all in determining the religious attitudes of other Muslims in the European regions of the USSR, it can be argued that only a small number of Muslims still observe the religious wedding ritual, while the majority still comply with the prohibition against eating pork. Only 11 per cent of the Tatars interviewed in the city of Tomsk in 1959 admitted that they celebrated a religious wedding, while 72.8 per cent of the same group expressed their compliance with dietary prohibitions. In the rural areas of Siberia, the percentages for the same categories were 25.8 and 75.5. There is evidence indicating that Tatars who live outside their own republic tend to observe traditional holidays and rituals more closely because in an ethnically heterogenous environment those traditions represent an important ingredient of their ethnic identity.[98]

In response to the persistence of religious rituals and celebrations among Muslims, as well as other peoples of the USSR, the government

has stepped up its efforts to create a core of Soviet secular rituals, which in time would replace the old rituals altogether. There is an effort to give more meaning and solemnity to "Red weddings", while 1 May, 7 November and New Year's celebrations take on an increasingly festive character. In addition, new rituals are emerging to celebrate the "coming of age" of a Soviet youth receiving his first internal passport, entrance to the university, the first job appointment, retirement, and other major events in one's life.[99]

Among Tatars, the folk festival of Sabantui (the plough feast) which celebrates the arrival of spring and the beginning of a new agricultural cycle has always been popular. The party leadership of Tatarstan has capitalized upon Sabantui's popularity and moved on to use it as the foundation of an edifice of Soviet Tatar traditions. The celebration of Sabantui takes place now on 25 June, to coincide with the proclamation of the Tatar Republic. Government and party organs take an active part in the organization of the holiday, which becomes a celebration of the achievements of Tatarstan and its labour heroes.[100]

The endurance of the Islamic rituals and celebrations among the Muslims of the European USSR testifies to the resilience of Islam as a religion. Deprived of schools, formal religious education and religious books, subject to political pressure and coercion, the Muslims of the European USSR have survived as such because the social bonds of Islam, tested by centuries of russification policies, have grown strong enough to withstand the pressures of an atheistic government.[101]

Islam has played a crucial role in shaping the national-cultural identity of the Tatars and Bashkirs. Today, their ethno-social and cultural behaviour bears to a great extent the imprint of the Islamic heritage. Soviet sociologists have pointed out that the outstanding feature of the consciousness of Soviet Muslims is the juxtaposition of their national and Islamic identities. Hence, they perceive religious rituals and holidays as elements of their national culture, and certain socio-cultural attitudes initially motivated by Islam have become components of the secular ethnic profile of these Muslims. The attitude of the Tatar population toward mixed marriages documents this point. Since endogamy among Muslims is mainly a result of religious restrictions, it would follow that the attitude of "secular Muslims" or atheists toward mixed marriages would be overwhelmingly positive. A survey conducted among the Tatar population of the village of Gorky revealed that of the 243 Tatars who declared that they were atheists, 17 per cent considered mixed marriages undesirable while among the 267 believers, 48 per cent were of the same opinion.[102]

Interestingly enough, in urban areas, among the Tatars of Kazan and Almet'evsk, the percentage of those who looked favourably upon mixed marriages was not much higher; 52 to 68 per cent. It seems

that in urban areas, the stronger negative attitude toward mixed marriages is triggered by a fear on the part of the Muslims that, in an environment which by its very nature has a levelling effect upon national cultures, marriage within one's own ethnic group enhances the chances of preserving intact national identity and hinders assimilation.

Social segregation along ethnic lines still characterizes the Muslim attitude toward non-Muslims in the USSR, despite the Soviet government's efforts to promote integration, "drawing together", and, eventually, assimilation. At the root of this attitude lies a set of socio-cultural values and traditions, many derived in whole or in part from extended contact and adherence to Islamic culture, which have guided the behaviour of the Muslim and Russian communities toward one another for centuries. These attitudes are unlikely to change quickly under any circumstances; they will change much more slowly if the Islam of the Volga Tatars and Bashkirs remains under attack by the Soviet State, for it is precisely Islam, giving over as it does at often indistinct junctures to a strong national identity, which has proved to be such an obstinate bulwark against Soviet social engineering to date.

NOTES

1. Census data for 1979 remain incomplete.
2. R.G. Kuzeev, *Proiskhozhdenie Bashkirshogo naroda. Etnicheskii sostav, istoriia rasseleniia* (Moscow, 1974); A. Kh. Khalikov, "Rannie etapy etnokul'turnogo razvitiia Tatarskogo naroda" in V. N. Basilov, T. I. Sultanov, "Vsesoiuznaia Tiurkologicheskaia Konferentisiia" (Alma-Ata, 27-29 Sept., 1976), *Sovetskaia Etnografiia* No. 3 (1977), pp. 142-144.
3. A. Battal, "Kazan Turkleri", *Turk ili* (Istanbul, 1928), (Turkish, Arabic script), p. 616; N. N. Firsov, *Proshloe Tatarii* (Kazan, 1926), pp. 7-11; R. Grousset, *L'empire des steppes* (Paris, 1952), p. 232.
4. N. N. Firsov, "Nekotorye cherty iz istorii torgovo-promyshlennoi zhizhi Povolzh'ia (s drevneishikh vremen do osmotra etogo kraia imperatritsei Ekaterinoi II-oi) in *Izvestiia Obshchevstva Arkheologii, Istorii, i Etnografii pri Imperatorskom Kazanskom Universitete* (Kazan, 1897), vol. 14 part I, p. 481.
5. Iu. Got'e, *Zheleznyi vek v Vostochnoi Evrope* (Moscow-Leningrad, 1930), pp. 179-80.
6. A. P. Kovalevskii, *Kniga Ahmeda ibn-Fadlana o ego puteshestvii na Volgu V 921-922 g. Stat'i, perevody i komentarii* (Khar'kov, 1956), pp. 130-140.
7. *Istoriia Tatarskoi ASSR* (Kazan, 1955), vol. I., p. 73, hereafter cited as *I.T.A.S.S.R.*
8. S.M. Soloviev, *Istoriia Rossii s drevneishikh vremen* (Moscow, 1960), vol. 5-6, p. 476.

9. I.T.A.S.S.R., pp. 80-81, p. 88; A. Battal, *Kazan Turkleri* (Istanbul, 1925), pp. 20-27; V. F. Genning and A. Kh. Khalikov, *Rannie Bolgary na Volge; Bol-she Tarkhanskii mogil'nik* (Moscow, 1964).
10. For various theories regarding the origin of the name "Tatar" see: R. H. Mathews, *A Chinese-English Dictionary, Compiled For the China Inland Mission* (Shanghai, Cambridge, 1969), p. 853; A. Vambery, "The Awakening of the Tatars", *The Nineteenth Century* Vol. 54, (Feb. 1965), p. 217; A. Temir, "Turk-Mogol imparatorlugu devrinde askeri teskilat", *Kazan*, Nos. 7-8, 1972, pp. 7-24; V. Dingelstadt, "The Musulman Subjects of Russia", *Scottish Geographical Magazine*, Vol. 19, No. 1 (1903), pp. 7-8; A. N. Kurat, "Malazgirt zaferi siralarinda Idil boyu ve Karadeniz'in kuzeyindeki Turk kavimleri", *Kazan*, Nos. 7-8 (1972), p. 2; Ebulgazi Bahadir Han, *Histoire des Mongoles et des Tatares* (St. Leonards, 1970, a reprint of the St. Petersburg edition of 1871-74); T. A. Trofimova, *Etnogenez Tatar Povolzh'ia v svete dannykh antropologii* (Moscow, 1949).
11. Firsov, *op. cit.*, pp. 12-24.
12. Battal, *op. cit.*, p. 618.
13. N. Ostroumov, "Musul'manskaia vysshaia shkola (madrasa)", *Zhurnal Ministerstva Narodnogo Prosveshcheniia*, St. Petersburg, part 5 (1906), pp. 113-163; Inorodetz (pseud. of Juozas Gabrys), *La Russie et les peuples allogènes* (Berne, 1918), pp. 204-205.
14. A. Mozharovskii, "Izlozhenie khoda missionerskogo dela po prosveshcheniiu inorodtsev s 1552 po 1867", *Chteniia v Imperatorskom Obshchestve Istorii i Drevnostei Rossiiskikh pri Moskovskom Universitete* (Moscow, 1880), book I, p. 2, as quoted from *Istoriia Gosudarstva Rossiiskogo*, Vol. 8, p. 133.
15. The term *inorodets* has no equivalent in English; it literally means "person of other ethnic origin"; until 1917 it designated the Eastern peoples of the Russian empire who lived beyond the Volga river and the Ural mountains.
16. Mozharovskii, *op. cit.*, pp. 13, 17.
17. A. Bennigsen and Ch. Quelquejay, *Islam in the Soviet Union* (New York, 1968), pp. 6-12; I. Katetov, "Obzor pravitel'stvennykh i tserkovnykh rasporiazhenii kasaiushchikhsia obrashcheniia v Khristianstvo Tatar-Mukhammedan", *Strannik*, No. 8 (1996), pp. 565-591.
18. Mozharovskii, *op. cit.*, pp. 78, 89-90, 94-95.
19. A. Efirov, "Russifikatorskie novokreshchenskie shkoly", *Prosveshchenie natsional'nostei*, No. 4 (1934), pp. 51-58.
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22. Frank McCarthy, "The Kazan Missionary Congress", *Cahiers du Monde Russe et Soviétique* Vol. 14, No. 3, (1973), p. 310.
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25. "Dukoborlar", *Ulfet*, 26 May 1907, p. 5.
26. S. Zhanaev, "Staraia Bukhara", *Musul'manin*, No. 2 (1910), pp. 48-49, No. 1 (1910), p. 23.

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28. Kh. Kh. Khasanov, *Revoliutsiia 1905-1907 v Tatarii* (Moscow, 1965), pp. 313-319.
29. *Idem*, p. 315. A. Bennigsen indicates the spring of 1906 as the date when Brek was organized. A. Bennigsen and Ch. Qulquejay, *Les mouvements nationaux chez les Musulmans de Russie: Sultangalievisme au Tatarstan* (Paris, 1960), p. 53.
30. A. Bennigsen and Ch. Lemercier-Quelquejay, *La presse et le mouvement national chez les Musulmans de Russie* (Paris, 1964), pp. 84-85.
31. *Idem*, p. 56. For Yamashev's biography see Kh. Kh. Khasanov's work in Tatar: *Husain Yamashev* (Kazan, 1954).
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34. Davletshin, *op. cit.*, p. 129-165; I.G. Gizatullin, *Zashchishchaia Zavoevaniia Oktiabria. Tsentral'maia Musul'manskaia Voennia Kollegiia, 1918-1920.* (Moscow, 1979)
35. Richard Pipes, *The Formation of the Soviet Union: Communism and Nationalism* (Cambridge, 1964, 2nd ed.).
36. Speech published first in *Znamia Revoliutsii*, No. 44 (8 March 1918), as quoted in A. Arsharuni and Kh. Gabidullin, *Ocherki Panislamizma i Pantiurkizma v Rossii* (Moscow, 1934), p. 78. Sultangaliev seems to have been an extremely perceptive analyst; his ideas were echoed years later by other Muslim Socialists, among them the Pakistani A. M. Malik who wrote: "Muslim Socialists represent a third road to human progress, which is neither the dictatorship of the proletariat nor capitalist exploitation. It is a harmonious combination of the contradictory interests of the society. A. M. Malik, *Labor Problems and Policy of Pakistan* (Karachi, 1954), pp. 32-33.
37. M. Kobetskii, "Sultan Galievshchina kak apologiia Islama", *Antireligioznik*, No. 1 (1930), p. 14. K. Tobolev, "Sotsializm ecyme hem burzua ilimintlarinin aktiflasulari", in G. Qusay, ed., *Kontr-rivolytsion soltangaliefcelkke qarsi* (Kazan, 1929), pp. 12-17.
38. A. Arsharuni, "Ideologiia Sultangalievshchiny", *Antireligioznik*, No. 5 (1930), p. 23.
39. M. Sultangaliev, *Metody antireligioznoi propagandy sredi musul'man* (Moscow, 1922), p. 2-6.
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41. M. Kobetskii, "Sultangalievshchina kak apologiia Islama", *Antireligioznik*, No. 1, 1930, pp. 12-14; A. Arsharuni, "Ideologiia Sultangalievshchiny," *Antireligioznik*, No. 5, 1930, pp. 22-25.
42. B. R. Bociurkiw, "Church-State Relations in USSR", in M. Hayward and W. Fletcher, eds., *Religion and the Soviet State: A Dilemma of Power* (New York, 1969), p. 73.

43. B. Szczesniak, ed., *The Russian Revolution and Religion. A Collection of Documents Concerning the Suppression of Religion by the Communists, 1917-1925* (Notre Dame, Indiana, 1959), pp. 34-35; M. I. Shakhnovich, *Lenin i problemy ateizma* (Moscow-Leningrad, 1961), p. 604.
44. Bociurkiw, *op. cit.*, pp. 76-77.
45. Nugman Ashirov, *Evoliutsiia Islama v SSSR* (Ufa, 1972), p. 15.
46. M. M. Persits, "Velikaia Oktiabr'skaia Sotsialisticheskaia Revoliutsiia i sozdanie uslovii dlia rasprostraneniia ateizma v massakh", *Voprosy Nauchnogo Ateizma*, No. 4 (1967), pp. 25-27 (hereafter VNA).
47. *Idem*, p. 31.
48. The Union of Militant Godless emerged as early as 1922 as the society for the friends of the journal *Bezbozhnik* (Godless); it was formally organized in 1925 and continued its activity until 1947, when it was replaced by the less militant but more effective society *Znanie* and by societies for the dissemination of political and scientific knowledge (obshchestva po rasprostraneniiu politicheskikh i nauchnykh znanii) and their scientific-atheistic sections (soiuz voinstvuiushchikh bezbozhnikov). *Bol'shaia Sovetskaia Entsiklopediia* (Moscow, 1957), 2nd ed., Vol. 40, p. 214 (hereafter BSE).
49. G. Kasymov, *Ocherki po religioznomu i antireligioznomu dvizheniia sredi Tatar do i posle revoliutsii* (Moscow, 1931), p. 35.
50. This is a statement made by E. Yaroslavsky, the president of the Union of Militant Atheists to a foreign visitor. Marcus Bach, *God and the Soviets* (New York, 1958), p. 2.
51. "Ateizm v SSSR", *B.S.E.* (Moscow, 1970), 3rd ed., Vol. 2, pp. 109f.; B. N. Konovalov, "Soiuz voinstvuiushchikh bezbozhnikow", *VNA*, No. 4 (1967), pp. 63-94. The publication of *Bezbozhnik* was interrupted between 1935-1938 and discontinued after 1941; although paper shortage was given as the cause, it is reasonable to assume that in a war-torn country the party wanted to avoid antagonizing the believers. "News from our countries", *Problems of the Peoples of USSR*, No. 5 (1960), p. 54; *B.S.E.* (Moscow, 1950), 2nd ed., Vol. 2., p. 512.
52. M. Kobetskii, "K voprosu o propagande sredi natsional'nykh menshinstv", *Antireligioznik*, No. 1 (1926), pp. 21-26, L. Klimovich, "Klassovaia sushchnost' Islama", *Antireligioznik*, No. 9 (1927), pp. 16-25.
53. L. Klimovich, "Proiskhozhdenie Musul'manskogo posta ramazana", *Antireligioznik*, Nos. 23-24 (1932), pp. 15-22, and "Kurban Bairam", *Antireligioznik*, No. 1 (1938), pp. 53-56.
54. Some of L. Klimovich's works: *Soderzhanie Korana* (Moscow, 1928), *Sotsialisticheskoe stroitel'stvo na vostoke i religiia* (Moscow, 1929), *Islam v Tsarskoi Rossii* (Moscow, 1936); other works on Islam by Soviet officials and scholars: E. Yaroslavskii, *Kak rodiatsia bogi* (Moscow, 1923); V. V. Bartol'd, *Islam Obshchii ocherk* (Petrograd, 1918); *Kul'tura Musul'manstva* (Petrograd, 1918); *Musul'manskii mir* (Petrograd, 1922).
55. K. P. Andrianov and V. V. Pavliuk, "Kul'turnaia revoliutsiia v natsional'nykh respublikakh i razvitie ateizma mass", *V.N.A.*, No. 4 (1967), pp. 159, 172.
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57. L. Klimovich's review of Dinsyzlar in *Antireligioznik*, No. 14 (1932), p. 62.
58. I. Agishev, "Zhurnal *Sugyshchan Allasyz* (obzor nomerov shurnala za 1936 i pervoe polugodie 1937", *Antireligioznik*, No. 8 (1937), pp. 61-64.

59. Among them materials such as *Antikurban-antireligioznaia listovka*; A. Davletshin, *Khimiia na antireligioznom fronte*; *Novinki Tsentrizdata Biulleten* (Moscow, 1930), Nos. 3-4, p. 5.
60. M. Krymogly, "Shariat i novye zakony Turtsii o brake," *Antireligioznik*, No. 2 (1928), pp. 27-32.
61. *Religious Minorities in the Soviet Union* (London, Minority Rights Group, 1977), pp. 5-6.
62. *Idem*, pp. 3-4.
63. G. E. Kudriashov, I. A. Kremleva, "Konferentsiia po problemam religioznogo sinkretizma", *Sovetskaia Etnografiia*, No. 6 (1973), pp. 153-55; C. E. Farah, *Islam, Beliefs and Observances* (New York, 1970), pp. 103-08.
64. M. Ashirov, *Evoliutsiia Islama v S.S.S.R.* (Moscow, 1972), p. 49; K. Matchett, "Moslems", *Religious Minorities in the Soviet Union* (London, 1977), p. 21.
65. Soviet publications on Islam point to the democratization process which has affected Islam in the years of Soviet rule and emphasize the fact that until 1917, the *Mufti* was appointed personally by the Tsar without considering the opinions of the community. See *Kratkii nauchnyi statisticheskii slovar'* (Moscow, 1964), p. 385.
66. A. Inkeles, *Social Change in Soviet Russia* (Cambridge, Mass., 1968), p. 223.
67. Davletshin, *op. cit.*, pp. 81-85.
68. Ashirov, *op. cit.*, p. 105. On Muhlise Bubi's school: Letter from Osman Ali, President of the Helsinki Tatar community, dated July 14, 1974; interview (14 Jan. 1975, Helsinki) with Reyhane Apa, a former graduate from M. Bubi's school. Reyhane Apa spoke with pride about the multilateral education which she received at M. Bubi's school and which also included the French language; for a survey of the religious organizations of Russian Muslims see A.S. Karliuk, *Ocherki po nauchnomy ateizmu* (Minsk, 1961), pp. 357-78, 406-09, 561-75.
69. G. Kasymov, *Ocherki po religioznomu i antireligioznomu dvizheniiu sredi Tatar do i posle revoliutsii* (Moscow, 1931), pp. 24-25.
70. Davletshin, *op. cit.*, p. 81.
71. Kasymov, *op. cit.*, pp. 48-49.
72. Ashirov, *op. cit.*, p. 11.
73. *Idem*, p. 123.
74. Iu G. Petrash and R. M. Khamitova, "K Kharakteristike protsessa modernizatsii sovremennogo Islama v SSSR", *V.N.A.*, No. 2 (1966), p. 324.
75. Ashirov, *op. cit.*, p. 38.
76. For Russian folk songs and proverbs on attitude toward children: V. Dal', ed., *Poslovitsy Russkogo naroda. Sbornik* (Moscow: 1957), pp. 382, 384; M. Azadovskii, ed., *Ruskii fol'klor, Kresti'ianskaia lirika* (Leningrad, 1935), p. 125.
77. In Tatarstan alone, aside from the thousands of women who were taking an active part in the economic and cultural life of the republic, women were actively involved in the political life of the republic. In 1970, of the 207 deputies to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, 110 were Tatar. Of these, 73 were women. I. Bobchenko, *Kazan-Putevoditel'* (Kazan: 1970), p. 48.
78. Ashirov, *op. cit.*, p. 102.
79. *Idem*, p. 103.
80. Petrash and Khamitova, *op. cit.*, p. 331.
81. Ashirov, *op. cit.*, p. 91.

82. Ibrahimof, *op. cit.*, pp. 27-28.
83. Kasymov, *op. cit.*, p. 37.
84. *Spravochnik propagandista i agitatora* (Moscow: 1966), p. 149.
85. Petrash and Khamitova, *op. cit.*, pp. 330-31.
86. Ashirov, *op. cit.*, pp. 136-37.
87. *Idem*, p. 22.
88. A. Inkeles, *op. cit.*, p. 228.
89. L. Klimovich, "Uraza i Uraza-Bairam", *Antireligioznik*, No. 10 (1937), pp. 60-63.
90. Ashirov, *op. cit.*, p. 137.
91. M. Bach, *God and the Soviets* (New York, 1968), pp. 171-72.
92. For comments about the meaning of the *hajj* made by I. M. Saltiiev, a member of the Central Asian *Muftiat*, upon his return from Mecca on 21 March 1969: Ashirov, *op. cit.*, pp. 144-145.
93. Bennigsen, *op. cit.*, p. 179. For sermons delivered on the occasion of Kurban Bayram of 27 February 1969 by *imams* Abzalov (Udmurt ASSR) and A. Mustafin (Moscow): Ashirov, *op. cit.*, pp. 67, 128.
94. *Idem*, p. 143.
95. Petrash and Khamitova, *op. cit.*, pp. 331, 107. S. S. Savoskul, "Sotsial'no-etnicheskie aspekty dukhovnoi kul'tury sel'skogo naseleniia Tatarskoi ASSR", *Sovetskaia Etnografiia*, No. 1 (1971), p. 12.
96. N. P. Lobachev, "O formirovanii novoi obriadnosti u narodov SSSR", *Sovetskaia Etnografiia*, No. 4 (1973), pp. 14-24.
97. In the summer of 1976, when T. Venclova visited the Muslim cemetery of Raižiai he spoke with several Lithuanian Tatars who had come from Kaunas to hold a memorial service for one member of their family. T. Venclova interview: 5 April 1979, Los Angeles.
98. N. A. Tomilov, "Sovremennye etnicheskie protsessy u Tatar gorodov zapadnoi Sibiri", *Sovetskaia Etnografiia*, No. 6 (1972), pp. 93, 95; G. V. Starovoitova, "K issledovaniiu etnopsikhologii gorodskikh zhitelei (po materialam oprosa naseleniia trekh gorodov Tatarskoi ASSR)", *Sovetskaia Etnografiia*, No. , pp. 52-53.
99. Lobachev, *op. cit.*, pp. 22-24.
100. R. K. Urazmanova, "Narodnyi prazdnik Sabantui u Tatar", *Sovetskaia Etnografiia*, No. 1 (1977), pp. 94-100.
101. The *muftiat* of Ufa publishes a journal of its own but it is for "internal consumption" and does not reach the average believer. Aside from the journal, the only material which was published under the auspices of the *Muftiat* was an abridged translation of the Koran with annotations and commentary by *mufti* Khiyaletdinov, which was printed in 1958. Petrash and Khamitova, *op. cit.*, p. 328; Ashirov, *op. cit.*, p. 64.
102. A. M. Orlov, "Opyt issledovaniia protsessa sekuliarizatsii v Tatarskikh selakh", *V.N.A.*, No. 16 (1974), p. 100.

The USSR and The Middle East

CHANTAL LEMERCIER-QUELQUEJAY

When discussing Soviet diplomacy, one can hardly avoid the trite: the Soviet Union is a state different from others. In particular, Soviet diplomatic activity in the Middle East displays several unusually salient characteristics. In that part of the world more than elsewhere, Soviet leaders can portray their state with three different faces, not unlike a Byzantine eagle. As a great power, the USSR is heir to a thousand years of Russian history which encompasses the numerous diplomatic, cultural, and political ties established with Middle Eastern countries by the Russian governments in St. Petersburg in the last three centuries. In addition to this purely Russian national face, the USSR is currently the centre of the international communist movement; when necessary, Soviet leaders may portray their country as the purveyor of universal ideas that transcend narrow historic phenomena. Finally, in the Middle East, the Soviet Union can and does adopt the profile of a great Islamic state. Indeed, it is justified in doing so, for today's Soviet Union, despite its heavy Slavic veneer, is the world's fifth largest Muslim power (behind Indonesia, Pakistan, India, and Bangladesh), claiming no fewer than 45 million nominally Muslim citizens, most of whom spring from Turkic stock.

One can argue that these three separate identities lend Soviet leaders a high degree of flexibility in dealing with the often confused political identitites of the Middle East. This is indeed the case, but one should not assume that these three different profiles correspond to three distinct political strategies. Rather, they are the different parts of a single coherent Soviet strategy, with all its contributing political, cultural, and military pieces. As such, this multi-facet Soviet strategy is not unlike a musical trio in which all the instruments from time to time address the main theme at the discretion of the composer. For the performance of this diplomatic "trio" in the Middle East, Soviet "composers" in the Kremlin direct the contributions of the traditional Russian national, the communist international, and the Islamic

instruments as required, according to the evolution of political events abroad and the domestic situation at home. If one instrument loses resonance - as is the case with the purely Russian national profile Soviet leaders chose for Afghanistan in the immediate aftermath of the 1979 invasion - the spotlight might be directed instead on a different profile or on a subtle combination of two or more, depending again on the resonant qualities of the *milieu*. Thus, Moscow would appear to have unusual latitude to change tactics without altering overall strategy in any given Middle East country. What is more, the Soviet leadership has shown itself adept at conducting successful dialogues simultaneously with completely different - and often antagonistic - Middle East governments, social groups, and political movements simply by offering the appropriate face at the approriate time. So it is that the Soviets are able to appear as a revolutionary communist power to the militant leaders of South Yemen, while at the same time the Mufti of Tashkent can be despatched to represent the Soviet regime in Saudi Arabia with every hope of success.

THE RUSSIAN PROFILE

To date, this profile is the best known. Russians have been in contact with the Muslim world since the 10th century when the Turkic kingdom of the Volga Bulgars adopted Islam. During this long exposure, Russians acquired certain "know-how" in dealing with Muslims, although early knowledge consisted mostly of intense suspicion, hostility, caution, and the conviction that "We" - the Russians - are threatened by "Them" - the hated *busurmany*.

Russian movement into the Middle East began in 1556, when the armies of Ivan the Terrible conquered the Astrakhan Khanate and reached the Caucasus. And this progress went on for centuries in the direction of the warm seas to the south, where the Ottoman Turks and the Iranians were pushed back. On the eve of the 1917 Revolution, the area of tsarist Russian influence in the Middle East was larger than that of the present USSR's sphere of influence. Then, it covered the northern half of Iran including its capital, the city of Tehran. The *vilayets* of Kars and Ardahan belonged to Russia, and the Moscow Patriarchs exercised a *de facto* protectorate over the Orthodox Church of Antioch while extending deep roots in the Holy Land. This position gave the Russians unique prestige among the rich and influential Orthodox Christian colonies of Lebanon, Syria, and Palestine, as well as among other, non-Catholic Christians of the Middle East such as the Jacobites, Nestorians, and Coptes. Moreover, Russia enjoyed the support of the influential Armenian colonies throughout the Middle

East and had established through the Church of Moscow a solid friendship with monophysite Ethiopia.

Leaders of the USSR have inherited all the assets and liabilities of tsarist Russia in this region. The most pronounced of the latter is a deeply-rooted anti-Russian popular feeling among the Iranians and the Turks. The *Mosqolar* represent the "northern barbarian" to these people, a traditional hereditary enemy. It is almost certainly the case that communism would have fared better in Iran and Turkey had it been presented under a flag other than the Russian one.

Russian assets are more numerous, especially among the Arabs, who were never conscious of the Russian imperialist threat and with whom Russians possess a solid capital of good will. In our time, the strongest pro-Soviet sympathies are to be found in those areas where tsarist Russia had been most successful: in Palestine, among Orthodox Arabs (who are very numerous in the Palestine Liberation Organization), in Ethiopia, and in Syria. It is significant that after World War II when the Soviet Union appeared on the Middle Eastern scene after many years of eclipse, it was Alexis, Patriarch of Moscow, who was among the first Soviet dignitaries to visit the Middle East. The Patriarch made two such journeys during which he enhanced the image of "Eternal Russia."

The Russian profile was, and continues to be, the embodiment of the USSR's logical inheritence of this centuries-old Russian presense in the Muslim world. In the post-World War II period, as Moscow courted and supported anti-Western but non-socialist Muslim governments (such as Nassar's Egypt) including openly anti-communist ones, this tactic scored many successes. This was an offensive movement, corresponding to Stalin's old and overly optimistic belief that in the common struggle against the same imperialist enemy, communists can re-educate and eventually absorb their radical nationalist fellow-travellers.

In the late 1970s, however, the focus of Soviet support shifted from the bourgeois nationalist regimes (such as Sadat's) that proved unreliable to more radical socialist leaders, who are more inclined to establish Marxist-Lennist political structures on the Russian model in their countries. This change has necessitated a change of profile.

THE COMMUNIST PROFILE

It must be stressed again that a change of profiles does not indicate a change of strategy. Nor does the Communist Profile contradict the Russian Profile, for the USSR is simultaneously the embodiment of both. The main difference between these profiles is that the former places greater stress on ideological orthodoxy, the result of a number of serious setbacks which the USSR sustained in the Middle East in

the 1970s. Probably no setback was greater than that which the Soviets suffered in Egypt under Sadat; nor was any diplomatic lesson more painfully learned. By 1971, Sadat was beginning to get out of control from the Soviet perspective with his suppression of Egypt's Soviet-oriented Left; later that year, he assisted Sudan's Numayri to crush an attempted Communist Party uprising. Thence came the well-known expulsion of Soviet experts from Egypt and, in 1974, the cancellation of Soviet-Egyptian assistance treaties, followed closely, in 1976, by the abrogation of the Soviet-Egyptian military assistance treaty. Only a few weeks before his murder, Sadat expelled from Egypt the Soviet ambassador and thirty diplomats.

Mainly, but not exclusively because of Sadat, Moscow became more selective in its choice of customers. Soviet support currently goes primarily to those preferred regimes who model their political structures on Soviet Russia: South Yemen, Afghanistan, and Ethiopia being the best examples. These Soviet-type socialist countries differ from the bourgeois-socialist regimes formerly in favour, principally on the strength of the formers' being said to have reached a higher level of political evolution. They are now part of the socialist world, and there is no way back. Should their existence be threatened, as was Afghanistan's, these countries could expect military assistance from the USSR. Conditions for this guarantee include the creation of a local Party apparatus and an internal security force (like the KGB) on the Russian model, as well as more pervasive Russian involvement at all levels of society.

This kind of "international proletarian solidarity" allows Moscow the option of using a seemingly inexhaustible supply of "fraternal assistance": Cuban cannon fodder for anti-guerilla operations, East German secret police and Party organization specialists, Czechoslovak economic and weapons experts, and so forth. These proxies can be both more efficient than Russians and less socially and culturally offensive.

There are risks for the Soviets in employing the Communist Profile. For example, when Russian influence is injected into the Middle East under the flag of revolutionary communism, when the tremendous power of the Soviet state is used to impose radical socialist regimes on traditional societies, the USSR often exhibits a frighteningly brutal aspect of its diplomacy, thereby establishing from the onset possible limits to its ability to maneouvre in the region as a whole. As heirs to the Russian tradition and as "friends of Islam" (see below), the USSR has always been a potential partner for all Arab countries, including the most conservative. As the spokesman for Godless communism, the USSR has less flexibility.

By presenting Leninist orthodoxy as worthly of emulation, Soviet

leaders encourage a further danger. Soviet Muslim territories are presented as models of socialist development, more rapid and more efficient that their capitalist counterparts. Central Asia thus becomes a reception centre for visiting foreign Muslim socialists and a training centre for political and military cadres from abroad. The risk is that each side will infect the other: foreign socialists, students and technical trainees who arrive from abroad for stays of varying lengths in Central Asia are unlikely to depart unaffected by the pervasive racism that characterizes Russian attitudes toward "their" Muslims and by the cultural disdain in which many Russians hold Islamic culture generally; for Central Asians, foreign visitors represent a conduit to the outside world and its forbidden ideas and a window on political, cultural, and religious freedoms unheard of in the USSR. For many Central Asians, whose socialist consciousness may already be tainted by nationalism or by lingering pan-Islamic sentiments, these contacts could prove to be - from the regime's perspective - unwanted stimuli. Recent attacks by the Central Asian and Caucasian press against the dangers of "nationalist deviation" suggest that Soviet authorities consider the danger of infection from abroad to be a very real one.

It is reasonably certain that the evolution of the USSR will be marked during the next few decades by the steady elevation of Soviet Muslim political cadres to decision-making levels. This process seems unavoidable in view of the huge demographic advances in the Soviet Muslim republics. One can speculate that these future Soviet Muslim leaders will have a different attitude towards the problem of revolution in the Muslim world than the current crop of geriatric Russians in the Politburo. If the coming Muslim cadres are as adventuresome and imaginative as their National Communist predecessors in the 1920s, one can envision some intriguing debates between the Russian centre and the Muslim borderlands. With the conquest of Afghanistan and its possible annexation to the USSR (or the annexation of any other Muslim country, for that matter), the borderland Muslims can expect to augment their arguments by the sheer force of numbers.

THE ISLAMIC PROFILE

As already noted, the USSR is a great Muslim power, and the southern regions of the state - the Caucasus and Central Asia, conquered by Russia little more than a century ago - are famous and ancient centres of Islamic civilization. Because of their geographic position, the Muslim territories of the USSR offer an enviable bridge for Soviet political activity into the Middle East. Paradoxically, it was the Muslim National Communists in the 1920s, such as the Tatar Mir Said Sultangaliev and the Azeri Turk Nariman Narimanov, who first proposed

the Soviet Muslim territories and peoples as "lighthouses to the Muslim world," a concept quickly and firmly rejected by Lenin and Stalin, who were concerned that turmoil along the periphery of the empire they were then restructuring might endanger Russian power at the centre.

Following Krushchev's fall from grace, Soviet leaders set out to equip themselves with a distinctly Muslim Profile for dealing in the Middle East. Among other things, the Soviet leadership clearly intended at that time to develop a unique and inexhaustible supply of Soviet Muslim experts, linguists, propagandists, and political and technical cadres for supporting Soviet initiatives in Middle Eastern countries. These cadres would appear more as "one of us," as Muslims, then was possible for similarly trained Russian cadres.

On another front, Moscow completed the domestication of its Muslim religious establishment, a process begun in 1942 when Stalin and the Mufti of Ufa, Abdurrahman Rasulaev, signed a Concordate normalizing relations between the Soviet state and the Islamic religion. Domestication of the Muslim establishment reached its zenith in 1979–1980, when the Soviet regime replaced three of the four Soviet Muftis with the regime's hand-picked successors. Today, the new Muftis of Ufa and Bunyaksk and the Shia Sheik ul-Islam are all unusually young for their posts, having been born during or after World War II: Talgat Taziev (Ufa) in 1948, Mahmud Gekiev (Bunyaksk) in 1944, and Alla-Shakur Pasha Zade (Sheik ul-Islam at Baku) in 1948, Only Ziautdin Babakhanov, the Mufti of Tashkent, belongs to the pre-war generation of Soviet *ulamas*.

These religious leaders enhance the Muslim Profile in several ways. First, within the USSR itself, they are charged with helping to preserve the believers' loyalty to the Soviet state. Second, in the Muslim world abroad, they are entrusted with two tasks: to present the USSR as a better partner than the West for the world of Islam; and to penetrate the conservative, pro-Western states, such as Saudi Arabia, Morocco, Jordan, and Egypt, which are otherwise closed to the Soviets. It is significant that the Muslim Profile is represented abroad by religious leaders rather than large numbers of lay personnel, who may be more susceptable to foreign ideas. This suspicion is understandable: progressive Muslim countries encouraged the development of a special kind of "Arab" or "Muslim" socialism, different from the Leninist model although not far distant from the Muslim national communism of Sultangaliev's time.

The USSR is the only great power in the world to have a systematic Islamic policy. During the last twelve years, the Mufti of Tashkent has organized countless international conferences that were attended by delegations from all Muslim countries, including those who have

no diplomatic relations with the USSR. Soviet religious leaders are constantly touring the Muslim countries of the Middle East and elsewhere, paying special attention to Saudia Arabia, and seldom miss an Islamic conference or international gathering. Needless to say, at these occasions their remarks are notable for their praise of the Soviet government and its support of Islam; simultaneously, they denounce all the "imperialisms" and the capitalist world. This propaganda may appear to be no less crude than that of the official Soviet propaganda agency *Agitporp*. But regurgitated by authentic *ulamas*, it is infinitely more effective. When Ziautdin Babakhanov speaks in Mecca to a Muslim audience he is accepted as one of their own.

For the Soviet regime, displaying its Muslim Profile abroad carrys a significant and potentially dangerous cost that must be borne at home. Apparently wary lest the Muslims of the USSR become unwilling to participate further in the complex charade of painting the USSR as the best friend of Islam abroad while suffering its persecution at home, the Soviet regime usually times its forays into the Middle East to coincide with the slowing of anti-Islamic propaganda or the opening of new mosques in Central Asian and the Caucasus. Yet, it is precisely concessions of this kind that the regime can ill afford if it is to keep to its clearly stated objective of wiping out "survivals of the past." Moreover, concessions to Islam in the USSR further cloud the already murky distinction between religion and nation in the minds of believers; thus, it is possible that the price for a successful Muslim Profile abroad is more nationalism at home.

Still another cost derives from the same geographic advantages that offer the USSR a bridge into the Middle East. The Muslim regions of the USSR are a classic "soft underbelly", susceptable to internal disruption from outside. Those same forces in the Islamic world which the Soviet regime seeks to use its own Muslims to harness could spill over into the Soviet Union itself; this is particularly true of the recent upsurge of Muslim fundamentalism. Soviet media, often quick to avoid discussing any problem whose existence the regime wishes to keep secret, have tackled the question of spillover head on. We have seen within the last year, for example, the Turkmen press fulminating against the apparently widespread practice by unofficial religious leaders and others of recording radio transmissions of Khomeini's speeches and circulating them among the faithful. The Turkmen press has offered repeated warnings against Muslim extremists and fanatics. First Secretary Mohamed-Nazar Gapurov has gone public with his condemnation of foreign propaganda and espionage aimed his republic. Gapurov has been especially critical of radio and television broadcasts from Iran (Radio Gorgan and Mashhad television), Radio Liberty, and Radio Peking, accusing all these media of spreading pan-Turkic and

pan-Islamic ideas and generally "sowing hostility among the people of the USSR living and working in Soviet Turkmenistan as a single fraternal family." In Azerbaidzhan, the head of the KGB, Major-General Zia Yusif Zade, came right to the point in an article in the Baku newspaper *Bakinskii Rabochii* (19 December 1980):

> . . . In view of the situation in Iran and Afghanistan, the U.S. special services are trying to exploit the Islamic religion, especially in areas populated by [Soviet] Muslims. . . . The Azerbaidzhan Communist Party Central Committee's . . . organization and ideological work creates favourable conditions for an effective struggle against enemy acts of ideological subversion. It has enabled us to score definite success during recent years . . . in supressing anti-social activity of the sectarian undergound and reactionary Muslim clergy, a politically harmful phenomenon among certain representatives of the intelligentsia and of the young people. At the same time, it should be noted that, under the influence of the enemy's subversive ideological activity, certain persons in the Republic perpetrate actions that do not correspond to the Soviet State's moral and legal norms. Such phenomena may be observed among certain immature sections of the population, especially among young people. . . .

The expressions "secretarian underground" and "reactionary Muslim clergy" are commonly used by all Soviet authorities to designate the clandestine Sufi brotherhoods (*tariqat*). To my knowledge, this is the first time a responsible Soviet leader has linked these conservative religious organizations with foreign espionage and subversion; similarly, it is an unusual reference to the impact of these forces among the intelligentsia and young people.

The campaign against the dangers of imperialist subversion and religious fanaticism in this case, both sides of the same coin, is especially strong in the three republics bordering Iran and Afghanistan: Tadzhikistan, Turkmenistan, and Azerbaidshan. Repeated warnings reveal an obvious nervousness among Soviet authorities, who seem to take very seriously the potential for spillover of the Iranian and Afghan "revolutions" into Soviet territory. It is difficult to appreciate whether this fear is justified or not, as our information is restricted to official Soviet sources which, despite their relative candor on this issue, are never eager to advertise a potential weakness.

Soviet authorites can be no more sanguine that Kadafi-style revolutionary Islamic socialism will leave Soviet Muslims unaffected. Contacts between Soviet Muslims and outsiders of a more militant pursuasion are unavoidable given the current demands on the Muslim Profile. Soviet Muslims are daily meeting Arabs, Afghans, Iranians, and Turks who live and travel in the USSR and who know the "hereti-

cal" Muslim literature, such as Kadafi's *Green Book*, the writings of the Egyptian *Ikhwan al-Muslimin*, or the works of the Iranian Ali Shariyati.

We may already have begun to see some cracks in the Soviet Muslim Profile, although it is still too early to tell how deep or how lasting these fissures may be. In September 1980, Mufti Babakhanov summoned the Islamic Congress of Tashkent to celebrate the 15th century of the Hejira and, not coincidentally, to put the finishing touches on a long campaign for Soviet-Islamic friendship. As is well known, the Congress ended in total failure. Billed in advance as "the most important post-war political meeting of the Muslim world," the Congress was boycotted by all but five delegations. The others, which included most of the larger Muslim states, stayed away in protest at the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

CONCLUSIONS

Since the invasion of Afghanistan and the spectacular failure of the Tashkent Congress, which were followed by the first symptons of a backlash of the Iranian revolution and the more ardent stirrings of an Afghan holy war against the Soviet Union, Moscow's strategy in the Middle East has taken on a more pronounced doctrinal Marxist-Leninist colouring. The Muslim Profile seems to have been put in storage, at least until the environment is right for its reappearance. Since September 1980, no foreign Muslim delegation has visited Central Asia. No Soviet delegation has been sent abroad, and Soviet Muslim religious leaders have restricted their propaganda. This could signal a real change in policy, or it could be a momentary reassessment. It is simply too early to say.

Similarly, it is difficult to say at this juncture whether the "three-faced" approach of Soviet diplomacy in the Middle East has been successful. There can be no doubt that it is a very flexible strategy which can be adopted to many circumstances and many political environments. We have yet to see if the costs, as outlined above, outweigh the short- and long-term benefits. Certainly it is the case that no strategy, however flexible, can whitewash so dramatic and negative an event as the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. But then, the Muslims of the Middle East have yet to articulate a unified - much less an effective - response to this blatant Soviet attack on a member of the Islamic family. Perhaps they never will. We can assume that the Soviet leadership calculated this risk and decided to take it. It may have been a good gamble, making the reappearance of the Muslim Profile a virtual certainty in the near future.

The Government of Muhammad Moussa Shafiq: The Last Chapter of Afghan Liberalism

RICHARD S. NEWELL

Afghanistan's experiment with constitutional monarchy ended abruptly when Prince Muhammad Daoud seized power on July 17, 1973. His Marxist-supported coup interrupted what proved to be the last attempt to redeem the liberal democratic promise of the 1964 constitution. After a calamitous period of political drift the monarch, Zahir Shah, had appointed Muhammad Moussa Shafiq Prime Minister on December 8, 1972. Shafiq appeared to have a mandate from the king to revitalize the floundering economic development effort, to stimulate the inert bureaucracy and to mobilize the support of the small but rapidly growing urban elite. The fact that his government was overthrown without resistance and apparently without protest suggests that Shafiq had failed. Yet during its seven months his cabinet displayed more activity, used more imagination to win popular support, explored more possible avenues for development than had the five previous liberal cabinets – with the probable exception of Yousuf's government which had launched the constitutional experiment in 1964.

This essay examines the place of Shafiq's government in the liberal era. Was it a last-ditch effort to revive a system that had already failed, was it a temporary stopgap while the royal family tried to sort out political alternatives, or was it cut off while in the process of proving that open political institutions were viable? In the wake of the Soviet invasion of 1979 a return to liberal constitutionalism seems most unlikely, but perceptions of the reasons for its demise could still have a bearing upon future Afghan politics, if the Soviet Union can eventually be induced to accept the negotiated return of genuine Afghan self-rule.

Young (48), ambitious, energetic and committed to Western-derived liberalism, Shafiq seemed well qualified to give the constitutional system a new lease on life. His close personal ties to the royal family assured him of Zahir Shah's support. His education and

experience gave him an almost unique combination of traditionalist and modernist credentials. He held degrees in Islamic Law from Al Azhar and Comparative Law from Columbia. His family background tied him to Afghanistan's Sunni *ullema* while his public and professional career had been devoted to modernist innovation. He had risen quickly in the rapidly changing political arena after the king had manoeuvred Daoud from power in 1963. Shafiq displayed a brilliant grasp of ideas and a canny shrewdness in cultivating allies within court, bureaucratic and legislative circles. He played a major role in the drafting of the 1964 constitution and served in all of its subsequent governments as a member of the cabinet or as a senior advisor. As foreign minister in Abdul Zahir's cabinet Shafiq stood out especially as a result of his success in attracting and coordinating foreign assistance for drought relief.

An infusion of energy and leadership was sorely needed in late 1972. Criticism of the government had become nearly universal. It had spread from the educated, politicized urban population to the rural areas of many provinces. Even the government press had taken up the cries of anger against declining services, rising prices, the flourishing drug trade, scandals involving government operations and the growing signs of moral decadence among the wealthy of Kabul.[1] An atmosphere of crisis had developed from political paralysis, economic stagnation and spreading social disorder.

After the election of 1969 an impasse had hardened between the National Assembly – especially its dominant lower house, the *Wolesi Jirgah* – and the cabinet. Its most spectacular manifestation was the nineteen days of tumultuous debate in which the members vented their resentment over the alleged abuses by previous governments before giving grudging approval of Abdul Zahir's cabinet in May 1972. Much of the ineffectiveness of Zahir's leadership can be attributed to this crippling beginning. Members of the assembly continued to launch investigations and to voice complaints against administrative offices while demanding favoured treatment from them. Some of the representatives contributed to the corruption by promoting a traffic in *haj* permits. Wealthy would-be *hajis* were willing to pay dearly for space on the special pilgrimage flights to Saudi Arabia that offered opportunities for both piety and profitable trade.[2] This corrosive relationship with the *Jirgah* weakened the government's will to impose the discipline on its own officials that was needed to check spreading corruption.

A more immediate threat to the functioning of the government was created by the breakdown in the constitutional machinery. Lacking effective internal organization and discipline, the *Wolesi Jirgah* continually failed to complete its most fundamental business.

Quorums were rarely achieved. Prior to a flurry of action late in November 1972, it had assembled the minimum number of representatives only once in two months.[3] Its members either stayed at home or found politicking outside its chambers to be more attractive than consideration of urgent bills, budgets, treaties or agreements reached on foreign loans. The resulting delays forced the already indolent bureaucracy to mark time. The assembly's failure to act kept administrators from implementing programmes intended to bring about improvements in taxation, civil service regulation, labour conditions, criminal law procedures and the promotion of external trade.

Friction between the legislature and the cabinet was aggravated by the failure of Zahir Shah to give critically needed support to legislators who were trying to make the system work. Still shaken by the violence and anti-monarchist demonstrations that had accompanied the *Jirgah*'s debate over approval of the first constitutional cabinet in October 1965, the king and his advisors had lost much of their enthusiasm for transferring more real power to popularly elected politicians. Features crucial for completing the implementation of the constitution were never installed. Political parties had not been allowed to organize legally despite the recommendations of several of the cabinets and approval by the legislature. Zahir Shah had withheld approval apparently fearing that autonomously-run parties would threaten his ability to control the system. The absence of a parties law severely restricted the development of ideological and organizational coherence among the members of the legislature. The system was denied development vital to its ability to mature and operate effectively. The behaviour of the legislature made it increasingly plain that it could not become productive without the discipline that viable political organizations would impose upon its members.

Zahir Shah also refused to approve legislation to extend representative government to the provinces and the cities. For most of the population this meant the continuation of arbitrary government mitigrated by *ad hoc* arrangements negotiated between local officials and the leadership of primordial groups – lineages, clans, tribes and sectarian communities. Popular constitutional institutions were left hovering remotely and insecurely over Afghan society without the linkage that might have permitted them to be grafted onto accepted traditional structures.

Loss of royal nerve in supporting the liberal reforms was also evident in the manipulation of some elections to the assembly, particularly the rigging which ensured the defeat of Muhammad Hashim Maiwandwal in 1969.[4] Anxiety over attacks on the royal

family and the constitutional reforms had also led to restrictions on the private press. The closing of the Marxist Khalq and Parcham newspapers coupled with occasional censorship of other publications muted, but had not totally eliminated criticism.

After nearly ten years the liberal reform effort had produced a truncated husk of the constitutional system that had been originally designed. Denied credibility, the new system suffered loss of support on all sides.

Economic woes further imperilled it. Most development schemes had stalled in the late 1960s. Inadequate and inconsistent planning, bureaucratic incompetence, an unhealthy reliance on foreign aid (for ideas and strategy as well as resources), and unbalanced investment which favoured the cities, especially Kabul, over the countryside had added greatly to discontent and unrest. Crop harvests had stagnated or were erratic. Industrial expansion had been marginal. There had been no appreciable rise in *per capita* income.[5] Conspicuous consumption by the well-connected few made it clear that the mostly rural Afghan majority was being left out of the benefits that the new system was expected to generate. This was most graphically demonstrated during the drought of 1970-1972 which brought starvation to many in the Hazarajat and the Western, North-Western and North-Eastern sectors of the country. The government's failure to recognize and respond to the crisis until foreign observers had raised the alarm gravely weakened its legitimacy with much of the population. When relief was finally organized it was marred by charges of embezzlement, theft, favouritism and its failure to reach some of the more remote of the afflicted areas.[6]

Late in 1972 the government gave little indication that it could improve its economic performance. The foreign donors on whom Afghanistan had depended for most of its previous development investment appeared to be losing interest. All donors were discouraged by the government's inability to make effective use of aid. Entanglements in Vietnam and domestic opposition to foreign aid as a tool of international policy were constricting American assistance. Declining American competition and the completion of the large construction projects on roads and dams which had attracted much of the Soviet Union's contributions indicated there would be reduction in Communist bloc assistance. As bilateral assistance waned, some of the slack was being taken up by international agencies, especially the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank. Yet their involvement in agricultural and industrial projects depended upon Afghanistan's ability to move into more sophisticated operational phases of development – precisely those areas of activity where bureaucratic effectiveness was most crucial and most seriously

lacking. Sources of foreign credits and resources were being severely constricted by a growing burden of debt and interest payments. Even with a considerable increase in the value of exports spurred mostly by tourism and the sale of natural gas to the Soviet Union, payments on outstanding loans were absorbing 27 per cent of Afghanistan's foreign exchange earnings. This proportion was expected to increase to 40 per cent by the mid-1970s.[7] The opportunity to vitalize and broaden the economy through foreign help appeared to have been bungled.

Yet these economic disappointments had not obstructed social changes which were bringing turmoil especially to Kabul. Radical groups had used student discontent to build political organizations dedicated to overthrowing the government. By the late 1960s the large number of students crowding Kabul's secondary and technical schools and the university was generating increasingly threatening political problems. Discontent arose from characteristic student grievances over food and living conditions, academic standards and seemingly insensitive or arbitrary administrative practices. Ominously, these complaints became tied to the growing competition for scarce jobs and the failure of the constitutional system to permit legitimate political activity. The students became increasingly politicized. Strikes and public demonstrations initially aimed at alleged academic corruption and police brutality in 1969 led to the recruitment of both secondary and university students into the Parcham and Khalq factions of the Marxist Peoples Democratic Party of Afghanistan. Ultra-conservative religious groups also gained followers on the campuses. Their most visible issues involved the growing number of women in western dress, admission of female students by the university and the anti-Islamic rhetoric employed by the Marxists. Radical groups at opposite extremes were thus building political organizations directed at destroying an already floundering system.[8]

When Zahir Shah directed Shafiq to form a cabinet it was evident that the constitutional system was facing a crisis of credibility and even of survival. The urban educated class which the liberal reforms had been designed to co-opt was now focusing its frustrations on the shortcomings of these reforms. Urban unrest was accompanied by turbulence in the countryside resulting from the distress and dislocation that had followed the drought.

Shafiq quickly displayed the strategy and tactics he would use to win back support for the system. Selecting a small group of cabinet ministers,[9] he set about trying to prove that the constitution was workable. Evidence that the government could perform needed to be produced quickly if public expectation of failure was not to be self-fulfilling. This required removing the legislative logjam that had

bedevilled his predecessors, reforming the bureaucracy and demonstrating that open democratic procedures and the realization of the civil rights promised by the constitution could be reconciled with stable government and vigorous economic development.

Shafiq expressed optimism over these daunting tasks in an interview with the *Kayhan* daily of Teheran several weeks after he took office. He was quoted as wishing "to inject a great deal of movement into the Afghan society", which he believed was "eminently suited for the development of democracy . . . Our people cannot be cowed by arbitrary authority . . . because freedom is more important to our people than life itself". He also claimed to be confident that modernization was compatible with Afghan culture. "We must remain Afghan but live in the twentieth century . . . The changes we ought to accomplish must take place within the traditional processes of change and development that have always existed in our society. What we mean to do is speed up the process".[10]

He did not identify such changes with fundamental social or economic reforms. Instead he based his hopes on perfecting existing social and political institutions. Agriculture was to be stimulated by "fiscal methods" to increase output of cash crops. Industry was to be developed through encouragement of foreign private investment. He saw foreign trade as a major means of generating development and in that context he saw drug smuggling as a dangerous deterrent to expanding Afghanistan's commercial links with the "market economies".

In arguing for gradualism Shafiq also defended liberal methods and goals. This line of argument enabled him to retain the support of the king and the small coterie of political entrepreneurs which had monopolized much of the country's new wealth. At the same time he claimed that his cabinet would set actions in motion that would lead to the solution of Afghanistan's mounting crises. He insisted that this could still be done within the framework of the liberal system. It had to be completed and made to work. "I shall not allow our new ideas to be defeated by a lazy and retarded bureaucratic system."[11]

The new leadership immediately set about to reinvigorate the government. From the start it employed high profile, public relations techniques to create the impressions of discussion, decision making and decisive action. Shafiq made unprecedented attempts to keep himself, as Prime Minister, in the news. Immediately after his appointment he made highly publicized visits to the senior officers of the Parliament. He quickly followed this with a visit to the Supreme Court. On both occasions he made much of the need for the three branches of government to work together. Later in

December he made similarly publicized visits to agencies and organizations which had been focal points of public interest or complaint. These included Kabul University, the Ministry of Education and Kabul city headquarters. With some fanfare he opened a working office in the building next to the *Wolesi Jirgah* and courted its members by making himself available to them. He also made frequent appearances before its committees.

Shafiq and his cabinet colleagues made new uses of the press. He coaxed the increasingly cantankerous private newspapers into dealing more informatively and sympathetically with the government. Their reporters were invited to join with correspondents of the official newspapers at Shafiq's first news conference on 1 January 1973. In February he attended a dinner in his honour given by the private press association. At his first press conference he made clear his commitment to opening government actions to public scrutiny, declaring

> Civilization starts with history. As long as we do not publish documents, we do not know from where history has started and thus we will remain outside history, and we will not feel responsible today, because as long as there is no sense of history there is no sense of responsibility.[12]

The high priority given to disseminating the public record imposed much responsibility upon the new Minister for Information and Culture, Sabahuddin Khushkaki, formerly publisher of the widely-read private newspaper, *Karwan*. He reorganized the information departments of his ministry along more effectively functional lines and was given the task of coordinating the cabinet's efforts to explain its decisions and actions. When a new literacy campaign was announced that was intended to reach two million adults within five years through the use of unemployed high school graduates, Khashkaki, not the education minister, was given the task of organizing and running it.

The public relations effort included giving prominent attention to the weekly meetings of the cabinet. Unlike the vague outlines which had been served up to the press previously, news releases gave detailed accounts of discussions and decisions. Press attention was also directed at Shafiq's efforts to pick the brains of intellectuals, scholars and former government officials. This placed tacit emphasis on the availability of Afghan expertise; it implied that reliance on foreign technical and economic advice had become less essential. The first attempt involved consultation on economic policy prior to the publication of the fourth five-year plan.[13]

Nearly all such publicity opportunities were used to exhort

government officials to perform more effectively and selflessly. Shafiq constantly returned to the theme that the bureaucracy was the greatest single stumbling block to Afghan progress. Much attention was paid to improving the managerial functions of government offices. Shafiq set up an administrative reform and review centre within the office of the Prime Minister. At cabinet level Shafiq insisted that the ministers set clear goals and establish priorities and schedules for making decisions.

In his attempts to argue his government's case, Shafiq frequently emphasized his close relations with the king. He obviously was not in a position to detach his fate from Zahir Shah's; consequently he attempted to make a virtue of necessity by constantly parading royal patronage as a political asset. Public announcements of his private audiences with the king were made almost weekly during the first two months after his appointment.[14] Thereafter they became less frequent. In addition the government press gave considerable play to the formal and social engagements that Shafiq and his cabinet kept with the royal family. In this fashion Zahir Shah appeared to convey a stronger endorsement of Shafiq than his predecessors.

Evaluation of the achievements of the Shafiq government requires separating its energetically cultivated appearance of action from concrete results. Balanced judgment also requires recognizing the perils it inherited, its limited time in power and the institutional constraints it was forced to operate within.

Shafiq was far more attuned to implementing or reviving established policies than to breaking new ground. His initial policy statement, broadcast on Kabul Radio on 10 December 1972, offered energy but no novel departures. His most celebrated actions, the Helmand Waters Treaty with Iran, the creation of the Industrial Development Bank, a new literacy programme, the creation of a Ministry for Higher Education and the development of a fertilizer and agricultural services delivery programme were all products of schemes begun by other governments. What was new was the sense of accumulating momentum and confidence especially during his cabinet's first months. Policies were debated and announced in a manner that conveyed the impression that officials once again believed they could be accomplished. These declarations were often accompanied by signs that real progress in dealing with difficult issues was about to begin. Such expectations were effectively cultivated at the very beginning. On the day of his appointment the official price of bread in Kabul was lowered 40 per cent.[15] The day after Shafiq delivered his policy statement the *Wolesi Jirgah* approved his appointment virtually without opposition. Perhaps more remarkable was the *Jirgah*'s willingness to consider and to pass the annual budget two

days later. It had languished for nine months since the actual fiscal year had begun. This earnest of the legislature's desire to co-operate with the new cabinet gave hope that the constitutional structure could be made to work.

The next two months were filled with announcements that the government was preparing ambitious programmes across the spectrum of the problems that it had inherited. In March 1973 its activities reached a climax. The founding of the industrial bank was followed a few days later by the signing of the Helmand Waters Treaty by Shafiq and Hoveida, the Prime Minister of Iran. Two months later the *Wolesi Jirgah* overwhelmingly approved the treaty. Shafiq had expended much of his political capital in ensuring its passage. This success appears to have come at a heavy price. His concentration on this issue – it required numerous appearances to give testimony before the *Jirgah*'s committees – identified Shafiq with an increasingly unpopular issue. The treaty committed Afghanistan to share the run-off from its largest river just as the country was recovering from a crippling drought. The value of closer diplomatic and economic relations with Iran had not yet become widely apparent. Two years later – after the global petroleum revolution – Iran's value to Afghanistan would be obvious and Daoud would attempt to take advantage of it.[16] In the meantime the long-standing Afghan ambivalence toward Iran exposed Shafiq (and Zahir Shah) to *sotto voce* charges of selling out to the Shah. His efforts to convince the legislature to accept a pro-Iranian stance therefore cost Shafiq political support. His boldest move brought him little immediate advantage and, as he struggled to carry it through, his government lost its appearance of momentum. Except for the treaty and the approval of a package of foreign loans, the *Jirgah* fell back to doing little. By early July it had managed a quorum only once in 82 meetings.

What had happened? The public record does not supply direct evidence but there are indications that the atmosphere in which the cabinet was operating changed as the spring of 1973 began. Shafiq's public appearances became less frequent, his announcements and those of his colleagues were less abullient, the impression of constant action over a wide front was being lost. Shafiq himself expressed a new tone of doubt when he decried pessimism over the nation's problems in a speech at the Ministry of Public Health on May 6.[17] It was to be one of his last significant statements as Prime Minister.

His position had become anomalous and he almost certainly knew it. The energy he displayed in the first months of his government clearly suggested that Shafiq expected to have a chance to carry his policies to fruition after the elections due in the fall of 1973. His new public reticence must have reflected recognition that his

government had become a lame duck. The schedule for the third parliamentary elections was announced on 22 April. They were to begin in late August for the *Mechrano Jirgah* (the Senate) and in early September for the *Wolesi Jirgah.*[18] This announcement, on which the king would have had the final say, made it certain that political parties would not be allowed to organize in time for the election. Shafiq had made clear his support for the legalization of parties. Such a step was probably crucial to his strategy of cashing in on the popularity earned by his government. Instead, Zahir Shah's refusal to endorse the parties law forced Shafiq to remain completely dependent upon him for future political office. The Prime Minister was forced to conclude that the king was no longer willing to support either his political ambitions or the system he was trying to preserve. Other arrangements were in the offing and they were not likely to include a politician so closely identified with an era that was being allowed to end.

If this thesis is substantially correct, Shafiq's efforts to revive the constitutional system must be considered to have been doomed from the start. Its survival depended upon his proving that it could still function. When he was on the brink of significant achievements and had shown that the legislature could be made tractable, he found that the royal family was ready to abandon him and the constitution. In the end it cannot be said that the liberal forms had failed; the monarchy had not been able to bring itself to give them an unfettered chance to work.

What followed was an unopposed coup which abolished the monarchy while Zahir Shah was conveniently out of the country. The circumstances suggest that Shafiq was aware of the denouement that was coming. Daoud and his Parcham allies were not the only plotters against the government. Shafiq may have been surprised that it was Daoud who seized power and not Abdul Wali, the king's son-in-law and a senior army commander, but he could not have failed to realize that it was over for his government.[19]

Shafiq's nimbleness as a politician allowed him to survive and briefly to regain influence. After imprisonment and house arrest he re-emerged as a prominent advisor to Daoud in the latter days of the Republic of Afghanistan. But the Marxist coup of 27-28 April 1978 proved fatal. He was arrested and executed a few days after Taraki's Khalq government had seized power. The decision to kill him attests a fear on the part of the Marxists that he retained some popularity and was therefore a threat to them.[20]

The monarchy and its liberal modernist collaborators had lost control over the political forces at work in Afghanistan. Into the vacuum rushed Marxists even less prepared to cope with the issues

of political consensus and development. With their failure came the opportunity for intervention by the Soviet Union and the serious possibility that Afghanistan was to be absorbed into a modern empire for the first time.

NOTES

1. See the *Kabul Times* during October and November 1972, especially its summaries of editorials from the government and the private press.
2. *Rozgar* quoted in the *Kabul Times*, 9 December 1972.
3. *Kabul Times*, 26 November 1972.
4. Louis Dupree. "Afghanistan Continues its Experiment in Democracy: The Thirteenth Parliament is Elected", *American University Field Staff Reports*, South Asia Series, Vol. XV, No. 3 (1971), pp. 1-2, 9-10, 13.
5. Amin and Schilz put the growth of the gross national product of Afghanistan at an annual rate of less than 3 percent for the decade ending in 1971. Estimated annual population growth was 2.3 percent. Hamidullah Amin and Gordon Schilz. *A Geography of Afghanistan*. Omaha, Centre for Afghanistan Studies, University of Nebraska at Omaha, 1976, p. 58.
6. Louis Dupree. "A New Decade of Daud?" *American University Field Staff Reports*, South Asia Series, Vol. XVII, No. 4 (1973), p. 4.
7. Interview of Kyan Mint, Resident Representative of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, *Kabul Times*, 14 November 1972.
8. Louis Dupree. "The 1969 Student Demonstrations in Kabul", *American University Field Staff Reports*, South Asia Series, Vol. XIV, No. 5 (1970); and "A Note on Afghanistan, 1971", *American University Field Staff Reports*, South Asia Series, Vol. XV, No. 2 (1971).
9. Shafiq's cabinet had only nine full ministers. He continued to hold the foreign portfolio; holdover deputy ministers from Zahir's cabinet were assigned to run the ministries for which new full ministers were not appointed. In addition to Shafiq the full ministers were:
   General Khan Mohammad, Minister of National Defence: the king's man; he had been defence minister since 1962.
   Dr. Nematullah Pazhwak, Minister of Interior: a teacher *cum* bureaucrat who was also a *Parcham* Marxist – apparently a sleeper at that time – he would serve as Education Minister in the first cabinet of Daoud's Republic.
   Mohammad Khan Jalalar, Minister of Finance: a career bureaucrat who had risen through the Ministry of Planning. An extraordinary survivor, he was to serve in cabinets under Daoud, Taraki and Karmal.
   Dr. Abdul Wakil, Minister of Agriculture and Irrigation: a trained agronomist who had served for twelve years as a senior official in the Helmand Valley administration. He had also been a senator and a member of Zahir's cabinet.
   Ghulam Dastagir Azizi, Minister of Mines and Industries: he was returning to this ministry after several years of political eclipse following service as a junior minister under Yousuf.
   Khwazak Zalmai, Minister of Public Works: a military engineer, he had held a series of civilian posts since 1963 and was held over at Public Works from the Zahir cabinet.
   Dr. Abdul Wahid Sarabi, Minister of Planning: also a holdover from the

Zahir cabinet. An economist Sarabi had been rector of Kabul University and had served as a cabinet minister since 1967.
Nasratullah Malikyar, Minister of Communications: another holdover appointee. He was an engineer with a long record of administrative experience extending back to Daoud's prime ministry.
Sabahuddin Khushkaki, Minister of Information and Culture: a newcomer to high government office, he had been editor/publisher of the outstanding private newspaper, *Karwan*.

10. Interview of Muhammad Moussa Shafiq by *Kayhan* of Teheran published by the *Kabul Times*, 25 January 1973.
11. Ibid.
12. *Kabul Times*, 7 January 1973.
13. The first consultative meeting was convened by Planning Minister Sarabi. It included former Finance Minister Abdullah Yaftali, former Commerce Ministers Nour Ali and Sarwar Omar, the Presidents of the Da Afghanistan and Pashtany Tejaraty Banks and a representative of the Bank Millie. *Kabul Times*, 25 December 1972.
14. *Kabul Times*, 8, 10, 16, 24 December 1972; 7, 23 January, 17, 25 February, 6, 18 March 1973.
15. *Kabul Times*, 10 December 1972.
16. Louis Dupree. "A New Decade of Daud?" *American University Field Staff Reports*, South Asia Series, Vol. XVII, No. 4 (1973), p. 4.
17. *Kabul Times*, 6 May 1973.
18. *Kabul Times*, 22 April 1973.
19. Louis Dupree. "A New Decade of Daud?" *American University Field Staff Reports*, South Asia Series, Vol. XVII, No. 4 (1973), p. 2.
20. Personal interview with a surviving member of Daoud's final cabinet, October 1980.

Soviet Islam since the Invasion of Afghanistan

ALEXANDRE BENNIGSEN

Since the Soviet military invasion of Afghanistan of December 1979, some dramatic developments have taken place in the political life of the Soviet southern borderlands which have complicated the climate of official friendship and cooperation between Soviet authorities and the Soviet Muslim leadership. Inaugurated after the downfall of Khrushchev, this coexistence is showing signs of strain. Little mention of the new developments has been made in the West; indeed, it is too early to speculate about them with any degree of certainty. They may represent the beginning of a new Soviet strategy toward the Muslims of the Soviet Union and toward the Muslim world abroad. Or they may be simply tactical adjustments. Similarly, it is too early to discern exactly what is behind the change, whether it is the result of side-effects from the war in Afghanistan, spill-over from the revolution in Iran, more aggressive Chinese propaganda, the growth of fundamentalist trends in Soviet Islam as elsewhere, or a combination of these.[1]

NEW ANTI-RELIGIOUS CAMPAIGN

The most significant and the most unexpected development in Soviet-Islamic relations since Afghanistan, is the launching in 1980 of an intense anti-Islamic propaganda campaign by all Soviet mass media. This campaign may be compared to the last anti-Islamic drive under Khrushchev. According to *Knizhnaiia Letopis'*, 154 anti-religious books and pamphlets were published in the USSR in 1980. Of this total, 27 (or 17.5 per cent) were devoted to Islam.[2] In contrast to the 1970s, when the brunt of the anti-Islamic campaign was directed toward the North Caucasus, the main targets of the current campaign are the Central Asian republics. In 1982, this campaign gained strength. Last year, 195 anti-religious books and pamphlets were published in the USSR of which 44 (or 22.6 per cent) were aimed at Islam.[3]

The character of the 1980-81 campaign is not basically different from the propaganda of the 1970s. Although more massive,[4] it is no more sophisticated, using essentially the same old themes: the incompatibility of science and religion, the superiority of communist morals over religious morals, and the necessity to eradicate obnoxious "survivals of the past". There are in the present campaign, however, two themes little used before to which we should pay particular attention. These are, first, a concern about the anti-social and anti-socialist nature of Islam and, second, the danger of counter-propaganda by religious activists. To underscore the latter point, the Deputy Director of the Propaganda and Agitation Section of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan noted in November 1980 that

> Everywhere religious activists are adapting themselves to the new conditions in social and economic life of the working class... [As a result] a revival is taking place in various religious ideologies. Young people are now replacing the old believers in Christian churches and in Islam.[5]

The Deputy Director did not elaborate on the "new conditions in social and economic life".

Another interesting shift is noticeable. In the 1970s, Soviet authorities launched a strong campaign against "parallel Islam" – meaning, primarily, against the resurgent Sufi brotherhoods – which at that time was seen to threaten especially from the North Caucasus. The current campaign, while not ignoring the North Caucasus altogether, again has as its main target the Central Asian republics. Targeted for special attention are Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, territories where the clanic-tribal structure of native society has been well preserved.[6] The First Secretary of the Kazakhstan Communist Party Central Committee and member of the ruling Soviet Politburo, Dinmuhammed Kunaev, as recently as February 1981 lamented that the observance of religious rituals is not declining in Kazakhstan and that even Communist Party members are participating in them.[7] (According to persistent reports, Kunaev himself is not above suspicion, having spent lavishly some years ago for a ritual ceremony and feast to mark the circumcision of his son, an event from which the general public was sealed off by a cordon of MVD troops.)

In Turkmenistan, at the Congress of the Communist Party held in January 1981, a complaint was voiced that district Party committees and the Party primary organizations are reluctant to conduct anti-religious work. As a consequence, "self-appointed *mullahs* and *ishans* [Sufi leaders] have established themselves in various 'holy places'".[8] A Turkmen newspaper noted the case of an interesting

Jekyll and Hyde, a teacher of history and member of the Communist Party who, "after imparting proper materialist concepts to his pupils during school hours, afterwards transforms himself into a Sufi *ishan*".[9] On 9 January 1982, *Turkmenskaia Iskra* published a long and curious article entitled "The Real Face of the *Ishan* – The Truth about the Holy Places". The article describes and denounces working "holy places" and singles out for special attention the fortress of Dinli Qala', where the Akbal tribe of the Tekke federation twice fought the Russians: victoriously in 1879, when a Russian attack was beaten back, and ruinously in 1881, when Russian troops stormed the fortress and slaughtered the entire population. Among the leaders of the resistance was Kurban-Murad *ishan*, a hereditary Sufi sheikh who escaped the massacre. Today Kurban-Murad is considered a saint, and his tomb at Dinli Qala' is the centre of an active pilgrimage whose significance seems to be more political than spiritual ("Among the pilgrims figure people who are not believers"). The authors of the article denounce the *ishan* as a fanatic who was responsible for the slaughter of the Turkmen population. The implicit message of their denunciation concerns not the distant past of the Turkmen people but the situation in Central Asia today. Conveyed to the readers is the notion that Sufi adepts – and, more broadly, all religious "fanatics" – are traitors who will lead the Turkmen to doom. One can easily see how this message is calculated to encompass the situation in Iran and its real and potential impact in Soviet Central Asia. There may be a message for the Afghan resistance fighters as well. Clearly the authors mean to impart that opposition to Russia is hopeless in light of its superior armies. In this sense, bloodshed – even wholesale massacres – can be seen not as the responsibility of the Russians who actually carry them out, but of the irresponsible resistance leaders who hopelessly subject their peoples to a confrontation with an immovable force.

In Azerbaidzhan, too, the campaign against "parallel Islam" is gaining momentum. In *Nauka i Religiia* (May 1980), A. Fatullaoglu of Baku decries the exploitation of "holy places" by Sufi adepts. These places, he contends, have become "centres of active religious propaganda and springboards for the dissemination of superstitions".[10]

There are many similarities between the current anti-Islamic campaign and those of earlier years, but there is also one more ominous difference: the 1980-81 campaign has a harsh and brutal edge to it, quite different from the "scientific" and relatively moderate propaganda of the post-Khrushchev period. All communists, all honest Soviet citizens, are now being reminded that it is their duty to engage in a "merciless struggle against religion, which poisons minds, and against superstitious survivals".[11]

THE DANGER OF "IMPERIALIST SUBVERSION"

In contrast to the anti-Islamic compaigns of the 1970s, today central and local authorities continually warn the population of Central Asia of the dangers of foreign subversion and of a resurgence of local nationalism, whether inspired from outside or by internal conditions. These warnings are backed up implicitly by more potent reminders: simultaneous campaigns praising the Border Guards, an arm of the KGB, leave little doubt that Soviet authorities are prepared to deal with "imperialist provocations". Thus, throughout 1980, the Central Asian and Caucasian press frequently published accounts of real of imaginary violations of Soviet borders by "foreign agents", and these accounts were inevitably concluded by the capture of the culprit by the vigilant guardians of Soviet frontiers.

The abundant literature glorifying the Red Army, the Border Guards and the KGB, with special emphasis on the glorious legacy of "our brave Chekisty" and of "Iron Feliks",[12] is equally significant and its meaning is also clear.

In December 1980, Soviet mass media gave exceptional coverage to several Party Conferences of the KGB and of the Border Guards of the Transcaucasian and Central Asian military districts. These conferences were attended by the highest Party members and by the KGB and Army high commanders.[13] The emphasis was laid on the necessity "to increase the vigilance and the fighting readiness of our units in order to ensure the inviolability of our borders",[14] "to oppose a resolute rebuff to any attempt to hinder the peaceful labour of Soviet people"[15] and to "unmask the alien ideology and the aggressive policy of Imperialism and of Maoism".[16]

Especially significant was the celebration of the 60th anniversary of the foundation of the Azerbaidzhan KGB, on 23 December 1980 in Baku. The ceremony was chaired by Haidar Aliev, the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Azerbaidzhan (and a former KGB general), who presented a lengthy report exalting the "glorious path of the Azerbaidzhan KGB" and the "glorious Chekist traditions of boundless devotion, courage, moral purity and implacability in the struggle against the enemies of the revolution".[17]

Indeed, the general style of the Central Asian and Caucasian mass media has undergone considerable change. In the 1970s, emphasis was placed on the classical theme of "Leninist friendship" between the minority nationalities of the USSR and the dominant Russians. Currently, emphasis is on the ability of the centre – meaning the Russians – to maintain order in the borderlands and to eliminate various domestic and foreign subversive elements.

One theme has become particularly popular since the invasion of

Afghanistan: the fate of the Basmachi Central Asian guerilla fighters who contested the Russians' reconquest of Central Asia in the 1920s. In the past, discussion of the Basmachi has been, with few exceptions, more or less taboo. Today, however, several major studies in Russian have been produced on this phenomenon; in memoirs, historical surveys and novels in the languages of Central Asia the Basmachi also figure prominently. For the most part, these new representations have little to do with historical reality. Rather, their purely political message is directed toward the Muslims of Central Asia and Russians who are fighting the Afghan war.

Two aspects of the 1920s fight against the Basmachi are stressed in today's literature. First, the Basmachi are considered to have been a strong movement, primarily because they "received extensive support from outside . . . Anglo-American imperialism was the true organizer and inspirer of the Basmachi movement, supplying the [Basmachi] bands with weapons, equipment, money, advisers, and even with uniforms[!]".[18] The second theme is that the Basmachi survived as long as they did – some accounts have them harassing the Russians until the mid-1930s, although it is generally conceded that the Basmachis' main effort was spent by the late 1920s–because Soviet power was at that time quite weak. This claim demonstrates again the flexibility of Soviet historical science, which in the 1920s insisted to the contrary on the rapidity of the Soviet victory.

The meaning of these treatments of the Basmachi is transparent. To the Muslims of Central Asia, Soviet authorities are saying: "We have beaten you before and, if necessary, we will beat you again." To the Russians the message is somewhat different: "In the 1920s, when Soviet power was still weak and vulnerable, we defeated a powerful and well-organized rebellion supported by strong outside forces. Today, the Soviet army is the world's strongest and it will crush the Afghan rebellion. The collapse of the Basmachi movement was historically inevitable. So it is for the Afghan rebels."[19] Increasingly, the problem of the Basmachis is being linked directly to the war in Afghanistan. For example, in a recent article in *Kommunist Tadzhikistana* (13 January 1982) entitled "Basmachestvo – Lessons of History", the author, R. Masov, explains that long before the guerilla war in Afghanistan the Soviets had learned a rich historical lesson in their struggle against the Basmachi. Masov also implies that the war may last for some time, for it took some time to deal with the Basmachi.

Soviet authorities have been particularly wary lest events in Iran and Afghanistan stimulate anti-Russian or pro-Islamic nationalism among Soviet Muslims. Again, any unfavourable change in the nationalist climate in Central Asia is thought by Soviet authorities

to be the result of foreign propaganda and agents. The most explicit acknowledgement of this to date came from O.S. Redzhepova, a high-ranking member of the Turkmen Communist Party. In the rather obscure *Izvestiia Akademii Nauk Turkmenskoi SSR* in April 1981, Redzhepova levelled strong criticism at a number of Western scholars[20] and then went on to acknowledge:

> An important and well-trained army of ideological diversionists, posessing the newest techniques, have been thrown on the propaganda front of the Cold War waged by the Imperialists against the USSR. We must not underestimate this reactionary force, nor its capacity to influence the hearts and the intelligence of the people. Our intelligentsia has a special responsibility in the struggle against the hostile ideology and propaganda. Not only because its task before the Nation and the Party is to unmask the false, calumnious character of the bourgeois propaganda, but also because our intelligentsia is on one of the main objectives of the ideological manoeuvres of the Imperialists. It is essentially among our intellectuals that our enemies are looking for potential dissidents . . .[21]

Other warnings echo that of Redzhepova. All are notable for their candour in acknowledging that nationalist ideas are powerful among Central Asians and especially among the Central Asian intelligentsia. For example, K. Nazirov in *Kommunist Tadzhikistana* (5 January 1982) describes "imperialist activity in Central Asia, whose final goal is to set Russians and Central Asians against one another", and denounces among the most dangerous perpetrators such diverse institutions as Radio Liberty, the Russian Research Centre at Harvard and the Russian Institute of Columbia University, and Professor Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone of Carleton University in Ottawa. Nazirov adds: "We must not underestimate either the ideological power of the world bourgeoisie or its ability to influence Soviet countries. Ideological myths of the Imperialists can be very dangerous." M. Uzbekov, writing in *Pravda Vostoka* (1 January 1982), adds the BBC, the Voice of America, the Institute for the Study of Islam in Pakistan, and an organization called Turks for the Liberation of Turkestan in Jakarta to the list of offensive subverters. And I. Anoslikin, writing in *Pravda Vostoka* (7 January 1982), *Sovetskaia Kirgizia* (5 January 1982), and *Kazakhstanskaia Pravda* (17 January 1982), denounced the efforts of "imperialists" and local nationalists to resuscitate "localism" (*mestnichestvo*) and to idealize "the past and reactionary traditions and customs".

Warnings against "imperialist subversion" and against resurgent local nationalism are particularly numerous in the three republics

bordering Iran and Afghanistan: Turkmenistan, Tadzhikistan, and Azerbaidzhan. They reveal a certain nervousness by Soviet authorities about the real possibility of a spillover of events from the turbulent Middle East. It is yet too early to appreciate whether this fear is warranted.

"RELIGIOUS TERRORISM"

According to Soviets who visit the West, information concerning terrorist activity and the trials of the so-called "religious fanatics" appears regularly in the local Central Asian press, media which are not available in the West. Much of this same information is reproduced in various anti-religious pamphlets published in the Muslim republics. These are our main sources on "religious terrorism".

The most spectacular terrorist act during the last two years was the assassination of Sultan Ibrahimov, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Kirghiz SSR on 4 December 1980 in a sanatorium of the Ferghana valley. The murder was announced in a brief communique published in the *Pravda* of 5 December without comment, except that the Prime Minister had perished (*pogib*) in his fifty-fourth year. No explanations were given and no assassin was arrested. However, according to a Soviet official who talked over the telephone to an AFP correspondent, "the murder was politically motivated". "It was a provocation before the opening of the 26th Congress of the Communist Party of USSR."[22] According to Western journalists in Moscow, "Unofficial reports from Moscow offered a different and more plausible explanation: that Sultan Ibrahimov was probably murdered by Muslim nationalists."[23]

Since the war, there has been no evidence of any Muslim nationalist unrest in Kirghizia and it is highly improbable that a political underground group was responsible for the assassination of a high ranking Party member. On the other hand, the Kirghiz press provides abundant information on a "criminal" religious organization,[24] whose adepts might well be responsible for the murder.

This organization is the Sufi Brotherhood of the "Hairy Ishans" (*Chachtuu Eshander* in Kirghiz, *Volosatye Ishany* in Russian), a dissident branch of the old mystic Yasawiya *tariqa* brotherhood,[25] which was founded in the late 1920s in the eastern, Kirghiz, part of the Ferghana valley and later spread to the Uzbek and Tadzhik territories. The brotherhood practised the loud *zikr*[26] with ecstatic songs and dances. Soviet sources have accused the "Hairy Ishans" of anti-Soviet activity and of close cooperation with the Basmachis.[27] After 1928, the brotherhood went underground, but was unmasked in 1935–1936 and, according to Soviet sources, partially "liquidated".[28]

The *tariqa* was "rediscovered" again in 1959-1960, when several of

its leaders were arrested, tried and in 1963 condemned to deportation. On this occasion, members of the brotherhood were accused of active subversion, of "preparing the destruction of the Soviet administration" and its replacement by a theocratic regime, a *Musulmanabad.*[29] The adepts of the *tariqa* refused to pay taxes, did not send their children to Soviet schools, tried to escape military conscription and indulged in violent anti-Soviet propaganda.

However, the brotherhood survived, because, as one Kirghiz specialist, Mambetaliev, pointed out: "It is impossible to destroy, in a single stroke, a sect with such a long history of clandestinity." After 1963, the brotherhood became a secret society, whose adepts practise *taqiya* – an official right to apostasy.[30]

In January 1981, the Soviet press released another curious piece of information concerning Muslim religious terrorism, this time in North Caucasus. This information figured in an article (an appeal for more efficient anti-religious propaganda) by a certain Dmitri Bezuglyi, editor of the journal *Groznenskii Rabochii* (Grozni, Checheno-Ingush ASSR) in the Moscow periodical, *Zhurnalist.*[31] The author, probably a KGB executive, describes as follows the pressure exercised by "reactionary sectarians" on the population of the Chechen-Ingush republic:

> An important (*znachitel'naia*) part of the population of our republic is still under the strong influence of the Muslim religion. Certain clerics and sectarians playing on the confusion between religious and national feelings inflame fanaticism and xenophobia . . . Under the influence of so-called "religious authorities" [a term commonly used in Northern Caucasus to designate the leaders of the Sufi brotherhoods], fanatics bully and persecute Russian teachers and other representatives of our intelligentsia.

To illustrate this pressure, Bezuglyi gives an astounding example of religious terrorism:

> A few years ago, a "fascist", one of those traitors who, during the last war tried to stab Soviet power in the back, was killed in the mountains of Checheno-Ingushetia by MVD units. This bandit, Khasaki Magomedov, had killed forty communists, Soviet activists and Komsomol members. *Groznenskii Rabochii* described his activity in an article called "Under the shadow of the Koran" (the bandit wore on his chest a miniature Koran) and asks the following question: "How was it possible that a Hitlerite bandit could survive for thirty years . . . sowing death and terror?" *Groznenskii Rabochii* explains it by the traditional "collective solidarity" (*krugovaiia poruka*). Numbers of people

> knew of the bandit but covered for him, because it would have been a shameful violation of the traditional hospitality of the mountain dwellers to betray anybody to the authorities, even a killer . . . .

The activity of this *abrek*,[32] who, though an old man, terrorized the country for nearly forty years, may also be explained by the religious background of the Checheno-Ingush country. Sufi adepts played an important role in the uprising in Chechnia in 1941-43, an event that was followed by the deportation of the entire population in February 1944 and the liquidation of the territory as a separate administrative unit.[33] Especially active at this time was the *tariqa* of Batal Haji, a branch of the Qadiriya *tariqa*,[34] which was founded in the late 19th century by Batal Haji Belhoroev as a branch of the Qadiriya *tariqa*.[35] This radical Sufi order, whose centre was and continues to be in the district of Nazran in the mountains of Ingushiia, has been since its founding engaged in a "holy war" against the Russians. During the 1941-43 revolt, it was led by Qureish Belhoroev, the last son of the founder. After the defeat of the rebellion, Qureish Belhoroev continued to resist in the mountains until 1947, when he was captured by MVD troops. Condemned to ten years of deportation in Siberia and released in 1957, he returned to Chechnia and, according to Soviet sources, "immediately resumed his criminal activity".[36] Qureish Belhoroev died in 1964, but his brotherhood, though outlawed and hunted, is still very active. It is often mentioned in Caucasian sources as a "bandit Sufi order". The *tariqa* has its own criminal courts, its own budget, a network of Koranic schools and clandestine house of prayer, and, if we are to believe Soviet sources, its own self-defence group.

It is tempting to believe that the *abrek* described by Dmitri Bezuglyi was a member of the Batal Haji *tariqa* and that the protection given to him by the population may be explained not by a medieval tradition of hospitality but by a much stronger religious solidarity. The *Zhurnalist* article, as well as other appeals to fight religious fanaticism, appear to be the psychological preparation for a more serious and sustained attack on "parallel Islam". The various Sufi orders pose a real threat to the tranquillity of Soviet Muslim territories, a threat that Soviet sources now are acknowledging with increasing frequency. It is unclear at this stage whether Sufi activity is greater or simply Soviet official attention to it greater than was the case before recent events in Iran and Afghanistan. In either case, the resurgence of Sufism in the Soviet Union commands our attention.

POPULIST TRENDS AMONG SOVIET MUSLIM INTELLECTUALS?

The general evolution of Soviet Islam in the direction of *mirasism* – the rediscovery of the pre-revolutionary national patrimony – continues in Soviet Central Asia, an evolution that is occasionally aided by the journal of the official Muslim establishment in the USSR, *Muslims of the Soviet East*. This journal has taken the lead in "rehabilitating" 19th century *jadids* – modernist-reformers. During 1981, some new elements appeared in the evolution of *mirasism*. These new elements, described below, may represent only a minor, insignificant phenomenon without serious consequences, but they may also be an expression of a change in the national consciousness of native elites, a change that could clearly mark the beginning of a new chapter in the history of Muslim nationalism in the USSR. Our knowledge of these new populist trends, unfortunately, is superficial, being based more on personal contacts with Soviet Muslims from abroad than on written sources.

Until recently, the *miras* movement encompassed mainly the rediscovery of great ancestors: sovereigns, scholars, poets, religious philosophers and others. Currently, interest is shifting to the pre-revolutionary "people", the *khalq*, and, more precisely, to the "poor people", the *kara khalq*, who are supposed to be more genuinely national than russified and westernized elites. This new interest in "the people" is especially strong among the younger generation of native intelligentsia, including junior members of the Communist Party.[37]

Such a shift is not an unknown desertion of the "establishment" by dissatisfied members of this same establishment. Indeed, precedents are numerous in nearly all societies, including Russian society, such as the *khozhdenie v narod* ("going to the people") movement of young Russian noblemen in the first half of the 19th century. But in Central Asia and the Caucasus, this kind of movement may present a greater danger. It is more than an expression of dissatisfaction and a tentative opposition to the norms of communist life; it is also an expression of latent nationalism. One must not forget that it was this same *khalq*, rather than the native elites, which was responsible for the resistance to Russian conquest in the 19th century and the establishment of Soviet rule: Shamil in the North Caucasus, the 1916 revolt of nomad tribes in Central Asia, the Basmachi, the 1920-23 revolt in Daghestan and Chechnia, and others.

STRONGER CHINESE PRESSURE

The last development in Central Asia which may explain the defensive

attitude of Soviet authorities toward Islam is the strengthening of Chinese anti-Russian propaganda. In 1980, the Chinese government began, cautiously, to imitate the Soviet practice of using their religious leaders as propagandists and itinerant ambassadors. For the first time, Chinese Muslim clerics appeared in the Muslim world abroad. In January 1981, Salih an-Shinwei, *imam* of the "Dongsi" mosque in Beijing, was invited to Pakistan and became one of the 12 members of the Executive Committee of the Islamic Council for the Coordination of the Muslim League.[38] His first act was a violent attack against "Soviet imperialism", an expression of a deep concern for the Afghan Muslims slaughtered by the Russians, and an appeal for the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan.

It is certainly premature to speculate on the possible impact of the new Chinese pro-Islamic strategy on Central Asia, but once again it seems that Soviet authorities are taking this new menace quite seriously, judging by the growing number of anti-Chinese articles and broadcasts in Central Asian mass media. One may wonder whether, in the long run, the Chinese, in spite of heavy initial handicaps, are not better prepared to use Islam for their benefit and to play the role of the "best friend of Islam" than the Russians. In China Islam is almost a "national religion" (half of the Muslims in China are ethnic Chinese), while for the Russians, Islam has always been and remains today a hostile alien body.[39]

CONCLUSIONS

Because our knowledge is so limited at this stage, we would be foolhardy to postulate any final conclusions. However, there is sufficient evidence to show that the Soviet leadership believes that the first articulations of the Middle East crisis are dangerous enough to warrant serious measures to isolate and protect its Muslim territories from foreign contamination. The question is, is an iron curtain (or, perhaps, an "iron carpet") possible under the conditions of the newly destabilized Middle East? It would appear that the Soviet leadership is redefining its relationship to its own Muslim establishment and toward the continued existence of Islam in the Soviet state. If we are to take seriously the Soviets' own references to the growing activity of various "subversive elements", of religious terrorists and other "fanatics", as well as of those young people who are rediscovering their Muslim roots, then it is logical to conclude that any effort to isolate Soviet Muslims from the rest of the Muslim world – or for that matter from the events in Iran and Afghanistan – is fraught with difficulties. How well Soviet authorities can accomplish this task may well be an important determinant in the future of the Soviet state.

NOTES

1. Our knowledge of the political life of Central Asia and of the Caucasus is limited and one-sided. Few Muslim *samizdat* publications have reached the West (they concern mainly the Crimean Tatars and the Meskhetian Turks). The voices of Central Asian dissenters, if any, are not heard abroad. We are obliged therefore to rely almost exclusively on official Soviet sources.
2. Out of this total, 2 concern Islam in general, 7 Uzbekistan, 4 Turkmenistan, 2 Tadzhikistan, 2 Kazakhstan, 2 Daghestan, 2 North Caucasus, 2 Azerbaidzhan, 1 respectively the Chechens, the Uighurs, the Tatars, Ossetia, Kirghiz, and Karakalpakistan. 14 were in Russian, 5 in Uzbek, 2 in Azeri, 2 in Kazakh, 1 respectively in Turkmen, in Uighur, in Tadzhik and in Ossetian.
3. 4 concerned Islam in general, 3 Uzbekistan, 2 Tadzhikistan, 2 Kazakhstan, and 1 respectively Kirghizia, Turkmenistan and the Uighurs. 8 were in Russian, 3 in Uzbek, 1 respectively in Kirghiz, in Turkmen and in Uighur. In 1978, out of the 144 anti-religious books and pamphlets published in the USSR, 32 (22.2%) were devoted to Islam. In 1976, the proportion was only 11.3%.
4. According to A. Artem'ev, "Current tasks of atheist propaganda", *Qazaqstan Kommunisti*, Alma-Ata, No. 11 (1980), pp. 36-41 (in Kazakh), in 1979-1980 in Kazakhstan alone there were 84 "People's Universities of Scientific Atheism", with more than 10,000 students. The universities of Alma-Ata and Karaganda had special "Scientific Atheism Divisions" with more than 1000 students. During the first six months of 1981, some 4000 anti-religious lectures were delivered and 30 anti-religious films shown in Tadzhikistan (cf. S. Dadabaeva, "It will not be unaided", *Kommunist Tadzhikistana*, 31 October 1980).
5. A. Artem'ev, pp. 39-40.
6. Already in 1965, a Tadzhik specialist of anti-religious propaganda wrote: "Today, the only religious survival which represents a real obstacle to the victory of the scientific-materialist outlook in our republic is the belief in the *ishans* (sheikhs of the Sufi Orders). A. Safarov, *Bakimandanho-yi Parastesh-i Eshanho, va Rohho-yi bartaraf kardani Onho dar Tajikiston* (The survivals of the cult of the Ishans in Tadzhikistan and how to overcome them), Dushanbe, 1965, p. 3 (in Tadzhik).
7. *Kazakhstanskaiia Pravda*, 5 February 1981, in B. Brown, "The phenomenon of self-appointed mollahs", *Radio Liberty Research*, 220/81, 29 May 1981.
8. *Pravda* (Moscow), 19 January 1981.
9. *Turkmenskaia Iskra*, May 1981; Brown gives a detailed description of the case.
10. Fatulla ӧglu, "Prostye sekrety 'sviatykh' mest" (Simple secrets of Holy Places), *Nauka i Religiia*, No. 5, May 1980, pp. 31-33.
11. A. Artem'ev, p. 41.
12. "Zheleznyi Feliks" – nickname of Dzerzhinskii, the Polish nobleman who was the founder and the first chairman of the Cheka.
13. Commentaries in *Krasnaia Zvezda*, Moscow, 20 December 1980, on the Central Asian Border Guards Party Conference held in Ashhabad on 19 December 1980; *Zaria Vostoka*, Tbilisi, 13 December 1980 on the Transcaucasian Border Guards Party Conference held in Tbilisi on 12 December 1980; *Kazakhstanskaia Pravda*, Alma-Ata, 24 December 1980 on the Easten Border District Party Conference held in Alma-Ata on 23 December 1981.

14. *Zaria Vostoka*, 13 December 1980.
15. *Krasnaia Zvezda*, 20 December 1980.
16. *Kazakhstanskaia Pravda*, 24 December 1980.
17. *Bakinskii Rabochii*, Baku, 25 December 1980.
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22. *AFP*, Moscow, 5 December 1980, *FBIS – Sov.*, 80/237, 8 December 1980, R-2.
23. *Economist*, London, 17-23 January 1981, "Down in Kirghizia something stirs".
24. Satybaldy Mambetaliev, *Perezhitki nekotorykh Musul'manskikh techenii v Kirghizii i ikh istoriia* (Survivals of some Muslim trends in Kirghizia and their history), Frunze, 1969, and by the same author, *Sufizm zhana anyng Kyrghyzystangagy agymdary* (Sufism and its survival in Kirghizia), Frunze, 1972 (in Kirghiz); also a collection of documents published by the Central Archival Department of Kirghiz SSR, *Protiv religioznogo obmana i mrakobesiia* (Against the religious deception and obscurantism), Frunze, 1970.
25. Founded in the 12th century by the mystic poet Ahmed Yasawi. His tomb, in the city of Turkistan, is one of the most celebrated places of pilgrimage of Central Asia.
26. Collective prayers, either silent or loud, with songs, music and dances, which represent the essential element of the Sufi ritual.
27. Anti-Soviet Muslim guerilla movement which started in 1918 and lasted until 1928. The Ferghana valley was one of its centres.
28. Satybaldy Mambetaliev, *Sufizm.*, *op. cit.*, pp. 47-52, quoting *Pravda Vostoka*, 24, 25, 26 October and 5 November 1935.
29. *Protiv Religioznogo Obmana . . .*, *op. cit.*, pp. 159-165, reproduces the documents concerning the trial of the leaders of the sect which took place on 10-12 August 1963 in Jelalabad; also S. Mambetaliev, *Perezhitki . . .*, *op. cit.*, pp. 38-39, quoting *Lenin Zholu*, a Kirghiz newspaper from Frunze, 10 February 1960 and by the same author, *Sufizm.*, *op. cit.*, p. 54, quoting *Lenin Zholu*, 19 March 1961.
30. *Perezhitki . . .*, *op. cit.*, pp. 38-39. The *taqiya*, a legal right to apostasy, has been traditionally practised by the Shias living in a hostile Sunni environment.
31. Dmitri Bezuglyi, "S pozitsii boitsa" (From the position of a fighter), *Zhurnalist*, Moscow, 1, 1981, pp. 46-48.
32. *Abrek*, "bandit of honour", a traditional institution in Northern Caucasus, especially popular in Daghestan and in Checheno-Ingushetia. Under tsarist rule, the *abreks* were often religious leaders, sheikhs of Sufi *tariqas*.
33. On the 1941-1943 uprising, Abdurrahman Avtorkhanov, *Narodoubiistvo v SSSR – Narodoubiistvo Chechenskogo naroda* (The genocide in the USSR – the genocide of the Chechen people), Munich, 1952, and Patrik von der Muhlen, *Zwischen Hackenkreuz und Sowjetsterne – Der Natsionalismus der Sowjetischen Orientvolker in dem zweiten Weltkrieg*, Dusseldorf,

1971.

34. Qadiriya, an order founded in Bagdad in the XIIth century by Abdul Qadir al-Jilani, was introduced into the North Caucasus in the late 1850s by a Kumyk, Kunta Haji Kishiev, who died in a Siberian camp in 1867. After his death, the *tariqa* split into several branches (*wird*), among which the Batal Haji order was the most puritan and the most xenophobic. The adepts of this last order took part in all anti-Soviet revolts in North Caucasus after 1920. Between 1928 and 1936, nine sons and seven grandsons of Batal Haji Belhoroev, the founder of the brotherhood, were killed in battle or executed by the Soviets.
35. An abundant literature has been devoted to this brotherhood; among other works are Husain Mamleev, *Reaktsionnaia Sushchnost' Muridizma* (The reactionary essence of Muridism), Grozni, 1966, and by the same author, *Nekotorye Osobennosti Islama v Checheno-Ingushetii* (Some pecularities of Islam in Checheno-Ingushetia), Grozni, 1970; A. Tutaev, *Reaktsionnaia Sekta Batal Haji*, Grozni, 1968, and M. M. Mustafinov, *Zikrizm i ego Sotsial'naia Sushchnost'* (Zikrizm and its social essence), Grozni, 1971.
36. A. Tutaev, p. 8.
37. Heard in a Paris cafe in September 1981 during a discussion between Khalqi students: "Let's get rid of the Parchamis and of the Russians; we could always find a common language with the Mojahidins, we both belong to the Poor People".
38. *FBIS-China*, 81/011, 16 January 1981, A/1, quoting *Zinhua*, in English, 1941 GMT, 8 January 1981, and *FBIS-China* 81/008, 13 January 1981, F/2, quoting *Xinhua* in English, 0258 GMT, 10 January 1981.
39. In 1980 an American visitor counted some 100 "working" mosques in the relatively modest city of Turfan while there are only two "working" mosques in Bukhara, one of the most prestigious historical centres of Islam. Tashkent, the fourth largest city of the USSR, has only 12 "working" mosques. In 1980, the Chinese government reestablished the Arabic script for the Uighur and Kazakh languages in Sinkiang, instead of the Latin alphabet, partly used since 1973.

The Present Situation in the Hazarajat

"B.M."

INTRODUCTION

Since the invasion of Afghanistan, Hazarajat, which has been under intermittent attack from Government troops, has distinguished itself by the quality of its military and civil administration. Hazara society still has a rural and tribal structure; however, even a short description will show that the traditional social equilibrium has been upset and will pinpoint the danger of such a situation at a time when exterior influences are strengthening newly emerging trends.

The size of the Hazara population has always been officially underestimated by one or two million; the Hazara themselves suggest four million (which probably includes the emigre population outside Hazarajat).

GEOGRAPHY

Hazarajat is a mountain chain situated in the centre of Afghanistan. The Hindu Kush mountain range slopes eastwards to the Warsak, westwards to the Taimani plateau, southwards towards Kandahar, and northwards to Mazar-e-Sharif; the slope is abrupt and the summits reach 3500 metres, while the cultivated valleys are usually as high as 2500-3500 metres. The region has a geomorphological similarity to the desert of Dasht-e-Nahur, which every spring becomes a swamp that dries eventually in the summer to leave pastures which can be cultivated from the beginning of June to the end of September.

Snow does not melt for six months during the winter, yet an exclusively agrarian economy has allowed the Hazaras to survive there for several centuries. The exact date of their arrival in this inhospitable land is unknown. They are meticulous farmers with an old agricultural tradition.

ECONOMY

The population density is remarkably high, and while the shortage of land only allows the existence of small communities, no cultivable land remains unexploited thanks to the *karez* (underground canals) which compensate for the weak and irregular flow of the streams even in places where the wind is too strong to allow trees to grow. The mountains are naturally almost completely treeless, all the trees there having been planted, among them the poplars which are vital for building frames for houses. Fruit trees are found only in the plains and in a few places where a milder climate allows two harvests a year.

Cultivation is limited to cereals and fodder crops, supplementary feeding for the flocks and herds (sheep, goats, a very few horses and cows) being provided by the collection of bushes in the mountains, which also provide heating for the winter months.

Resources, other than agricultural, are limited. There is no easy way to cross the Hazarajat as the main road, Kabul-Kandahar-Ghazbi, bypasses it. Only villages situated near cities enjoy the benefits of commerce, which include basic manufactured goods, imports of corn, the sale of cattle and wood (there are tree plantations in the few areas where there is enough water). Seasonal or permanent migration to the cities also provides some extra income.

At first glance, there is nothing in the material culture of the Hazaras to distinguish their villages from those of the nearby Pashtuns apart from the fact that due to poverty their grain jars and houses are smaller. Yoghourt is prepared in the same type of earthenware jar, bread is baked in a *tandur* (as in Iran), which is also used for heating the living rooms through the ground, the oven being placed under the floor. A good quality cloth called *barak* is produced in the Hazarajat – this is one of the few remaining crafts practised.

When at the end of the last century, as a result of its conquest by Abd-ul-Rahman, Hazarajat entered into the national marketplace, articles of craftsmanship almost disappeared, to be replaced by manufactured goods; basic products are now brought from the cities and are sold in some of the bazaars. Demand, however, is small, due to lack of money, as the agricultural and pastoral lifestyle barely allows self-sufficiency.

Mineral resources are the iron in Hadjigak (south of Bamyan) and coal in Dar-e-Suf (south of Mazar-e-Sharif). There is no industry in Hazarajat and there are no towns.

At present this poor and isolated region has drawn attention to itself by the quality of its military and civil administration when facing Soviet aggression. A centralized political organization,

independent of political parties outside Afghanistan, has emerged in Hazarajat. Its appearance is not due to the talent of any one particular person, but rather to the strong cohesion typical of tribal and village life. Its influence, however, does not extend beyond the borders of the region.

SOCIAL ORGANISATION

HISTORICAL DOCUMENTS

There is no written history of Hazarajat. The population has never been the dominant ethnic group of Afghanistan and unlike some Pashtun tribes, the Hazaras have no historical documents. Due to the inaccessibility of this mountain range, travellers to Central Asia in past centuries have given no information about it.

Only British officers have, for political reasons, studied the Hazarajat. Their works, however, have not been published, whereas English reports about other local populations are now available.

The sources I have been able to use are therefore extremely limited. I have had access to the reports of Dafadar Mohamed, Akbar Khan and Subadar Mohamed Husein, written for Lieutenant-Colonel P. J. Maitland, during their travels in the Dai Kundi and Besud areas. The publication date of these reports was 1888. However, the information on the distribution of the various Hazara tribes is still relevant today.

THE TRIBES

There are basically ten large tribes in Hazarajat. They are (in alphabetical order): Besud, Dai Kundi, Dai Mirdad, Dai Zangi, Jaghatu, Jaghori, Mohamed Khwoja, Polada, Shahar Dasta, Uruzgani. At the end of the 19th century there was no federal organization to head these ten tribes, nor did each have a leader. There was a *mir* or *beg* for one or several fractions of each tribe.

This lack of unity is witnessed nowadays in their vocabulary: the Arabic word *qaum* is used to designate a tribe and also a division of a tribe, instead of *ta'efa, pai* or *dasta.* Divisions and sub-divisions vary in size and consequently in importance.

However, local organization is very strong, and belonging to the division and sub-division of a tribe is an essential factor in the social integration of an individual. Every Hazara can give the list of the villages of his tribe, divisions and sub-divisions. He will also know to which divisions neighbouring villages belong.

Valleys and villages are remarkably homogeneous. This area is highly differentiated from a geographical point of view, and each division occupies part, or all, of a valley. Intermediate zones are, on the other hand, populated by two divisions.

No alien ethnic group has lived in Hazarajat since Pashtun government representatives acting as civil and military administrators were expelled after becoming Khalqis. Pashtuns are still settled as colonials in some peripheral Hazara lands (Uruzgan, Qarabagh).

THE VILLAGES

It is a point of honour among the Hazaras not to appeal to Pashtu and Sunni legislation to solve their internal conflicts. Justice, administration and education are, therefore, always local. An administrative unit, depending on the geography of the area and the density of the population, would comprise two, three, or more villages, each one, of course, within the same tribal division.

As the villages are small, each house is known to all the members of the group. This is enough to provide the necessary basis for administration, despite the lack of any real census.

Usually, each village has two or three fortresses (*qala*) which are rectangular in shape, and no larger than our own European fortified farms. They were used in the past as refuges in case of attack. There are of course a few houses outside the *qalas*. The fortresses are very crowded; each family lives in two small rooms with practically no windows. There are often two floors in each dwelling, the cattle and the *tandur* which heats the upper rooms being on the ground floor. If the *qala* is in good condition (some are ruined though still inhabited) then one of the most important families in the village will have its house built in the depths of the main walls.

Most of the villagers own some land, generally insufficient for their needs. They then have to hire themselves as servants or farm hands – their livelihood depends on those who can furnish them with work.

THE KHANS

The survival of the power of the old families is due to the fact that their wealth is not divisible, and to the automatic right of the first-born to inherit. The names of the great families mentioned by J. P. Maitland at the end of the last century are still known today. Several brothers under the leadership of the eldest one – the Khan – would administer their property together in what is called a *Khanawar*. Younger brothers are also called khans, as in "brothers of the Khan". In some areas the hereditary titles of *mir* and *beg* are still used.

There are apparently some big landowners in the centre of Hazarajat, who because of the proximity of a town, have invested outside Hazarajat, such as in shops, transport or trade. Their fortunes, however, seem modest. The khans are not the only ones to have been investing. There are notables in the villages who do not belong to any old established family. They are called *malek* (if they

held this function in the old regime), *hadji* or *karbolai* (if they have been able to make the pilgrimage to Mecca, or the closer holy place of Karbala in Iraq) or are known by the title of *zahed*. These titles are not hereditary.

However, wealth is not judged by the amount of capital, but by the generosity that a notable can show when receiving guests. In this country with an agrarian civilization (forgetting for the purposes of this article the Mongol aspect of Hazara culture) where one can still find rams' horns decorating the tombs of saints, wealth, above all, means food.

It is difficult to travel in Hazarajat: there are few roads or tracks, few means of transport, the terrain is rough and most travelling has to be done by foot. For prestige and security reasons one has to travel in groups outside one's own territory, and there are few tea houses away from the main roads.

The khan or notable is therefore the one who can offer food and shelter to guests. In wartime this is particularly important; the knowledge that one can be sheltered and fed is a pre-requisite for any move, as requisition by armed forces does not happen in Hazarajat.

The wealth of a khan is measured by the size of his reception room, which shows how many guests he can house and feed. All the inhabitants of a *qala* share in the upkeep of travellers. If the guests are not important enough or if no notables can receive them (there currently is overpopulation, as people have moved from the areas devastated by government troops) they will be housed in the mosque, where unmarried men normally sleep.

The mosque is above all the meeting place for men and for notables, including the *mullahs*.

THE MULLAHS

The mullahs are in charge of religious education which is the only type of education commonly available in Hazarajat, schools being rare owing to the small villages, and the difficulty of travelling during several months of the year, as well as the lack of interest on the part of the government in developing the region.

To be able to read the Koran and write in Persian – the Hazaras speak a dialect (Hazaraji) which is closely related to Dari – remains the privilege of families who are rich enough to free their children from domestic and agricultural work and to pay the mullah in food for their education. The situation of the mullahs can be compared to that of the French village priests before the 1789 Revolution. They have a modest income, with the exception of those who are allowed to collect *khoms* – at present this is done in the name of the Imam Khomeini. Their main privilege is the ability to avoid harsh agricultural work.

Apart from their role in ceremonial life (weddings, funerals) the mullahs also, as in other Islamic countries, treat ailments by *tawiz* (charms, amulets) and *showiz* (a drink made by diluting the ink of a few written lines from the Koran). In addition to these functions, some mullahs double up as magicians (*jadudak*) – in spite of it being *haram* – to help avoid bad luck and to fight against the evil eye.

Few mullahs are able to finish their education in Iran. No religious school exists in Hazarajat (but there is one in Kabul). The prestige of the mullahs is due to their knowledge (reading and writing) and their power over life and death. However, they are merely Hazaras, whereas real spiritual power belongs to the *sayyeds*, the descendants of the Prophet, through the twelve Imams who the Shiia Hazaras recognize.

THE SAYYEDS

As opposed to the name of *sayyed*, the common population (which means all the Hazaras) is known by the name of *'am*. The sayyeds are not included in the Hazara tribes and have separate genealogies.

As a rule they do not intermarry with the Hazaras, but will sometimes choose Hazara wives. In this they are no different from the Hazaras themselves, who favour marriage within the close family, among cousins. However, they do make marriages of alliance – like the khans – to strengthen their connections within Hazarajat.

Those of the sayyeds who are wealthy and generally much more so than the khans. They own land, of course, but also collect various taxes in their own right, or in the name of the Shiia clergy of Iran.

They intervene in ritual life (the trying of the belt of boys around the age of ten or twelve) and their powers seem to be in their saliva. The tombs of saints which are places of pilgrimage (*ziarat*) are those of the sayyeds, not of the Hazaras.

The sayyeds are distinguished by their black turbans. They are reputed to look down upon the Hazara population, which is already generally despised in Afghanistan. It is the custom to kiss the hands of the sayyeds.

It is, however, the khans and the local notables who form the backbone of village society, the mullah not being the most important element and the sayyeds not always being rich or numerous enough to be listened to in villages which are based on tribal kinship. Without the khans, the social structure of a village would be completely disorganized and the illiterate villagers would be at the mercy of any alien power (that is, alien to the village) which might choose to replace their old leaders.

Even mighty and respected khans can have their power challenged within the village or tribal fraction: Faiz Mohamed Khan, chief of the Shahar Dasta tribe, was deposed and replaced for having acted

rashly and thus provoked the invasion of Qarabagh by the Afghans in the last century. This still happens nowadays.

The power of the khans is based on their credibility, their honesty and their respect for traditional values. At village level, secrecy is not possible: the servants listen, the neighbours spy and to have an *in camera* meeting is one of the most difficult things imaginable.

What is more, if a villager belongs first of all to his village and tribal division, the same applies to the khan; his *raison d'etre* is defined by his kinship – outside this his social existence would be nil. His power is measured by the number of men (neighbours, farmers, servants) he can gather together under his command, but he has no police to ensure his orders are obeyed.

ATTEMPTS TO DESTROY HAZARAJAT

THE CONQUEST OF HAZARAT BY ABDUL-UL-RAHMAN

Conflicts between the Hazara and Pashtun ethnic groups are probably centuries old. Among the Pashtuns, the traditional enemies of the Hazaras are the nomadic Kuci, who need the Hazarajat highlands during the summer for their flocks. To this clash of economic interests are added religious differences (Sunni-Shiia), linguistic differences (Pashtu-Dari), and racial differences, in that the Hazaras are of Asian origin. Their behaviour is also different; the Hazaras are restrained, the Pashtuns extrovert.

The Hazaras are agriculturalists, working on highlands little fit for this use. The lowlands surrounding Hazarajat are held in the south and west by the Pashtuns and in the north by the Uzbeks. Because of their poverty, the Hazaras have been unable to acquire enough weapons to conquer more favourable agricultural lands in the last century.

Since the political takeover of Afghanistan by the Pashtuns (Ahmed Shah Durani, in the 18th century), their power has continued to grow. In 1893 Hazarajat was finally subjugated. The Hazara tribes living near the towns were forced to pay regular taxes. Their defeat was made worse by numerous indignities (public executions of Hazara chiefs in Kabul, the sale of women and children as slaves) which are still well remembered. The existing chiefs were deposed and replaced by representatives of the victors. There was no rebellion thereafter until the one led by *bacce* Glassou, after World War II.

During the modernization of the Afghan state and its consequent administrative division, Hazarajat disappeared from the map of Afghanistan as an autonomous province. Each Hazara region was attached to a *willayet* comprising non-Hazara ethnic groups.

However, at the local level, administration always remained indirect: it was the *malek* (provincial governor) representing two,

three, or sometimes up to 10 villages, who assumed the co-ordination with central government, which was only represented in the *ulus-wali*, the administrative centre for the region.

Thus local life went on as usual, the regular collection of taxes, however, further impoverishing this already ill-favoured region.

MODERNIZATION

Integration within the Afghan state has enabled the Hazaras, however, to gain access to education (the only means to get one's voice heard at the national level), which was aided by the opening of a primary school in 1953 and of a secondary school around 1950 in Jaghori, as well as in Penjao and a few other administrative centres; the creation of more numerous primary schools only happened in 1960. Meanwhile the Pashtun aristocracy continued to be educated in the West, while the bourgeoisie gained access to the local university. This modernization has strengthened Pashtun supremacy.

During the years which have witnessed the development of political movements issuing from the newly educated classes (Khalq, Parcham), the educated Hazaras have created their own parties, representing oppressed minorities. These parties, dominated by non-Pashtun ethnic groups, have not been associated with the Khalq and Parcham governments (from which the Hazaras are not completely absent).

During the last 10 or 20 years, owing to education and commercial activity, a Hazara middle class has emerged. As a result the title of khan has been devalued. It has lost the aristocratic, hereditary connotation and has become merely the sign of a certain material well being; anybody whose wealth allows him to have more than a certain number of dependents is called khan. This Hazara middle class has been unable to find a place within Afghan society or within the traditional society of Hazarajat.

KHALQ POLICY

Soviet policy aims to break the structure of Hazarajat – as well as of all Afghanistan – to establish a new social system where there would be no place for the khans. The scarcity of land fit for cultivation in Hazarajat means that any more or less egalitarian division of land can only result in equality in poverty (as long as the excess population remains in these mountains), while illiterate Hazaras will fall under foreign domination: Khalq, Parcham or Soviet. Hazarajat has freed itself from Khalq (and Pashtun) oppression since 1979 and has regained its unity. However, propaganda hostile to landowners has not left the population indifferent. The author of a development project for the central regions of Hazarajat remarked as early as 1971 that the situation there was explosive; the lack of land was reducing

the peasants to misery.

One can notice today that, while the military and administrative organization at the local level remains, as in the past, in the hands of the notables, there has been an important change at the management level of the region as a whole.

THE PRESENT-DAY SITUATION

ADMINISTRATION

Hazarajat has a council – *Shura ye Itifaq e Afghanistan* – which assumes the civil administration of the region. The members of the council were chosen in Waras in September 1979 by representatives from every part of Hazarajat. As a matter of fact, most of the council members also belong to various political parties (*Raad, Nirou, Nahzat, Nasr*, etc.) founded in Iran and a great many of them are mullahs, although the khans are also represented. The president of the *Shura* is an ayatollah, the Sayyed Ali Beheshti, whose seat is in the centre of Hazarajat, in an area which is not at the time of writing under attack by the Soviets. (*See postscript – Editor.*)

Recently, the *Shura* has sent to the different *willayets* governors (*wali*) who do not originate from the areas which they administer. In fact, each *willayet* automatically assumes its own administration, especially the organization of the military front if there is war.

MILITARY ORGANIZATION

There are three main fronts in Hazarajat, grouped under the command of Sayyed Hassan, an ex-lieutenant of the Afghan Army who has recently been promoted to general by Sayyed Ali Beheshti. The fronts correspond to the three existing *willayets* in the East of Hazarajat and are situated at the main points of access into the mountain range.

The Ghazni front is commanded by the *arbab* Gharibdad; the Jaghori front, little active militarily, is the site of great political activity (the level of education is higher there and some political parties from outside Hazarajat have offices there). One must also mention the existence of the Turkmen front, commanded by Hadji Nader, and that of Dar-e-Suf, which is very important but is situated much further north.

At the local level, each man if he is old enough to fight and has a gun will defend his village in case of Soviet attacks. Each group of villages has a commander chosen from among the local people.

There is also a recruitment system, according to which each group of villages has to provide a certain contingent yearly. Because the richer people can buy an exemption, it is the poorer who are obliged to go. They must guard strategic points in the mountains near the

access roads into Hazarajat, escort convoys of merchandise and guard the leaders personally.

New recruits coming from regions free from attacks (in the west of Hazarajat) are sent for as reinforcements if there is any large-scale fighting within three or four days walk from their homes. They are placed under the command of leaders from their own tribal division.

The present situation is characterized by the importance of the sayyeds and mullahs, who were previously kept away from village administration, in the running of the region. As is customary, the sayyeds call for other sayyeds to share power. The ideology of Ayatollah Beheshti, which is taught to children by the mullahs, is inspired by that of another now-famous sayyed, the Ayatollah Khomeini.

IRANIAN INFLUENCE

The Shiia Hazaras have always been connected with Iran: the mullahs by their education, the rest of the population by the payment of taxes to Iran. Part of Hazara emigration is directed to Iran, where salaries for lowly jobs are higher than in Afghanistan.

Ayatollah Khomeini is the Imam of the Shiia, including the Hazaras. His influence nowadays is not merely in religion but spreads to political and military fields, thanks to Iranian counsellors. This is not a recent phenomenon; for some time now Iranians have been coming to Hazarajat as instructors. Recently, more arrived, commanding refugee Hazaras from Iran. They tried to establish military bases in three areas, Nahur, Waras and Uruzgan, but were quickly expelled.

In the village where the *Shura* sits, recruits shout, under the orders of their instructor, "Down with America" and "Long live Khomeini". The peasants know only one direction, that of Mecca, and not one of them would be able to say where the American enemy is. The tiny bazaar is much too poor to offer American goods; cloth comes from Russia and electric lamps from China. The presence of America is invisible to everyone but the mullahs who have returned from their studies in Iran.

When returning to their homeland with the newly acquired title of Ayatollah, they are bound to repeat the speeches they have learned from their Iranian counterparts, the only exception being that the current Russian enemy is condemned in a few words at the beginning of the speeches, which then go on tearing all foreigners to pieces indiscriminately. For the *mujahidin* who hears the speeches "the foreigner" could be "the Russian" but the attitude of the mullahs towards the West does not leave any doubt that this is not entirely so.

Ayatollah Beheshti has declared that he does not want to accept any help from Britain, Israel, South Africa, or, of course, China.

Only help from Iran seems to be welcomed; to be suspicious of a brotherly country would be unseemly.

The sayyeds and mullahs in power in the Hazarajat wish above all to remain there, a characteristic which is not unique to them. Support from Iran is necessary for this, as well as the weakening of the traditional ruling group – the khans. "In Islam there is no room for the khans" can be read under the name of one of the political parties formed in Iran. This slogan has been put into action, as is demonstrated by the number of khans imprisoned in the village which is the seat of the *Shura*, whose propaganda on this count supports that of the Soviets.

Nobody knows exactly who the Iranians who come to Hazarajat are, and the worst possible rumours are circulating. It would be naive to think that the Soviets have no plans for Hazarajat, even though their main concern at the moment is to secure control of the Kabul-Kandahar road.

DANGERS OF THE PRESENT SITUATION

At present the danger does not come from attacks by government troops. Last year the Soviets tried to penetrate into Hazarajat through Besud, Ghazni and Jaghori, but had to retreat rapidly. The geography of the land does not allow a foreign army to remain for a long time for fear of being cut off from its support. Hazara air defence has discouraged helicopter attacks while the *mujahidins*, by disappearing among the rocks, render bombing expensive when viewed in terms of its efficiency. The main problem is that currently there is no way, legal or otherwise, to ensure the representativeness of the *Shura* in the light of new political and military developments.

A regional organization either cannot, or has no reason to, reflect the unwritten rules which regulate village life. The same applies to any important power centre. On the contrary, regional leaders tend to be maintained and reinforced by outside help, however limited, rather than by the village. These leaders imagine themselves to be unassailable. But in fact, in order to become so, they must get the loyalty of the people by engaging in a clever redistribution of resources and weapons.

At present, opposition can only be achieved by strength. It is necessary to deploy a sufficient number of armed men to be able to force the issue. One hears tales of violent death from time to time, but so far there have been no proper battles.

In the *willayet* of Besud, a conflict, latent for several months, periodically erupts. It is difficult to understand the root of the problem as I do not know its economic and tribal implications. Political differences are expressed in religious terms. For some (the chief of the Hazara front of Kabul) true Islam is that which favours

alliance with other ethnic groups within Afghanistan, be they Sunni or Shiia, in order to safeguard national independence and avoid the acceptance of foreign help, whatever its origin; for others (the Governor of Besud – a representative of the *Shura*) it is to seek the help of brotherly countries, richer and stronger than Afghanistan, in the name of Muslim internationalism.

There is another source of discontent, at the local level this time; certain tribal divisions do not have the position they consider themselves to deserve (from the number of men and the strategic location about which they can boast) in political and military representation. To satisfy those who are discontented by a clever distribution of weapons could be, for a party hostile to the present representations of the *Shura*, a means of upsetting the balance of power. The danger would then be that Hazarajat could lose its political and administrative unity.

Criticism of the *Shura* has increased since the defeat inflicted by the government army on Sayyed Hassan in May 1981. His troops were forced to retreat, and tanks reached the east of Dasht-e-Nahur. They had not penetrated so far inland since the time of Taraki. Today the subject of conversation is local politics; the Soviet invasion has been pushed into the background, and one hears people talk about the khans again.

The only party which might be capable of gathering together the local notables who are tired of the hold of the mullahs is a group of educated Hazaras. Their main asset is that they were born and bred in their villages and therefore understand the way of thinking and the dialects of the peasants. They are also able to express their political views in the language of Islam – the only language understood by the masses. The propaganda of the mullahs against the members of this party – they are accused of being unbelievers (*kafir*), communists, pro-Chinese – has so far kept the masses away from them. However, the present situation is favourable to them.

They do not wish to break up the present unity of Hazarajat and refuse to favour any particular tribe in the distribution of resources. This means that the educated Hazaras are losing potential tribal allies, who are disappointed in their hopes of gaining supremacy. This party would like to see a non-Islamic government for Hazarajat (and Afghanistan).

Khalq propaganda and Soviet intervention have resulted in a change of direction in the liberated province of Hazarajat. Sayyeds and mullahs, inspired by Iran, are now most prominent in this part of Afghanistan.

The Soviet intervention of May 1981 and the inability of Sayyed Hassan's recruits to resist it have given the khans new hope of

regaining their lost power, which had been undermined by Khalq propaganda.

Meanwhile the men mobilized for the defence of the territory are forced also to defend the interests of the khans or of the sayyeds – the two groups entitled to collect exceptionally high taxes from the farmers.

The situation of the farm-hands and poor farmers who constitute the majority of the troops has worsened since mobilization. The problem of the lack of land is still vital. Who will best be able to speak in the name of the people?

It is said that there are in Hazarajat – as elsewhere in Afghanistan – Khalq and Parcham members who have been infiltrated into responsible positions. The fight for power within the region will continue.

POSTSCRIPT

We have just learnt that the village of Waras was in fact bombarded by helicopter in February 1982. The bazaar and the mosque were destroyed.
Editor.

Sir Olaf Caroe (1892 - 1981)

GEORGE CHOWDHARAY-BEST

PART 1

As someone who spent the last two years of Sir Olaf's life helping him with his autobiography, I have been asked to write about the great man for the first issue of this journal.

Born in 1892 of a distinguished Anglo-Danish family, his father being for many years architect to the Ecclesiastical Commissioners, Olaf Kirkpatrick Caroe first went to school at Summer Fields, near Oxford, after a childhood spent in Chelsea and a year at Copthorne. At Summer Fields he was a near-contemporary of Harold Macmillan, afterwards Prime Minister and Chancellor of the University of Oxford, who became a friend for life. He did not however follow Macmillan to Eton but instead went to Winchester, which his parents favoured because, as he subsequently wrote, "Winchester is among the most paradisal spots on earth". At Winchester his twin interests in antiquities and in mountaineering developed, and he was honourably commended for his Latin.

From Winchester he went on to Magdalen College, Oxford, as a demy or scholar. The Magdalen of that period excelled in talent of all kinds: as he wrote, "it was a dish whose flavour was all the more subtle for being made up of elements of conflicting taste and provenance – the undergraduate who in his own thought still wore the tasselled garb of the seigneur, the representative of wealth, the hearty rowing-blue, the studious demy, sometimes with a chip, even the memory of Oscar Wilde beneath the Tower".[1] His closest friend at Magdalen was Edward Bridges, only son of Robert Bridges, then Poet Laureate, who lived in a house on Boars Hill and "liked to regale his Sunday guests on a strong local ale then known as Five-X". To the end of his life Sir Olaf always seemed to prefer beer to wine and his tastes were generally of the simplest, consonant always with dignity.

Edward Bridges subsequently became Lord Bridges, Head of the Home Civil Service. A more illustrious contemporary still was Edward, Prince of Wales, afterwards King Edward VIII, with whom he marched in the Officer Training Corps; but the Prince and he were never friends.

Reading classics, Olaf Caroe was impelled to cut short his Oxford career because of the Great War: like most persons of spirit, he enlisted. As his parents then lived in Surrey, he opted for "The Queen's" or Royal West Surrey Regiment (now amalgamated into The Queen's Regiment). In October 1914 he was sent to India. After a few weeks at Secunderabad (where he was greatly impressed by the Hyderabad Residency) the regiment was posted to Lucknow in January 1915. There Sir Olaf began to learn Urdu with the reigmental *munshi*, beginning in the traditional way with *From Sepoy to Subedar*. Unlike the great Pashto poet Khushhal Khan Khatak, whom Sir Olaf was later to translate, the *munshi* was prepared to defend the the Emperor Aurangzeb, and Sir Olaf recalls having tremendous arguments even then over this monarch's character. From Lucknow too, he was able to go on a mountaineering expedition to the Pindari Glacier.

No sooner had he returned than the regiment was posted to the North-West Frontier, after a brief period at Pachmarhi in the Central Provinces. In January 1916 his first sight of Peshawar followed. "The grand circle of mountains around the Vale was wreathed in snow, and the trees gloomed brown and leafless as in winter in Europe. I remember thinking at first sight that, compared with Indians down country . . . the people looked wild, fierce and uncompromising, and I did not take to them at once". Language was, at first, a barrier; Urdu would not serve, and in the summer he became ill with dysentery and, later, paratyphoid. After a prolonged convalescence during which he visited Kashmir for the first time, and made friends with both Lutyens and Baker in Delhi, he was posted with his regiment to Lahore in the spring of 1917. Here he met O'Dwyer, then Lieutenant-Governor of the Panjab (Sir Olaf always insisted on the Hunterian spelling of that name); and was presented to Lord Chelmsford, the Viceroy who, taking a personal interest, expressed the hope that he might one day enter the Indian Civil Service. Lionel Curtis, too, he met at this period, founder of the "Round Table" in all its forms, and of the journal to which Sir Olaf later became so distinguished a contributor and whose recent passing we mourn almost as his. In the Curtis papers in the Bodleian Library at Oxford there is a full and vivid account of this first meeting.[2]

In May 1919 he was, with his regiment, involved in what is usually called the Third Afghan War. This followed the assassination of

Habibullah and the accession of his third son, Amanullah, to the throne of Afghanistan. Amanullah proclaimed a *jihad*, and his army began to invade and pillage the North-West Frontier province. Sir Olaf with his contingent (he was by then a Captain) arrived at Peshawar in the early hours of 12 May to find a strange situation. The postmaster, an Afghan, had turned traitor to the British and had distributed *jihad* leaflets signed by the Amir, and there were also plans to burn the railway station and cantonment, and destroy the mobilization stores. This threat was met by dividing the city garrison into many pickets occupying the various important points. Later in the month the regiment was moved to Nowshera, and, the war having fizzled out, Sir Olaf began to learn Pashto "and the way to care for the Pathan".

Demobilization followed, with a return to England and marriage to Kitty Rawstorne, daughter of the Bishop Suffragan of Whalley (in the Anglican diocese of Manchester) on 10 January 1920. A loyal and devoted son of the Church to the end of his days, Sir Olaf could not have chosen a finer partner. There was a spiritual radiance about Lady Caroe which impressed all who met her, however briefly. One felt that she was incapable of a mean or uncharitable action. The best man was Donald Somervell, who had become a close friend in India, and who was later to become Attorney-General. Then followed outstanding success in the special examination held after the war for the Home, Indian, and Colonial services. Olaf Caroe stood at the head of the list, and could take his pick of all the varied range of services which administered the great Empire which still remained intact and in many ways at the zenith of its achievement. Never one to take the easy or smart option, he chose India. Hoping ultimately to go to the Frontier, he chose the Panjab in the first instance, for service on the Frontier was restricted to members of what was called the Indian Political Service, direct recruitment to which was not allowed. Thus it was that in 1920 he returned to Lahore as an Assistant Commissioner, making friends on the ship with Evan Jenkins, afterwards Governor of the Panjab, and Frederick Bourne, who occupied a similar position in the Central Provinces and afterwards in Bengal.

The then Governor of the Panjab was Sir Edward Maclagan, who had succeeded O'Dwyer after the Amritsar tragedy at Jallianwala Bagh, which has been so much written about, and which made a deep impress on the Indian mind. Sir Olaf was not an eye-witness, but he did go more than once to look at the scene, and here is his considered judgement, written in old age:

> The objective of civil and military authority in concert must be, remembering that civil disturbance is not war, and rioting crowds

> are not enemy, to employ the minimum force necessary to restore order and obedience to authority. There should be no triumphing, or thought or talk of teaching lessons: that is where Dyer, not to be confused with O'Dwyer, went wrong at Amritsar. It has to be remembered that the Amritsar mob had already proceeded to violence, including the murder of women, and had deliberately defied orders to disperse. That justified the use of military force to control them: it did not justify Dyer's proclaimed determination to teach a lesson that would go beyond the immediate situation with which he was faced in that bottleneck of the Amritsar City, a dead-end from which there was no egress except by the entrance closed by his detachment of troops.

To this it is necessary to add that Sir John Smyth's account[3] should also be read. P. G. Robb in his book *Government of India and Reform* argues that casualties would have been higher if Dyer's armoured cars, as well as his fifty rifles, had been able to get through the narrow entrance, but I think this is to attribute a quite unbelievable degree of malignity to Dyer: his intention was to address the crowd from the top of one of the cars; and he might well have been successful in doing so and in consequence had to use less force rather than more had he been able to effect an entry with one of them. It would also have been easier for him to control firing by his troops had this been seen as necessary even in this event.

During Sir Olaf's own time in Amritsar, whither he was posted under Henry Craik, he was concerned with the Gurdwara agitation, whose object was to oust the priest-managers (*mahants*) of such Sikh holy places as the Golden Temple in that city. It was claimed by many orthodox Sikhs that the *mahants* were in danger of reverting to idol worship and Hinduism. They formed themselves into *jathas* (armed bands) and attempted to take over the *gurdwaras* by force. The authorities were obliged to intervene; but the situation was tactfully handled, especially by the Governor, Sir Edward Maclagan, 'gentle Annie' as he was dubbed, and in due course the disturbances died down.

At the end of 1921 Sir Olaf joined the secretariat at Lahore, working under two Indian members of the Governor's Executive Council, Sundar Singh Majithia, and Fazl-i-Husain, the Minister for Local Government, both prominent and respected figures in the political history of the Panjab between the wars. His service (I.C.S.) superior too was an Indian called Alma Latifi. The summer capital of the Panjab government, as of the central government at Delhi, then being Simla, Sir Olaf was able to proceed thither in due course with his wife, who had joined him with their first child, Richard, when he took up his secretariat appointment. Friends of those days

included Michael Harrison and Samuel Wilberforce, both judges of the Panjab High Court, the latter, a relation of mine by marriage, being a potent spiritual influence, descended as he was from the great opponent of slavery and from the Bishop in Victorian days known affectionately as 'Soapy Sam'.

In 1923 Sir Olaf succeeded in entering the Indian Political Service, which was drawn partly from the Indian Army and partly from the I.C.S., and was posted to Peshawar as city magistrate. There he was impressed, not only by the high crime rate, but by the calibre of the local bar, and he has paid tribute in this respect to both Hindu and Muslim lawyers of the period. But representative institutions had not, at that time, been accorded on the Frontier, even in the settled Districts, as they had in the plains under the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms, and herein lay the seeds of future trouble, as Sir Olaf clearly foresaw. At the end of 1924 he was moved to Mardan, some 25 miles from Peshawar, as Assistant Commissioner. This was the headquarters of a sub-division of the Peshawar District, and also of that famous regiment, The Guides, who invented khaki as the colour for fighting dress. One of his memories of that period was of digging trenches in order to combat a plague of locusts. He also made friends with two of the most prominent men of that period on the Frontier, Abdul Qayyum and Akbar of Hoti, who feature prominently in his classic book *The Pathans.*[4] There was time to enjoy the beauties of Nathiagali, the summer capital of the N.W.F.P. near Abbottabad. His wife had now rejoined him after a brief absence in England for the birth of his second son, Michael, and with another close friend, Francis Wylie, afterwards Governor of the United Provinces (Uttar Pradesh) he would roam the hills and valleys of the Frontier during brief periods of leisure. But he worked as well as played hard – an eighteen-hour day was often the norm; and his disarming gentleness and charm concealed a burning dedication.

In 1928, after a year's leave, Sir Olaf returned to the Kohat District, south of Peshawar, as Deputy Commissioner, and a year later returned to Peshawar as Secretary to the Chief Commissioner, Sir Norman Bolton. There he found the political situation unsettled, partly because reforms in the Province had been withheld, and partly because of the *badshahgardi* or 'King-turning' in neighbouring Afghanistan. Amanullah had been unseated, the freebooter Bacha-i-Saqao had taken over and in his turn been killed, and Nadir Khan of the Yahya Khel had succeeded in attaining the throne. In May 1929 there had even been an abortive Russian invasion of Afghanistan through Mazar-i-Sherif by Russian soldiers disguised as Afghans in support of Amanullah.[5] In the province itself the political movement centred mainly on the two Khan brothers. One of these

brothers, Abdul Ghaffar Khan, had been politically active as far back as 1919; the other, Dr Khan Sahib, held a commission in the Indian Medical Service which he gave up about this period to go into politics. They both, ultimately, became friends of Sir Olaf, and the latter was his Chief Minister in 1946-47 when Sir Olaf was Governor of the Province, but at this time they were a focus of discontent. They had founded the Frontier Jirga, also known as the Red Shirt movement because of the faded plum colour of their garments. The origins of this are described in the third edition of the *Peshawar Gazetteer*, published in 1934, to which Sir Olaf contributed. In the spring of 1930 there was difficulty in collecting the revenue, parallel courts were being established, and crime was getting out of hand. When the Khan brothers were arrested at their home at Utmanzai in the Charsadda *tahsil* there was a tremendous outcry. Large demonstrations took place in Charsadda itself, and spread to the city of Peshawar. When the troops were sent in, an armoured car was set fire to in the main street, thirty of the crowd were killed, and Metcalfe, the Deputy Commissioner, was hit on the head and put out of action. Evelyn Cobb, Assistant Commissioner, asked for help and Sir Olaf, though serving in the Secretariat, was directed to proceed to the city and report. "When I reached the main police station", wrote Sir Olaf later, "I found the military more or less in control, but an armoured car ablaze, a number of dead bodies lying about, and a general sense of uncertainty. Moreover one regiment of the army refused to take action when ordered to do so, and had to be withdrawn. This was near mutiny. By the evening control had been more or less established, but on the next day a deputation of City fathers, including Sir Abdul Qayyum, waited on Bolton and persuaded him that, if he would withdraw the troops, all would calm down. Bolton's nerve cracked and he had to retire from the scene but not before he had agreed to withdraw the military. The result was that the police were barricaded into their stations and the City became what we would now call a no-go area".

The Viceroy's response was to send down Evelyn Howell, his Foreign Secretary, by air to try and restore the situation. (Howell was, in retirement, to collaborate with Sir Olaf in the well-known translation of the poems of Khushhal Khan Khatak, the Pashto poet.) In this instance, however, he showed himself more as a man of action. It was decided to re-occupy the City, and this was done in the small hours of 5 May, with not a drop of blood being shed or shot being fired. Sir Olaf was the chief civil officer sent in with the troops and in his own words "had something to do with the decision".

This was not, however, the end of the disturbances. A new Chief Commissioner, Steuart Pears, arrived on 9 May and on the 31st a

Lance-Corporal of the King's Own Yorkshire Light Infantry accidentally discharged his rifle in a guard room at the Kabuli gate, killing the wife and two children of a passing dairy farm supervisor. Sir John Smythe, V.C., was then city commandant, and he has described in his book *Milestones* how the round went off within an inch of his head as he was taking some doctors round on a tour of inspection: indeed it was their arrival which seems to have flustered the Lance-Corporal. This tragic accident led to the gathering of a large mob, and Sir Olaf was summoned from the secretariat by telephone. When he arrived he found "a small body of troops with police facing a mob filling the whole street. However, there was a company of the 15th Sikhs and another of the 36th drawn up out of sight, and I had more police with me. But these were roughly handled by the crowd and I had to warn the latter of my intention to call in the military, and asked Smyth to take over. As he relates, the rooftops were by this time black with rioters armed with stones, bottles, and bricks".

With great coolness a captain of the 15th Sikhs who had four picked shots each with one round in the chamber was called up and ordered by Smyth to clear the street. As he saluted and turned to go, a man on the roof of the nearest house leant over and threw a brick which hit him full on the side of the face, cutting his cheek open and knocking him unconscious. Smyth thereupon ordered one of the escort to fire one round at this man. It hit the brickwork just beside him, and the crowd melted away at once. The street was cleared and picketed in exactly seven minutes with only that one shot fired. The Lance-Corporal was later tried by Sir Olaf and sentenced to 18 months imprisonment. The Congress Party made much of this and other disturbances, and even concocted their own version of some of the incidents, but the evidence produced at the official inquiry, which was chaired by Mr Justice Sulaiman, showed that very great care had been taken to avoid unnecessary loss of life, and that no-one lost his head.

The disturbances in Peshawar simmered down, and although on 16 August Martial Law had to be proclaimed throughout the District because of invasions by armed bands of Afridis, this was enforced only in the Peshawar sub-division, up until January 1931. In his report to the Government Pears referred to "the tactful and humane manner" in which it had been administered by Sir Olaf and the officers of the District. Tact and humanity were ever a mark of Sir Olaf's dealings with his fellow-men. In 1932 he was made a C.I.E. (Companion of the Order of the Indian Empire). From April 1930 he had been Joint Deputy Commissioner, Peshawar, together with his friend Wylie (deputed by Howell from Simla); and from July was sole Deputy Commissioner.

In 1931 the civil disobedience campaign was called off following what was called the Gandhi-Irwin pact, and the Khan brothers were released. But violent crime continued to mount, the revenue could not be collected, and on Christmas Day 1931 the Khan brothers, together with nearly 2,000 others, were again arrested. By January 1932 all was calm, and in April Sir Olaf went on leave after a month's tour via Gilgit to Kashmir, making friends on the way with the Mehtar of Chitral and his eldest son, Nasir-ul-Mulk. In 1933 he returned to the province as Chief Secretary to the Government, "a coveted post which meant that I could spend the hot weather in the hills at Nathiagali amid those Himalayan fir forests, breathing the life-giving air wafted from the snows of Kaghan and Kashmir".

In 1934 Sir Olaf was summoned to go to the Government of India as Deputy Secretary to the Foreign (later the External Affairs) Department. Here he spent nearly three years, working under Metcalfe. Sir Olaf could, in later life, recall little from this period except that once during a leave vacancy when he was acting for his Chief, he ventured to disagree with Lord Chetwode, the Commander-in-Chief. Chetwode was incensed, but the Viceroy, Willingdon, smoothed the matter over with imperturbable charm. "But perhaps the chief interest of the work at Delhi", he wrote, "was the enlargement of the prospect from the narrow stage of the North-West Frontier to embrace the entire perimeter of what was then India. Within the sub-continent we now surveyed all the way from Baluchistan in the west round over the Peshawar frontier, up the far north close to Soviet Central Asia in Chitral and Gilgit, round by Kashmir and along the Himalaya to include Nepal, Sikkim and Bhutan, to Burma in the east, still then unseparated from India. And, beyond, we dealt with a multitude of questions in the Gulf, in eastern Iran itself, in Afghanistan, in Tibet, and to some extent in China, then under the Kuomintang of Chiang Kai-shek. The Political Agents in the Gulf, many of the British Consuls in Iran, the staffing of the Legation, later an Embassy, in Kabul, the Consul-General in Kashgar in Chinese Sinkiang, and representation in Tibet, all were in our hands and the officers found from the Political Service".

At the end of 1936 Sir Olaf proceeded on leave to England via Rhodesia and South Africa, "where even then the malaise of racial thought was all too apparent", and in the late summer of 1937 was appointed to a leave vacancy in which could then still be called without embarrassment the "Persian" Gulf. He found his Persian good enough for conversation, but regretted his want of Arabic. From the Gulf, where he got to know that remarkable personality, Sir Charles Belgrave, he proceeded to Quetta, again to fill a leave vacancy. This he described in his disarming way as "a rest-cure in

fine, rugged scenery and a good climate", but his knowledge of the people, more than half of whom are Pathans, stood him in good stead in later years when he had to answer for such matters in the Parliament of British India. Sir Arthur ("Bunch") Parsons, substantive holder of the Quetta post, he describes most vividly as "spare, ascetic, a man a little like Gallio, who cared for none of these things. He had a very clear sense of duty, and was not swayed by persons or ideas".

From Quetta Sir Olaf was moved to become Resident in Waziristan at a time when the activities of the Faqir of Ipi had led to widespread military operations in the area. In April 1936 there had occurred the abduction and alleged coversion to Islam of a Hindu minor girl, and in August the Judicial Commissioner decided that she should be returned to her parents. Thereupon the Faqir raised the banner of *jihad*, claiming that the conversion was genuine, and he and his followers harrassed the Razmak and Bannu columns, killing 19 and wounding 90.[6] Sir Olaf was mentioned in dispatches for his work during this period, and in 1939 presided over a Committee of Inquiry into the Bannu raid of 23 July 1938, in which six townsmen were killed and a policeman and a frontier sepoy injured. The Deputy Commissioner, the report said, "surrendered the initiative to the military" and failed to take proper measures, and the Frontier Constabulary's contribution was "practically nil". The constant use of military force, it was argued, was not a lasting cure for such raids: the enlargement of the Frontier Constabulary was recommended, together with the construction of a motor road along the administrative border interspersed with forts. Ransom for any kidnappings ought to be deducted from allowances paid to tribes where political pressure failed.[7]

Sir Olaf was never therefore in favour of the use of military force in such situations except in the very last resort, and where it had to be used, he believed that civil police should always be there in conjunction to act as antennae. One sometimes feels that it is a pity that his expert knowledge and experience of the handling of civil disorder with the minimum use of force was not utilized during the recent horrific disturbances in Northern Ireland.

Was he ever afraid? I once asked him. Yes, he said, I detested these violent incidents and dreaded being summoned to them. Once summoned, however, he knew what to do.

In July 1939 he took up a new appointment as External Affairs ("Foreign") Secretary to the Government of India at Delhi and Simla. This post he held for over six years, until his appointment as Governor of the North-West Frontier Province in November 1945. Separated from his wife and family throughout the period, it was a

trying time for him personally, though much good work was accomplished.

The External Affairs Department had a complicated history. Beginning as the Secret and Political Department under Warren Hastings in 1784, it was from 1842 called the Foreign Department. Then in 1914 an additional Secretary was added and the name changed to Foreign and Political. In March 1937, with the advent of what was called "responsible government" under the Act of 1935, the Department was split into two, the two Secretaries becoming heads of the External Affairs and Political Departments respectively. The first of the new Departments was responsible, in the first place, for relations with States, independent and quasi-independent, on the Indian periphery (Afghanistan, Tibet, Sikkim, Nepal, and so on) and secondly (but only indirectly) for the Tribal Areas of the North-West Frontier Province, Baluchistan, and so forth. This second field of responsibility was not clear-cut, since although in the first the External Affairs Member of the Viceroy's Executive Council was responsible, the second was primarily that of the Governor of the N.W.F.P. and the Chief Commissioner of Baluchistan reporting direct to the Viceroy. As External Affairs Secretary Sir Olaf had a seat in the Central Legislature and frequently spoke there on matters affecting his Department.

Of his period as Secretary, Sir Olaf was wont to recall two actions and one policy which may have done some good, as he put it, during the war years. "The first two were that, alone of men who had held this office during the 170 years that had elapsed since Warren Hastings' time, I paid personal visits both to Afghanistan and Nepal, and established close and friendly relations with the two Prime Ministers, Hashim Khan and Maharaja Joodha". And, as to policy, he tried to strengthen the North-East Frontier towards Tibet and beyond Assam. Of this policy, K. P. S. Menon, who was Sir Olaf's fellow Deputy Secretary in the then Foreign Department in 1935 and afterwards independent India's ambassador to Moscow, has written that he "with a presience which, in the light of the events of the sixties, must be regarded as remarkable, realized that the North-East Frontier might one day become as live as the North-West, and pressed for the extension of the rudiments of administration, civil and military, into the areas abutting the McMahon line". But for Sir Olaf's foresight, he added, "independent India might have found herself in an even more difficult position to resist the Chinese menace".

During this period too, much time and effort had to be expended on maintaining relations with the Americans in India. Two envoys in succession, Louis Johnson and William Phillips, were sent by President Roosevelt as ambassadors at large. Sir Olaf was not greatly

impressed by either of them. In May 1943 Phillips sent a confidential letter to the U. S. President which included such expressions as "there is no evidence that the British intend to do much more than give token assistance" (in the conduct of the war against Japan!) and "General Stilwell has expressed to me his concern . . . in particular in regard to the poor morale of the Indian officers".[8] This letter was "leaked", probably by someone in the President's office, to the journalist Drew Pearson in 1944 and published in the latter's syndicated column. The Indian Government were incensed, and sent a confidential telegram to the India Office in London, signed by Sir Olaf, saying that it was better that Phillips should not return to India, and that he would not be welcome if he did. The telegram was repeated to the Indian representative in New York, and there itself leaked, thus placing the Ambassador, Halifax, in a difficult position. Many of the repercussions of the affair are recorded in the *Transfer of Power* series of documents.[9] In a speech on 28 September 1944 in the House of Commons in London, Winston Churchill did not directly refer to Phillips' strictures, but he was at pains to reply to general criticisms of British efforts in Burma. "Once again, India and her vast population have reposed serenely among the tumults and hurricanes of the world behind the Imperial shield. The fact should sometimes be noted that under British rule in the last eighty years incomparably fewer people have perished by steel or firearms in India than in any similar area or community on the globe".

Another feature of his time as External Affairs Secretary was the formation of a group which came to be known as "Caroe's Brains Trust". This, as he described later, was a group of young and not so young men which gathered to discuss the future of India's foreign relations. The picture they saw covered all the lands from Palestine to Japan and all the seas between Suez and Singapore – a regional view of Southern Asia. For, as he stated in 1956, "one must live in the present and, so far as one does not live in the present, look to the future".[10] For all his great historical sense – and no one had a better knowledge of how to construct an historical work than he – Sir Olaf was always, right up to the end of his life, looking to the future: he never allowed himself to be smothered by the past.

This is not the place to discuss in detail the development of Indian representation overseas, with which Sir Olaf was also deeply concerned during this period. It may be said however that in the early 1940s Agents General for India both in the United States and in China were appointed. These remained, however, technically attached to the British Embassies in those countries until 1946.

By then Sir Olaf had been appointed Governor of the North-West Frontier Province. This very important period in his life, and his

activities after his retirement, I hope to be able to describe in a subsequent article.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

Unless otherwise indicated, all direct quotations in the text of this article are taken from a hitherto unpublished autobiography by Sir Olaf, which was constantly being revised with my assistance up to the time of his death. I have taken care, however, in selecting my quotations, to use only those words which I know to be his own. Other references, some of them from his other writings, are as follows:

1. *The Times*, 19 Dec. 1963, p. 17.
2. Ms. English Hist. (Bodl.) 868, fos. 100–6.
3. Sir John Smyth, *Milestones* (1979), pp. 58-61.
4. First published by Macmillan (1958). Re-issued as a Papermac (1965). A further re-issue, this time by Oxford University Press, Karachi, has been for some time in contemplation.
5. *The Times*, 11, 24, 31 May 1929; H. W. Bunn transl. "G. Agabekov", *OGPU* (1975).
6. Report on the Administration of the Border of the North-West Frontier Province for 1936-37 (1937), pp. 15-18.
7. *The Times*, 23 August 1939, p. 14.
8. W. Phillips, *Ventures in Diplomacy* (1955 edn.), pp. 250-2.
9. Edited by Mansergh and Lumby; vol. IV, pp. 1203-4; vol. V, pp. 6, 31, 51, 102.
10. *Asian Review* (July 1956), p. 202.

Recent Chinese Research in Turkic Studies

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In pre-liberation China, due to scientific and cultural backwardness, scientific Turcological studies did not exist. Following the establishment of the People's Republic of China, relevant organizations were set up to carry out research in Turcology as well as to teach this subject. Unfortunately, because of the abnormal political development of our country from 1957, Chinese Turcology faced impediments. This was especially so during the Cultural Revolution and it was only after the downfall of the "Gang of Four" in October 1976 that the situation in this field gradually changed for the better.

In the following, I will give a brief introduction and touch upon three aspects of recent Turcological studies in China.

TEACHING AND RESEARCH ORGANIZATIONS

PEKING

As early as the autmn of 1949, the Oriental Languages Department of Peking University set up a degree in the Uighur language. In 1951, when the Central Institute for Nationalities was established, its Department of Minority Languages provided this facility as well. In Summer 1952, these two groups were merged into one teaching and research section, under the Department of Minority Languages of the Central Institute for Nationalities. The work of this centre is the teaching and research of Turkic languages (Uighur, Kazakh, Kirghiz etc.) in Xinjiang. Within this department, two separate Uighur language-literature and Kazakh language-literature teaching-research sections and a Kirghiz language-literature teaching-research group have now been formed. These two teaching-research sections and the teaching group have a teaching staff of over twenty, almost half of whom are from the minority nationalities. As well as this, some personnel of the History Department of the Institute are engaged in teaching the history of Xinjiang, as well as in research.

In 1957, on the same basis as the research section of the Central

Institute for Nationalities, a Nationalities Research Centre, attached to the Chinese Acadamy of Sciences (now called the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences) was established. As part of the language research section of that centre a Turkish languages research group has been set up. This group has a staff of five or six researchers. Under the historical research section a North-West nationalites group has been formed. In addition, there is a Xinjiang archaeology group in the Archaeological Research Centre of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS). Some people in the Historical Research Centre of the CASS are also engaged in Xinjiang Studies.

Recently a number of non-governmental research societies have been successfully established in Peking. Among these are:

1. The Central Asian Culture Research Society of China, which was established at the end of 1979.
2. The Turkic Languages Research Society, which was established at the beginning of 1980.
3. The Old Nationalities Writings Research Society, which was established in Summer 1980.

XINJIANG

Throughout the 1950s and 1960s the Xinjiang branch of the Academy of Sciences had only one research centre engaged in research on Xinjiang history, the Nationalities Research Centre. Recently the Xinjiang branch of the Academy of Social Sciences has established a number of research centres, as follows:

1. The Languages Research Centre, based on the former Writing Reform Committee.
2. The Literature Research Centre.
3. The Archeaological Research Centre, based on the former archaeological team of Xinjiang Museum.
4. The Religious Research Centre.
5. The Central Asian Studies Centre.

As these centres are just being set up, they have not achieved much although the Nationalities Research Centre published a two-volume history of Xinjiang in 1980.

At the University of Xinjiang, the Department of Chinese Languages and the Department of Chinese Literature have set up Uighur language and literature centres respectively. In the University's History Department a Xinjiang history centre has also been set up. Lastly, I would like to mention that the Kashgar Pedagogical College in Kashgar and the Ili Pedagogical College in Kulja have also set up Uighur and Kazakh language-literature specialities.

LANZHOU

The Uighur language department of the North-West Nationalities Institute has a longer history. However, this institute was dissolved during the Cultural Revolution and has only recently been re-established.

MAIN ACHIEVEMENTS

The Chinese Turcologists have had some success in teaching and researching the Turkic languages of China. For example, as early as the late 1950s we carried out a systematic and thorough investigation of Uighur, Kazakh, Kirghiz, Yughur, Salar, Tuva, and other languages and compiled special reports on them. At the same time, the relevant teaching and research units wrote many textbooks, grammars and dictionaries concerning the Uighur, Kazakh and Kirghiz languages. Unfortunately, for various reasons, most of these results have not yet been published.

The following dictionaries, however, have been published recently:

1. Chinese-Uighur.
2. Chinese-Kazakh.
3. Kazakh-Chinese.

A more complete Uighur-Chinese dictionary will soon be published.

A series of books about the history of the Turkic peoples in China and their languages will follow in the near future.

Two special groups have recently been formed in Xinjiang. These are the *Diwanu Lughat it-Turk* group and the *Qutadghu Bilig* group. These two groups are translating the above-mentioned works from Old Turkish into modern Uighur and Chinese.

During the past few years the publication of the original sources of the national cultural heritage has also been re-established. For example, the National Languages Publishing House in Peking recently published the famous *Tarih-i Musiquiyin* (History of Music) which was written by the Khotan scholar Ismayil Mujiz in the 18th Century in Chagatay Turkic.

At present, China does not have a specialist Turcology journal. Since the establishment of the Turkish Languages Research Society of China, (the president is Burhan Shadidi - the former president of the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Regions), we have until now issued two mimeographed information bulletins. We will try to publish a Chinese Turcological journal in the near future.

Up to now, Turcological articles have generally been published in the following periodicals:

1. *Minzu Yuwen* (Nationalities Languages)
2. *Minzu Yanju* (Nationalities Research)

These two journals are sponsored by the Nationalities Research Centre.

3. *Zhongyang Minzu Xueyuan Xuebao* (Bulletin of the Central Institute for Nationalities)
4. *Xinjiang Daxue Xuebao* (Bulletin of Xinjiang University)

This last journal is printed in both Chinese and Uighur.

5. *Xinjiang Shixue* (Xinjiang History)

This is sponsored by the Nationalities Research Centre of the Xinjiang branch of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences.

6. *Xinjiang Wenxue* (Xinjiang Literature)

This is the organ of the Xinjiang Writers Union, and is published in Chinese, Uighur Kazakh, and Kalmyk.

7. *Bulaq* (Spring)

This is an irregularly published scientific journal which is sponsored by the Xinjiang People's Publishing House in the Uighur language.

RECENT DISCOVERIES IN XINJIANG

Since the late 1950s nearly 100 wooden tablets in Kharosthi script have been discovered as well as over 100 wooden tablets in Tibetan script. The greatest discovery in Uighur script was the 293-folio manuscript which was unearthed at Hamir (Kumul) in 1959. The greater part of this manuscript is a more complete copy of the *Maitrisimit* and a small part of it (about 20 folios) is, according to my studies, a copy of *Daš̌akrmapuda'awtanamal*, which was published by F.W.K. Müller in *Uigurica IV*.

In addition, in 1975, railway workers accidentally discovered in Yanqi (Karashar) a lot of *pothi* leaves (about 80 complete leaves) in Tocharian A. From preliminary studies this appears to be another more complete *Maitreyasamitināṭaka* copy. This discovery is of great importance for the study of Tocharology, especially for the study of Tocharian A. As well as these, some folios in Sanscrit, Soghian and Khotanese were also discovered, including a very important and complete Soghian civil document.

In 1979, the Xinjiang archaeology group of the Archaeological Research Centre in Peking excavated a huge Buddhist monastery in Jimsar (Beshbalik) county. Many more complete wall paintings and Buddha figures were discovered. These findings seem to belong to the earlier Uighur period. In support of this thesis, the wall paintings have many colophons in Uighur script. This is the first ancient Buddhist temple ruin to be discovered north of Tian-Shan. Recent discoveries of caves containing well-preserved wall paintings have been made at Lumtura and at Kizil.

Lastly, I would like to mention the discovery of a mummy last year in the Lupnor (ancient Kroraina) region by the archaeological team of the Xinjiang Archaeological Research Centre. It is the mummy of a girl, and according to the preliminary radiocarbon dating is more than 6500 years old. She has golden hair and a Europoid nose. This discovery is of great significance for those anthropologists studying the population of ancient Xinjiang. Since the news of this discovery was published, however, some scholars, for example, Professor An Zhimin, have raised doubts as to the age of the mummy. In Japan, some scholars also think that the high radiocarbon dating is due to nuclear experiments which have been carried out in the Lopnor region.

Non-Russian Education in Central Asia: An Annotated Bibliography

ISABELLE KRIENDLER

The topic of Tsarist education as a whole has received relatively little attention in either Tsarist or Soviet Russia, and even less in the West. In non-Russian education the situation is still worse. Not a single monograph on Tsarist non-Russian education exists in any language, while the few general works on education provide, at best, a scanty chapter.[1]

However, a great deal of valuable material, both primary and secondary, is available on separate nationality groups, usually widely scattered in specialized literature or in periodicals. In the bibliography that follows, I have attempted to list most of the significant sources that pertain to non-Russian education in Tsarist Central Asia, few of which have appeared in guides to Central Asian nationalities.[2]

The bibliography is divided into five sections. Section 1 contains general sources which pertain to non-Russian education in the Russian Empire with a focus on the Eastern borderlands; Section 2 groups sources which deal with the area of Central Asia (including Kazakhstan); Sections 3, 4 and 5 list sources specific to the Kazakhs and Kirghiz, Uzbeks and Tadzhiks, and Turkmen respectively. As becomes immediately apparent, the Kazakhs and Kirghiz (especially the Kazakhs),[3] have received a much wider coverage than the other nationalities, which is probably the result of their earlier "entrance" into the Russian Empire.

I have used only two abbreviations – *AN* for Akademiia Nauk and *ZhMNP* for *Zhurnal Ministerstva Narodnogo Prosveshcheniia.*

I. *Non-Russian Education in Tsarist Russia; focus on the Eastern Borderlands*

1. Alektorov, A. E. "Novye techeniia v zhizni musul'manskikh shkol", *ZhMNP* (April, 1909), pp. 187–202.
Author argues that the Muslim schools have been left unobserved too long.

2. Antsyferov, S. I. *Spravochnaia Kniga po Nizshemu Obrazovaniiu*. St Petersburg, 1909.
Pp. 138-143 contain data on non-Russian schools.

3. Bobrovnikov, N. (ed.) "Novye techeniia v Musul'manskoi shkole", *ZhMNP* (Aug. 1915), pp. 202-230.
Articles on *jadid* schools by O. G. Romanov and I. G. Arentov.

4. Bobrovnikov, N. "Sovremennoe polozhenie uchebnogo dela u inorodcheskikh plemen vostochnoi Rossii", *ZhMNP* (May, 1917), pp. 51-84.
Article was written in February 1917. Author calls for a basic revamping of non-Russian education and specifically for a return to the "Il'minskii system" with its stress on the mother tongue.

5. Bogdanov, I. M. *Gramotnost' i Obrazovanie v Dorevoliuisionnoi Rossii i v SSSR (istoriko-statisticheskie ocherki)*. Moscow, Statistika, 1964. 194 pp.
Chapter 7 deals with literacy and education by nationality.

6. Budilovich, A. S. *Doklad Predsedatelia Osobogo Soveshchaniia po Voprosam Obrazovaniia Vostochnykh Inorodtsev Ministru Narodnogo Prosveshcheniia*, August 13, 1905. Kazan, 1905. 52 pp.
This is essentially the introduction to the Reports of the Conference, which Budilovich chaired. See entry No. 34.

7. Burmistrova, T. Iu. and Gusakova, V. *Natsional'nyi Vopros v Programmakh i Taktike Politicheskikh Partii Rossii, 1905-1917*. Moscow, Mysl', 1976. 263 pp.
The question of non-Russian education as a political issue in the last decade of the tsarist regime is discussed in Chapter 4.

8. Charnoluskii, V. I. "Nachal'noe obrazovanie vo vtoroi polovine 19 stoletiia", in *Istoriia Rossii v 19 Veke*, Vol. 7. St Petersburg, Granat, 19--, pp. 108-169.
The author was interested in non-Russian education and hence devoted attention to the subject.

9. Chekhov, N.V. *Narodnoe Obrazovanie v Rossii s 60kh Godov 19 Veka*. Moscow, Pol'za, 1912.
A balanced, well-grounded work. Chapter 9 is devoted to schools in the borderlands. The author was active in non-Russian education (also in the Soviet period).

10. Chernousov, V. and Falbork, G. *Inorodcheskie i Inovercheskie Uchilishcha*. St Petersburg, 1903.

11. Falbork, G. A. and Charnoluskii, V. *Nastol'naia Kniga po Narodnomu Obrazovaniiu (zakony, rasporiazheniia, pravila, instruktsii)*. St Petersburg, Znanie, 1899. 2 vols.
See especially Vol. I, pp. 453-487 (477-487 Muslim education), Vol. II, pp. 1287-1289.

12. Kreindler, Isabelle. "Educational Policies Toward the Eastern

Nationalities in Tsarist Russia: A Study of Il'minskii's System", Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University, 1969. 237 pp. Bibliography, pp. 214-237.

13. Kirchinskii, Arslan. *Ocherki Russkoi Politiki na Okrainakh.* Vol. 2: *Bor'ba s prosveshcheniem i kul'turoi krymskikh tatar.* Baku, 1920.
Although the work focuses on the development of education among the Crimean Tatars, it contains interesting material on Russian Muslim education in general.

14. Lazzerini, Edward J. "Gadidism at the Turn of the Twentieth Century: A View From Within", *Cahiers du Monde Russe et Soviet-ique*, Vol. XVI, No. 2 (April-June, 1975), pp. 245-277.
A translation, with introduction, of a pamphlet written by Ismail Bey Gasprinskii on the problems (including education) facing Russian Islamic society.

15. Lipset, Harry. "The Education of Moslems in Tsarist and Soviet Russia", *Comparative Education Review*, Vol. XII, No. 3 (1968), pp. 310-322.
Very little on the pre-revolutionary period, which the author pictures as very bleak.

16. Majerczak, R. "Notes sur l'enseignement dans la Russie musulmane avant la Revolution", *Revue du Monde Musulman*, Vol. XXIV (1917-1918), pp. 179-246.
Based largely on sources from *Mir Islama.*

17. *Materialy po Istorii Tatarii Vtoroi Poloviny 19 Veka: agrarnyi vopros i krest'ianskoe dvizhenie 50-70kh godov. I.* Moscow-Leningrad, ANSSSR, 1936. 512 pp.
This work is much broader than the title would suggest. Close to three-quarters of the book is devoted to tsarist cultural policies in its Eastern borderlands. (The Regulations of 1870, for example, are reproduced in full on pp. 287-299.)

18. Medynskii, E. N. *Istoriia Russkoi Pedagogiki do Velikoi Oktiabr'skoi Sotsialisticheskoi Revoliutsii.* 2nd ed. Moscow, Narkompros RSFSR, 1938.
A solid work. Chapters 16 and 20 for non-Russian education in the 19th and 20th centuries respectively. The first edition of this work (Moscow, 1936) has only a brief section on the subject.

19. Ministerstvo Narodnogo Prosveshcheniia. *Izvlechenie iz Vsepoddaneishego Otcheta Ministra Narodnogo Prosveschehniia.* St Petersburg, 1851-1915.
Starting with the Report for 1866, most volumes contain a separate section on non-Russian education.

20. Miropiev, M. "Kakie nachala dolzhny byt' polozheny v osnovu obrazovaniia inorodtsev (po povodu brochiury Izmail Bey

Gasprinskogo 'Russkoe Musul'manstvo", *Rus'*, No. 17 (Sept. 1884), pp. 24-41.
Author was a conservative disciple of N. I. Il'minskii; at the time he was a teacher in the Turkestan Teachers' Seminary.

21. "Nachal'nye uchilishcha dlia inorodtsev zhivushchikh v vostochnoi i iugovostochnoi Rossii", *Mir Islama*, Vol. II, No. 4 (1913), pp. 269-278.
Basic legislation on Russian Muslim education starting with the Regulations of 1870.

22. *Odnodnevnaia Perepis' Nachal'noi Shkoly v Imperii proizvedennaia 18 Ianvaria 1911 goda*. St. Petersburg, Ekonomika, 1912-1914. 8 vols.
Turkestan was not included. However, Vol. 7 covers the Orenburg School District and hence the Kazakh schools.

23. Ostroumov, N.P. "K istorii musul'manskogo obrazovatel'nogo dvizheniia v Rossii v 19 i 20 stoletiiakh", *Mir Islama*, Vol. II, No. 5 (1913), pp. 302-326.

24. Ostroumov, N.P. "Musul'manskaia vyeshaia shkola", *ZhMNP* (October, 1906).

25. *Pedagogicheskaia Entsiklopediia*, Edited by A. G. Kalashnikov and M.S. Epshtein. Moscow, Rabotnik prosveshcheniia, 1927-1929. 3 vols.
Includes much material on non-Russian education. Arranged topically. Has detailed table of contents and index.

26. Pennar, Jaan *et al. Modernization and Diversity in Soviet Education, with special reference to nationality groups.* New York, Washington and London, Praeger, 1971. 397 pp.
Has background material on pre-revolutionary period.

27. "Pervyi vserossiiskii s'ezd po voporsam narodnogo obrazovaniia voobshche i inorodcheskogo v chastnosti", *Inorodcheskoe obozrenie*, Books 10-11 (1915), pp. 763-810. (Supplement to *Pravoslavnyi sobesednik*).
The non-Russian section of this Congress proved to be most controversial. Non-Russian teachers demanded wide autonomy and recognition of the mother tongue. Also see discussion of the coming Congress in *ZhMNP* (Nov. 1913), pp. 107-116 and the report about the Congress, with a great deal on the non-Russian section, in *ZhMNP* (April, 1914), pp. 178-257.

28. Piskunov, A. I., *et al.* (eds.) *Ocherki po Istorii Shkoly i pedagogicheskoi Mysli Narodov SSSR; vtoraia polovina 19 veka.* Moscow, Pedagogika, 1967. 600 pp.
The book focuses on Russian pedagogical thought and schools, but includes also chapters on non-Russians. For Central Asia see Chapter 24.

29. Piskunov, A. I. and Smirnov, V. Z. *Sovetskaia Istoriko-*

Pedagogicheskaia Literatura (1918-1957). Moscow, ANRSFSR, 1960.
A skimpy Chapter 6 deals with "Istoriia shkoly i pedagogiki nerusskikh naradov do revoliutsii 1917g i posle".

30. "Postanovleniia Soveta Ministra Narodnogo Prosveshcheniia; zasedanie 2 Fevralia 1870g (delo po voprosu o merakh k obraxovaniiu naseliaiushchikh Rossiiu inorodtsev)". *ZhMNP* (April 1870), pp. 47-63. (The Regulations also appear in *Sbornik Postanovlenii Ministerstva Narodnogo Prosveshcheniia*, Vol. IV, 1871, pp. 1555-1556. This is the basic legislation which in theory governed non-Russian education with only minor amendments up to the revolution.

31. *Proshenie o Nuzhdakh Magometanskogo Naseleniia.* Kantseliariia Ego Imperatorskogo velichestva po priniatiiu proshenii, 21 fevralia, 1905 [NNC]
The petition reflects the Muslim community's desire to control its own education. Copy of petition in Columbia University Library.

32. Rozhdestvensii, S. V. (ed). *Istoricheskii Obzor Deiatel'nosti Ministerstva Narodnogo Prosveshcheniia, 1802-1902.* St Petersburg, MNP, 1902. 787 pp.
Education in both the Western and Eastern borderlands is reviewed. See especially pp. 592-597, 691-694.

33. *Sbornik Dokumentov i Statei po Voprosu Obrazovaniia Inorodtsev.* St Petersburg, Pol'za, 1869. (Pechatano po rasporiazheniiu MNP).
Rich and varied source – documents, studies, reports, editorials – for Christian, Muslim and Buddhist non-Russian education in the eastern borderlands.

34. *Trudy Osobogo Soveshchaniia po Voprosam Obrazovaniia Vostochnykh Inorodtsev (na pravakh rukopisi).* Edited by A. S. Budilovich. St Petersburg, tipog. Porokhovshchika, 1905. 368 pp.
Invaluable source on non-Russian education in the eastern borderlands. For Central Asia, see especially report of the third section, pp. 67-101, Ostroumov's report on pp. 307-309, and Voskresenskii's report on *Medrese* and *Mektebe*, pp. 303-311.

35. Tumim, G. G. and Zelenko, V. A. (eds.) *Inorodcheskaia Shkola; Sbornik Statei i Materialov po Voprosam Inorodcheskoi Shkoly.* Petrograd, Karbashnikov, 1916.
Useful source. Includes a great deal on the changes in the 1870 Regulations as well as on the non-Russian section of the First All-Union Congress on Education.

36. "Zhurnal osobogo soveschaniia po vyrabotke mer dlia protivodeistviia Tatarsko-Musul'manskomu vliianiiu v privolzhskom krae", *Karsnyi arkhiv*, 1929. Vol. 35, pp. 107-127; Vol. 36, pp. 61-83. Introduced by A. Arsharuni.

In spite of the title, the 1910 Special Conference organized by the Ministry of the Interior was concerned with Russian Muslim in general and with what was viewed as the dangers of the *jadid* movement. For education and schools specifically, see pp. 120-127; 61-74.

II. *Education in Central Asia*

37. Allworth, Edward (ed.). *Central Asia; A Century of Russian Rule.* New York and London, Columbia University Press, 1967. 552 pp.
Excellent for background, especially Chapters 5-7 by Helene Carrere d'Encausse.

38. Bacon, Elizabeth, E. *Central Asians Under Russian Rule: A Study in Culture Change.* Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Press, 1966. 273 pp.
Has some brief references to education; especially in Chapter 4.

39. Bartol'd, V. V. *Istoriia Kul'turnoi Zhizni Turkestana.* Leningrad, ANSSSR, 1927. 256 pp.
The author covers the subject from the pre-Muslim period to the end of the tsarist regime. Chapter 7 is devoted to schools in Turkestan. (Bartol'd does not deal with Kazakhstan.)

40. Bendrikov, K.E. *Ocherki Po Istorii Narodnogo Obrazovaniia v Turkestane, 1865-1924.* Moscow, APNRSFSR, 1960. 512 pp.
Well grounded on archival and contemporary sources of the period. Covers traditional Muslim schools as well as government schools for non-Russians and for the settlers.

41. Bobrovnikov, N. "Russko-tuzemnye uchilishcha, mektaby i medresy v Srednei Azii; putevye zametki", *ZhMNP* (June 1913), pp. 189-241; (July 1913), pp. 49-84.
Bobrovnikov, an Il'minskii disciple, had toured Central Asia in the autumn of 1912. His report is extremely critical of the educational system.

42. Carrere d'Encausse, Helene. "La politique culturelle du pouvoir tsariste au Turkestan, 1867-1917", *Cahiers du Monde Russe et Sovietique*, Vol. III, No. 3 (1962), pp. 374-407.
English translation, slightly abridged, appeared as "Tsarist Educational Policy in Turkestan", *Central Asian Review*, Vol. XI, No. 3 (1963), pp. 374-394.
This solid article is chiefly devoted to the question of education.

43. Dumenko, M. F. *Russko-Tuzemnye Shkoly Turkestana.* Tashkent, MNPFUzSSR, 1957, 15 pp.

44. Gramenitskii, S. *Ocherk Razvitiia Narodnogo Obrazovaniia Turkestanskom Krae.* Tashkent, 1896.
Blames low level of non-Russian schools on the "backwardness"

(*kosnost'*) of the natives.

45. Gramenitskii, S. *Polazhenie Inorodcheskogo Obrazovaniia v Syr Darinskoi Oblasti.* Tashkent, 1916.
Argues against the "Il'minskii system"; praises his own approach of stressing the Russian language and culture.

46. Izmailov, A. E. *Prosveshchenie v Respublikakh Sovetskogo Vostoka.* Moscow, Pedagogika, 1973. 368 pp.
The first chapter is devoted to tsarist and native Muslim education in Turkestan.

47. Kerenskii, F. M. "Medrese Turkestankogo kraia", *ZhMNP* November 1892), pp. 18-52.
The father of the future premier of the Provisional Government contends that Muslim schools should not be left outside government supervision and that the Russian language should be introduced.

48. Kocharov, V.T. *Iz Istorii Narodnogo Obrazovaniia v Turkestanskom Krae.* Tashkent, gosizdat Uzbek SSR, 1959. 79 pp.
A brief, dull treatment of government schools from 1863.

49. Novitskii, K. P. "Politika tsarskogo pravitel'stva v oblasti narodnogo obrazovaniia v Srednei Azii", *Prosveshchenie natsional'nostei,* No. 6 (November/December 1934), pp. 11-25.
Novitskii's approach to tsarist educational efforts is quite different from the present view which stresses the great Russian contributions.

50. Nalivkin, V. *Svedeniia o Sostoianii Tuzemnykh Madras v Syr Darinskoi Oblasti.* Tashkent, 1916.
The author was sympathetic toward the Central Asians. He was a teacher in a Russian-native school.

51. Ostroumov, N.P. *K Istorii Narodnogo Obrazovaniia v Turkestanskom Krae. Konstantin Petrovich Fon Kaufman, Ustroitel' Turkestanskogo Kraia; lichnye vospominaniia, 1877-1881.* Tashkent, Kamenskie, 1899.
Ostroumov, an Il'minskii protege, was intimately involved in the cultural and especially the educational life of Turkestan.

52. Ostroumov, N. P. "Musul'manskie maktaby i russko-tuzemnye shkoly v Turkestanskom krae", *ZhMNP* (Feb. 1906), pp. 113-166.

53. Ostroumov, N. P. "Madrasy v Turkestanskom krae", *ZhMNP* (January 1907).

54. *Otchet Po Revizii K. K. Palena Turkestanskogo Kraia,* proizvedennoi po vysochaishemu poveleniiu. St Petersburg, 1909-1910. 19 vols.
Volume 6 is devoted to "uchebnoe delo".

55. Perepel'tsina, L. A. *Rol' Russkoi Kul'tury v Razvitii Kul'tur Narodov Sredneiv Azii.* Moscow, Nauka, 1966. 129 pp.
Chapter 3 discusses the Russian contribution to the education of non-Russians in Central Asia.

56. Pierce, Richard A. *Russian Central Asia 1867-1917; A Study in Colonial Rule.* Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1960. 359 pp.
Chapter 13 is devoted to education. A clear and authoritative discussion of the intricacies of regulations and rules. The Kazakhs are included.

57. Vambery, A. *Western Culture in Eastern Lands; A Comparison of the Methods Adopted by England and Russia in the Middle East.* New York, Dutton, 1906.
Not overly flattering to Russia. However N. I. Il'minskii's and D. A. Tolstoi's efforts come in for praise.

58. Vakhidov, Kh. *Prosvetitel'skaia Ideologiia v Turkestane.* Tashkent, Uzbekistan, 1979. 155 pp.

59. Vasilievskii, E. "Zachatki narodnogo obrazovaniia v Turkestanskom krae", *Sredniia Aziia* (October 1910).

60. Williams, S. D. M. "The Traditional Muslim Schools of the Settled Regions of Central Asia during the Tsarist Period", *Central Asian Review*, Vol. XIII, No. 4 (1965), pp. 339-349.

61. Zenkovsky, Serge. "Kul'turkampf in Pre-Revolutionary Central Asia", *American Slavic and East European Review*, Vol. XIV (1955), pp. 15-41.
A clear and well-researched account.

62. Znamenskii, P. "Sistema inorodcheskogo obrazovaniia v Turkestanskom krae", *Russkaia shkola*, Nos. 7-8 (1902).
Znamenskii was also an Il'minskii disciple.

63. Zhamenskii, P. "Uchastie N. I. Il'minskogo v dele inorodcheskogo obrazovaniia v Turkestanskom krae", *Pravoslavnyi sobesednik* (January 1900), pp. 40-70; (February 1900), pp. 149-187; (March 1900), pp. 278-298; (April 1900), pp. 349-374.

III. *Kazakhs and Kirghiz*

64. Aimanov, K. A. "Razvitie narodnogo obrazovaniia v Kazakhstane", *Sovetskaia pedagogika*, No. 5 (1967), pp. 25-32.
Author devoted first few pages to a review of education under the tsars.

65. Aitmambetov, D. *Dorevoliutsionnye Skholy v Kirgizii.* Frunze, 1961.

66. Aitmambetov, D. *Kul'tura Kirgizskogo Naroda Vtoroi Poloviny 19 - Nachala 20 vv.* Frunze, Ilim, 1967. 307 pp.

67. Alektorov, A. E. "Iz razvitiia obrazovaniia sredi Kirgizov Akmolinskoi i Semipalatinskoi Oblastei", *ZhMNP* (Dec. 1905), pp. 154-191.
A detailed description of the development of Kazakh schools. Author was director of public schools in Akmolinsk.

68. Alektorov, A. E. *Ukazatel' Knig, Zhurnal'nykh i Gazetnykh Statei i Zametok o Kirgizakh*. Kazan, 1900.
Also in *Izvestiia obshchestva arkehologii, istorii i etnografii Kazanskogo Universiteta*, Vols. 16-20 (1900).
A valuable source. The entries are annotated. Many articles on Kazakh education which had appeared in such provincial periodicals as *Astrakhanskii listok, Orenburgskii listok, Nizhegorodskii listok.*

69. Alektorov, A. E. "Zadachi shkoly v inorodcheskoi orde", *Moskovskie vedomosti*, No. 261 (1895).
Argues for state schools as the best means for russification.

70. Alektorov, A. E. "Ocherki iz istorii razvitiia inorodcheskogo obrazovaniia v Rossii", *ZhMNP* (July 1904), pp. 27-46.
Deals with Kazakh education in the Orenburg School District. Largely based on personal experience from his arrival in Orenburg in August 1881.

71. Altynsarin, I. *Izbrannye Proizvedennia*. Compiled by B. S. Suleimenov. Alma Ata, ANKazSSR, 1957.
This is the first publication in Russian of the Kazakh educator's selected works. They were previously published in Kazakh in 1943. His complete works were published as *Sobranie Sochinenii v Trekh Tomakh*. Alma Ata, 1975-1978. 3 vols.

72. Asfendiarov, S. D. *Istoriia Kazakhstana s Drevneishikh Vremen, I.* Alma Ata, Kazakstanskoe kraevoe izd., 1935.
Has very little on education, but is interesting for its pre-"friendship of People" approach.

73. Beisembiev, K. *Ideino-Politicheskie Techeniia v Kazakhstane Kontsa 19 Nachala 20vv*. Alma Ata, ANKazSSR, 1961. 379 pp.
Has a great deal on Kazakh education and on I. Altynsarin. Also see his earlier work, *Iz Istorii Obshchestvennoi Mysli Kazakhstana Vtoroi Poloviny* 19v. Alma Ata, ANKazSSR, 1957.

74. Beisembiev, K. B. *Ocherki Istorii Obshchestvenno-Politicheskoi i Filosofskoi Mysli Kazakhstana*. Alma Ata, Kazakhstan, 1976. 428 pp.
A slightly expanded version, mainly in connection with discussion of the Kazakh press.

75. Bekmankhanov, E. B. *Ocherki Istorii Kazakhstana 19 v.* Alma Ata, Mektep, 1966. 191 pp.
Chapters 4 and 6 are devoted to Kazakh culture. Altynsarin is cast as one of the trilogy of "enlighteners" (Valikhanov, Altynsarin, Kunanbaev).

76. Berzhanov, K. *Russko-Kazakhskoe Sodruzhestvo v Razvitii Prosveshcheniia (istoriko-pedagogicheskoe issledovanie)*. Alma Ata, Kazakhstan, 1965.

77. Berzhanov, K. *Is Istorii Kul'turno-Prosvetitel'noi i Obshchest-*

vennoi Deiatel'nosti Uchitel'stva Kazakhstana. Alma Ata, 1951.

78. Efirov, A. "Russifikatorskaia shkola u Kazakhov", *Sovetskaia pedagogika*, No. 12 (December 1939), pp. 120-129.
In spite of the negative label, tsarist efforts are judged basically "progressive".

79. Efirov, A. F. *Ibrai Altynsarin (1841-1889), Zhizn' i pedagogicheskaia deiatel'nost'.* Alma Ata, 1949.

80. Grekhovodov, M. "Narodnoe obrazovanie sredi Kirigzskogo naseleniia Petropavlovskogo uezda Akmalinskoi oblasti", *Inorodcheskoe obozrenie* (March 1913), pp. 83-112. (Supplement to *Pravoslavnyi sobesednik.*)
Offers history of Omsk schools for wealthy Kazakhs and then plunges into a history of the Russian Kazakh schools which began to open in 1902. Provides statistics.

81. Ikramov, Kamil. *Vse Vozmozhnoe Shchast'e;* Serialized in *Nauka i Religiia* (1976), No. 2, pp. 69-77; No. 3, pp. 79-83; No. 4, pp. 72-82; No. 5, pp. 67-75; No. 6, pp. 60-74.
An interesting, well-researched historical novel based on Altynsarin's life. The title is taken from one of Altynsarin's official reports in which he pictured as "the greatest happiness" for his people, their future merging with the Russians along with their spiritual and economic development. (Official reports however are not always accurate reflections of one's feelings.)

82. Il'minskii, N. I. *Vospominaniia ob Altynsarine.* Kazan, tipog. Kliuchnikova, 1891.
Most valuable source for Russian-Kazakh education. Includes documents, projects and Altynsarin's letters to Il'minskii and others.

83. *Istoriia Kazakhskoi SSR v Piati Tomakh, III.* Alma Ata, Nauka, 1979. 543 pp.
Chapters 14 and 19 contain valuable material on Kazakh education. For a slightly different interpretation see the earlier edition, *Istoriia Kazakhskoi SSR, I.* Alma Ata, ANKazSSR, 1957. 610 pp. (Chapters 19 and 22) and for yet an earlier and more divergent interpretation, *Istoriia Kazakhskoi SSR s Drevneishikh Vremen do Nashikh Dnei,* edited by M. Adykalov and A. Pankratova. Alma Ata, 1943.

84. Izmailov, A. E. *Ocherki po Istorii Sovetskoi Shkoly v Kirgizii za 40 Let, 1917-1957.* Frunze, Kirgiz gosuchpedizdat, 1957.
First chapter covers pre-revolutionary schools.

85. *Kazakhsko-Russkie Otnosheniia v 18-19vv (1771-1867), Sbornik Dokumentov i Materialov.* Alma Ata, Nauka, 1964.
Many interesting documents on early attempts at Kazakh education.

86. Mironov, P. M. "Ocherk o russko-kirgizskikh shkolakh Ural'skoi oblasti", *ZhMNP* (August 1910), pp. 178-199.
Author was personally involved in the schools.

87. Sabitov, N. "Bibliograficheskii ukazatel' materialov o zhizni i deiatel'nosti kazakhskogo pedagoga i prosvetitelia I. Altynsarina", *Vestnik ANKazSSR*, No. 5 (1959), pp. 54-57.
Much more has been published since then.

88. Sabitov, N. "Russko-Kirgizskie shkoly", *Vestnik ANKazSSR*, No. 7 (July 1949), pp. 74-78.
Useful only as a brief summary. (Based on secondary sources.)

89. Sembaev, A. I. *Istoriia Razvitiia Sovetskoi Shkoly v Kazakhstane*. Alma Ata, 1962.
First chapter deals with pre-revolutionary period. Also see Sembaev's earlier work, *Ocherki po Istorii Kazakhskoi Sovetskoi Skholy*. Alma Ata, Kazuchpedgiz, 1958.

90. Sitdykov, A. S. *Pedagogicheskie Idei i Prosvetitel'skaia Deiatel'nost' Ibrahima Altynsarina*. Alma Ata, MP KazSSR, 1949. 195 pp.
Stresses the importance of Il'minskii's influence.

91. Suleimanov, B. S. "Obshchestvenno-Pedagogicheskie vzgliady Ibragima Altynsarina", *Vestnik ANKazSSR* (May 1950), pp. 20-35.
Very critical review of the Sitdykov's work (no. 90).

92. Tazhibaev, T.T. *Kazakhskaia Shkola Pri Orenburgskoi Pogranichnoi Komissii, 1850-1869*. Alma Ata, 1961.

93. Tazhibaev, T.T. *Pedagogicheskaia Mysyl' v Kazakhstane Vo Vtoroi Polovine 19v*. Alma Ata, Kazakhstan, 1965.
A detailed, unexciting approach; but includes much useful material on Kazakh education. See also Tazhibaev's earlier works *Prosveshchenie i Skholy Kazakhstana Vo Vtoroi Polovine 19v*. Alma Ata, Kazgosizdat, 1962. 507 pp. (has a rich appendix of documents, regulations, projects); *Razvitie Prosveshcheniia i Pedagogicheskoi Mysli v Kazakhstane Vo Vtoroi Polovine 19v. Part I*. Alma Ata, ANKazSSR, 1958.

94. Vasil'ev, A. V. *Istoricheskii Ocherk Russkogo Obrazovaniia v Turgaiskoi Oblasti i Sovremennoe Ego Sostoianie*. Orenburg, Turgaiskii oblastnyi komitet, 1896.
Vasil'ev largely draws on Il'minskii's materials in *Vospominanie ob Altynsarine* (no. 82).

IV. *Uzbek and Tadzhik (some Karakalpak)*

95. *Istoriia Karakalpakskoi ASSR, I.* Edited by I. M. Munimov *et al.* Tashkent, Fan, 1974.
Contains some useful material on schools.

96. *Istoriia Narodov Uzbekistana, II.* Edited by B. Bakhrushin *et al.* Tashkent, ANUzbekSSR, 1947.
Some material on education and schools. Also *Istoriia Uzbekskoi SSR*, Vol. I. Tashkent, 1955-1956.

97. *Istoriia Tadzhikskogo Naroda, I.* Edited by B. Gafurov and V. Litvinskii. Moscow, 1963.

98. Kadyrov, I. K. *Uspekhi Narodnogo Obrazovaniia v Uzbekskoi SSR.* Tashkent, 1957.
Has material on the tsarist period for contrast.

99. Kary-Niiazov, T. N. *Ocherki Istorii Kul'tury Sovetskogo Uzbekistana.* Moscow, ANSSR, 1955. 650 pp.
Chapter I covers pre-revolutionary period. Author stresses the benefits of Russian rule.

100. Kocharov, V. I. *Iz Istorii Organizatsii i Razvitiia Narodnogo Obrazovaniia v Dorevoliutsionnom Uzbekistane, 1865-1917.* Tashkent, Fan, 1966. 124 pp.

101. Medlin, William K., *et al. Education and Development in Central Asia; A Case Study of Social Change in Uzbekistan.* Leiden, Brill, 1971. 285 pp.
The first chapters provide background material on education.

102. Obidov, I. *Istoriia Razvitiia Narodnogo Obrazovaniia v Tadzhikskoi SSR, 1917-1967.* Dushanbe, Irfon, 1967. 295 pp.
On pre-revolutionary schools – Chapter 1.

103. Ostroumov, N.P. *Sarty; Etnograficheskie Materialy, obshchii ocherk.* Tashkent, Tipog. Sredniaziatskaia zhizn', 1908. 3rd edition.
Includes first-hand information on schools.

104. Radzhabov, S.R. *K Istorii Shkoly v Uzbekistane.* Tashkent, 1957.
Has some discussion of tsarist period.

105. Serbov, P. I. and Nikiforov, A. D. *Narodnoe Prosveshchenie v Uzbekistane.* Samarkand, Tashkent, 1927.

106. Umarov, Iu. U. *Ocherki Po Istorii Trudovogo Vospitaniia v Shkolakh Uzbekistana, 1865-1930.* Tashkent, 1969.

107. Urumbaev, D. "Rastsvet narodnogo prosveshcheniia v Karakalpakii za 25 let", *Sovetskaia Pedagogika,* No. 6 (1950), pp. 29-39.
Offers statistics on the pre-revolutionary period.

V. *Turkmen*

108. Atabaev, M. "Maktaby u Turkmen Zakaspiiskoi oblasti", *ZhMNP* (February 1906).

109. Berdyev, T. B. *Ocherki Po Istorii Shkoly Turkmenskoi SSR.* Ashkhabad, 1960.

110. Karryev, A. and Rosliakov, A. *Kratkii Ocherk Istorii Turkmenistana, 1868-1917.* Ashkhabad, 1956. (A brief summary in *Central Asian Review,* Vol. VI (1958), pp. 125-142.)
Includes discussion of schools.

111. Karryev, A., *et al. Istoriia Kul'tury Sovetskogo Turkmen-*

istana, 1917-1970. Ashkhabad, Ylim, 1975. 466 pp.
First chapter useful for pre-revolutionary educational scene.

112. Kurbanov, A. A. and Kuz'min, O. D. *Ocherki Po Istorii Razvitiia Pedagogichesnoi Mysli v Turkmenistane, 1886-1941.* Ashkhabad, Turkmenistan, 1972.
First chapter for pre-revolutionary period. Also Chapter 4 includes methods of teaching Russian to the Turkmen in the tsarist period.

113. Kurbanov, A. A. and Kuz'min, O. D. "Razvitie pedagogicheskoi nauki v Turkmenii", *Sovetskaia Pedagogika* (Nov. 1968), pp. 107-111.

NOTES

1. The few Western works on tsarist education, such as Patrick Alston's *Education and the State in Tsarist Russia* (1969), Thomas Darlington's *Education in Russia* (1909), William Johnson's *Russia's Educational Heritage* (1950, 1969), ignore the subject altogether. Nicholas Hans in his *History of Russian Educational Policy, 1701-1917* (1931, 1964) and *The Russian Tradition in Education* (1964) has only a few lines on the subject. Allen Sinel's study of D. Tolstoi's ministry, during which the government first became involved in non-Russian education in the Eastern borderlands, (*The Classroom and the Chancellory*, 1973) does not deal with the subject at all, since, as Sinel explains in the introduction, "it would take a separate monograph to explore adequately the unique problems of educating the non-Russian nationalities and the great variety of projects involved".
2. Edward Allworth's excellent guide, *Soviet Asia: Bibliographies. A Compilation of Social Sciences and Humanities Sources on the Iranian, Mongolian and Turkic Nationalities* (New York, Praeger, 1975) lists sources chiefly in Russian with a few also in Central Asian languages under each of the Central Asian nationalities. The *Guide to the Study of Soviet Nationalities: Non-Russian Peoples of the USSR*, edited by S. Horak (Littleton, Colorado, Libraries Unlimited, 1981), contains a large section on Central Asian peoples. Most of the sources are in Western languages. See also Richard A. Pierce's guide, *Soviet Central Asia: A Bibliography, Part II 1867-1917* (Berkeley, University of California, 1966).
3. Until 1926 the Kazakhs were known under the name of Kirghiz, while the present-day Kirghiz went under the name of Kara-Kirghiz. Thus in works published before the mid-twenties, the Kirghiz of the title are actually the Kazakhs.

From the Turkmen Press

DAVID MORISON

Most of the information about Soviet Central Asia that has been gleaned from its newpapers over the last six decades or so has been gleaned from its Russian-language newspapers. The local-language newspapers, naturally, have not been read outside the republics concerned to the same extent as the Russian ones – although, naturally again, it is the local-language newspapers which "the locals" mainly read. Surely it is high time to see what it is that they are reading, and what it is that they are writing, in their own languages.

But don't these local-language newspapers, some will ask, simply contain "the mixture as before"? Do they not simply present the same sort of reports and comment as the Russian papers, only in a different language? If the notes which follow are considered to have shown that this is not the case, they will have achieved their main purpose.

ASHKHABAD'S 1981 CENTENARY

The centenary of Ashkhabad was celebrated in 1981. Its coverage in the Russian and Turkmen-language press is a good case in point. For the centenary, the Ashkhabad publishing house "Ylym" published in Russian a year-by-year chronicle, *Khronika Istorii Ashkhabada*, for the years 1881 to 1975 of notable events in Ashkhabad's history.[1] Its first entry is:

> 1881. 18 January. Col Kuropatkin's detachment occupied without an engagement the village of Askhabad and set up camp on its eastern outskirts.

There are three other entries in the chronicle under the year 1881, all brief, and only two of them dated: one, for 1 July, concerns Askhabad's promise as an *entrepot* for cotton and for livestock; the other, dated 5 September, concerns the arrival of a delegation from Merv "for talks with the aim of accepting Russian citizenship".

It was *Askhabad*, under that name, that became the capital of Russian's Transcaspian province. Count K. K. Pahlen, who in 1908–1909 headed an important investigation into the administration of Turkestan, wrote of Askhabad at that time: "Askhabad is a new city, founded and developed after the Russian occupation. There is no native quarter, and at the time of my visit the population numbered about 40,000. The streets are broad and lined by two rows of trees, mostly poplars. The architecture of the houses is European, their windows facing on to the street".[2] Occupied by anti-Bolshevik forces in 1918, the city was taken by Soviet forces on 9 July 1919, when it was renamed Poltoratsk, in memory of the Bolshevik leader Poltoratskii, who had been shot on 22 July 1918. In February 1925 the Turkmen SSR was formed; and by its enactment of 7 April 1927 the city's name was changed from Poltoratsk to *Ashkhabad*. All in all, given that Ashkhabad "started" in 1881 – albeit as a Russian military encampment, and under a name slightly different from its present one – Ashkhabad had more reasons for celebrating its centenary in 1981 than in any other year. But the fact remains that the anniversary, in the strictly chronological sense, was the anniversary of the occupation of a Turkmen village by Russian forces.

The date chosen for the climax of the 1981 centenary year was, in the event, Saturday 26 December. A report by Turkmeninform (the Turkmen SSR information agency), which appeared both in the Russian-language newspaper *Turkmenskaia Iskra* and in the Turkmen-language daily *Sovet Turkemnistany* on 27 December, spoke of Ashkhabad's workers "marking the centenary of their beloved city" in a festive atmosphere, with the city itself looking "more beautiful, and even younger", and of thousands of its residents and guests "taking part in or watching the mass festive happenings going on in the avenues and boulevards and stadiums of the Turkmen capital". Of these jollier proceedings the information agency gave no details; it chose to spread itself more on the subject of the ceremony held at the monuments to heroes of the revolution and of the Great Fatherland War, where wreaths from the republic's Party and government authorities were laid, and a minute's silence was observed in memory.

On 25 December, the eve of the chosen centenary date, the First Secretary of the Turkmenistan Communist Party's Central Committee, M. G. Gapurov, opened Ashkhabad's Centenary Boulevard, lined with newly planted plane trees and beautified by a 100-jet fountain. *Turkmenskaia Iskra* and *Sovet Turkmenistany* of 25 December made their own contributions – each according to his kind – to the festive occasion. Both published a list of Ashkhabadians awarded a republican distinction for meritorious services. Both also published a

lengthy message, under the heading "In one united family", from the Ashkhabad City Party Committee First Secretary, S. Niiazov. The message was more or less the same in both papers. But, whereas in the Russian version Niiazov said that Ashkhabad's centenary was "a festival of the entire people, a very important page in the chronicle of the Turkmen people", in the Turkmen version he said: "Ashkhabad's centenary is a big festival for the workers of this republic of ours. This year marks an important page in the chronicle of the Turkmen people".

The two papers' leading articles emphasized different aspects of the occasion. The Russian paper said it was a festival which "we had long waited for, and prepared ourselves to celebrate worthily. It is for everyone, this festival. It leaves no one out. But, above all, it is a festival of the working people of Ashkhabad, of those who rightly regard themselves as representatives of His Majesty the working class". The article celebrated the years – pre-revolutionary and post-revolutionary – which led up to the establishment of the authority of the Soviets, "the history of the liberation struggle of the toiling people. of the construction of plants and factories". It was the festival of Ashkhabad's builders and construction workers; of its Party and war veterans; of its young people – for, statistically, Ashkhabad is a city of young people; of science and the arts; and of international friendship, in a city where members of 105 nationalities lived and worked together.

The leading article in the Turkmen-language paper, *Sovet Turkmenistany*, began by observing that the occurrence together of the centenary, and the award to Ashkhabad of the Order of the Red Banner of Labour by Brezhnev, and also the seventy-fifth birthday of Brezhnev himself – "tireless fighter for lasting world peace" – had "created a high surge in political and work activity among the workers of our republic". Ashkhabad's centenary was "an important event in the life of the Turkmen people". Ashkhabad had played an important part in the dissemination in Turkmenistan of the ideals of Marxism-Leninism, and in the growth of the revolutionary movement. It was in February 1925 that it had been proclaimed the capital of the Turkmenistan SSR, and it was thereafter that its economic and cultural development really gathered pace, with specialists and technicians coming from all over the Soviet Union. "With the triumph of the Leninist nationalities policy, Ashkhabad was transformed into an international city". The leader ended – as it had begun – on the work note: by pointing to the work successes achieved by Ashkhabadians in honour of their city's centenary.

If the leading articles in *Turkmenskaia Iskra* and *Sovet Turkmenistany* for this date differed in emphasis, so did the style and

content of the two papers' various centenary features. *Sovet Turkmenistany* published half-a-dozen of what might be termed "testimonies and recollections" by Ashkhabadians – two Turkmens, two Russians and an Armenian – about their life and work for the city. The Russian-language *Turkmenskaia Iskra*'s contributions were perhaps less telling: some rather diffuse reflections on the city's past, present and future by a Russian woman correspondent, and an article by the city planning commission chairman about the city's consumer goods trade and manufactures.

What sounds like an interesting centenary exhibition – evidently the principal one – was held in the premises of the permanent exhibition of the TSSR's economic achievements. The Russian paper on 19 December published an account of the various sections of the display – the first two concerned the pre-revolutionary years, and "Ashkhabad, centre of the revolutionary movement" – by Kh. Muradov, chief specialist of the permanent exhibition, and perhaps himself responsible for the special one. The Turkmen paper published later, on 23 December, an article by the deputy director of the permanent exhibition, A. Allamyradov, which was as much about the permanent exhibition as about the special centenary display; he seemed to imply that the former would enlighten the visitor more about Ashkhabad's essential economic and industrial activity than would the "Ashkhabad Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow" display, which he eventually came to make mention of, as being "one of the important events in the life of the exhibition". But the Turkmen paper also had a brief Turkmeninform report (25 December) on the special Ashkhabad exhibition.

The city's history as seen through its records and documents and from photographs and films was the subject of an article in *Turkmenskaia Iskra* (15 December) by S. Shapiro, senior inspector in the TSSR archives. From Ashkhabad's preparations for its great centenary festival, said Shapiro, the personnel of the archives department "could not of course stand aside". Among the historic documents in the archives was a copy of the Tsar's decree of 15 May 1881 on the establishment of the Transcaspian province; and there was also the first and sole issue of the illegal newspaper *Soldat* which was put out by the Central Asian military organization of the Russian Social Democratic Labour Party in July 1906. There were unique documents concerning Ashkhabad's early years – on such subjects, for example, as the daring and unprecedented ride by Turkmen horsemen from Ashkhabad to Moscow. Also carefully kept in the archives were the records that told of the bravery of Turkmen soldiers at the front in the war years. "The task now is to bring these documents before the broad masses". The department had organized public

lectures, talks to and excursions for schools and colleges, film shows and photographic exhibitions, and a recent centenary conference on the department's premises.

Sovet Turkmenistany had little to say about these exertions by the archive department. However, in its issue of 22 December there was a brief report by T. Bordzhakov of an illustrated talk on the centenary given at the Gorky State University by A. V. Golovkin, the archives director.

It was also left to the Russian paper to publish, on 21 December, an account by the "Ylym" publishing house director, D. B. Berdiaev, as reported by the paper's correspondent L. Yurina, of a batch of new books, both in Russian and Turkmen, published by "Ylym" for the Ashkhabad centenary. "Dedicated to the 100th centenary of Turkmenistan's adherence to Russia" was a monograph, *The strengthening of Russian-Turkmen links in the 18th and 19th centuries*, by M. Annanepesov. "It investigates the origins of Russian-Turkmen relations, their development in the time of Peter the First, the movement among Turkmens to accept Russian citizenship, and the Turkmens' trading and economic links with Russia in the 19th century". Among the Turkmen-language books was mentioned a collection of articles under the title "Problems of atheist education". "It includes materials about Turkmenia's 'holy places', and about their origins and their influence on the local population".

In the last three months before the centenary events of 25-26 December, *Turkmenskaia Iskra* published many articles about the centenary, *Sovet Turkmenistany* few. The editors of the Turkmen-language paper were presumably not anxious to concentrate their Turkmen readers' attention on the celebration of a Turkmen defeat at the hands of the Russians. During November – when *Sovet Turkmenistany* seemed to be almost silent about the anniversary – the Russian paper published articles on the Russian theatre in Ashkhabad (4 November); on Ashkhabad as the flourishing centre of Turkmen dramatic art (19 November); and on Ashkhabad's parks and botanical marvels (21 November).

On 11 November the Turkmen paper, in its "Party life" section, published an article by a Russian lady, Party Secretary V. Strogonova, who complained that not enough had been done in the city to bring its streets and pavements up to the standard expected in a jubilee year. Some engineering establishments, however, in a "patriotic initiative", had volunteered to give their services for a month to help to get the city tidied up. Then on 21 November, *Sovet Turkmenistany* itself began to take some notice. It published a picture of a very smartened-up-looking M. I. Kalinin Agricultural Institute, with a caption saying how much the capital had been beautified for its

centenary; and on the same page it printed a poem about the pleasures of a day's outing to visit Ashkhabad. One verse of this reads: "Look, streets clean as glass! Gleaming, like bright new flowered felt rugs!"

In December *Turkmenskaia Iskra*, apart from other articles connected with the anniversary, published six short biographies under the title "Ashkhabad and Ashkhabadians". Of the Ashkhabadians thus "written up" two were Turkmens; a railway worker of many years' service (16 December), and a "mother heroine" grandmother, mother of ten children and grandmother of over thirty (19 December). "It remains to add", said the correspondent, K. Dzhemelova, "that in Ashkhabad we have over 550 of such families with many children". And in the hands of the mothers, whether young or grey-haired, "lies the future of our capital".

The significance of one rare "Ashkhabad Centenary" article which the Turkmen paper did publish, on 16 December, was its total irrelevance to Ashkhabad's centenary. It was by the head of Ashkhabad's automobile-transport undertaking No. 1, K. Achylov. After dwelling on the conscientious efforts made by the drivers of his enterprise to satisfy often demanding passengers, and mentioning plans in hand to improve the drivers' services to passengers and also to improve their own rest quarters, he conceded that, of course, "there's no stable without its lame horse": there were occasional cases of drivers not meeting passengers' legitimate requests, and of drivers who used rough language to passengers. But they were dealt with at the brigade's weekly soviet meeting, and their names were put up on the wall newspapers. "There are also fundamental shortcomings which negatively effect the progress of our work. For the drivers good working conditions are not being created. There is a shortage of tyres and spare parts". After this *obiter dictum*, the drivers' boss said that his work force was "pressing on ahead", and intended to mark the Ashkhabad centenary and the USSR's 60th anniversary with an extra work drive, and to finish the year's work plan in advance of time, being inspired to this by Brezhnev's speech to the November 1981 Central Committee plenary session.

One article which the Turkmen-language paper, *Sovet Turkmenistany*, did publish, relevant to the centenary, contained some diplomatic criticism of the Russians and a subtle reminder that while a great deal was being made of Ashkhabad's centenary – that is, the anniversary of the Russian takeover – in fact, the city's roots are more natural and much deeper. In his article in 2 December, "Why do we say 'Ashkhabad'" (or rather, "Why do we say 'Ashgabat'", for that is its Turkmen name), the leading authority on Turkmen toponymy, Soltanisha Atanyiazov, noted that the name Ashgabat

consists of the two components *ashg* (from the Arabic *ashq*) meaning "love, ardour, affection" – like the Turkmen *yshk* – and *abat*, which in place names of Persian origin means "place of settlement" – village, town or city. In Turkmen, however, *abat* has the meanings of "entire", "well built", "well provided". The learned Hungarian traveller Vambery, says Atanyiazov, correctly identified the name Ashgabat and its meaning, in places which he visited in the last century. "But, in spite of this, we come across scholars who, basing themselves on the corrupted form of the name as it was written in Russian, Askhabad, take the *Askh* part as being the name of a king or emperor, and yet others who connect it with the name of the Greeks' god of the harvest and of love". In the Murgab oasis, says Atanyiazov, there was a place called Ashgabat in the Middle Ages. In Iran, according to Dr L. M. Payan's place-name dictionary, published in Mashhad in 1960, there are no less than 16 Ashgabats, "most of them in areas of Iran not far from our own capital . . . In the Arabic script the names of all of them, including those of the villages in Turkmenistan, are written alike". In Turkmen, the name would have to appear in the form Yshgabat. The meaning of Ashgabat, as Vambery correctly concluded, was "city of love", or "city built with ardour, with affection". The notion that it meant "city of lovers" (Turkmen: *ashyklar sheheri*) was a romantic one, but quite without foundation.[3]

After this philological excursion, Atanyiazov points out that "as is well known, after the Akhal oasis was united to Russia, in 1881 in the vicinity of the old Ashgabat village a military stronghold was built, and it was given the name of that village. Although officially the city may be taking the date of its foundation from that year, there are dwellings of very early times in the area". Archaeologists' digs have confirmed this (he indicated the sites concerned). Moreover, he says, the name Ashgabat is, necessarily, of considerable antiquity; he places its origins in the seventh century.

It is hoped that these notes may be felt to add a bit of body to the rather jejune picture of life in a Soviet Central Asian republic which is sometimes got from only looking at the Russian-language press. A young Uzbek historian who visited our research centre in 1969 asked me: "Why doesn't your research centre read the Uzbek newspapers?" When I said I had been given to understand that their content was not all that different from that of the Russian newspapers, he replied: "Well, they're the newspapers that we all read".

NOTES

1. *Khronika istorii Ashkhabada*, ed. G. G. Melikova. Ashkhabad, Ylym, 1981, 144 pp.
2. *Mission to Turkestan, being the Memoirs of Count K. K. Pahlen, 1908-*

1909, translated by N. J. Couriss, ed. Richard A. Pierce. London, OUP (in association with the Central Asian Research Centre), 1964, 241 pp; p. 129.

3. For a fuller account, see S. Atanyiazov, *Turkmenistanyng geografik atlarynyng dushundirishli sozlugu* (Explanatory dictionary of geographical names of Turkmenistan). Ashkhabad, Ylym, 1980, 364 pp; pp. 48-49. For *abad* and *abat* in place names of Persian derivation, see the same author's *Turkmenistanyng toponimiyasy* (The toponymy of Turkmenistan). Ashkhabad, Ylym, 1980, pp. 41-42.

Afghanistan in Crisis: A Review Article

ANTHONY HYMAN

Nancy and Richard Newell. *The Struggle for Afghanistan.* Cornell U. P., Ithaca, N. Y., 1981. 204 pp. $14.95.

John C. Griffiths. *Afghanistan; Key to a Continent.* Andre Deutsch, London/ Westview Press, Colorado, 1981. 205 pp. £7.95.

K. P. Misra (Ed.). *Afghanistan in Crisis.* Vikas, India/Croom Helm, London, 1981. 150 pp. £10.95.

Anthony Arnold. *Afghanistan. The Soviet Invasion in Perspective.* Hoover Institution Press, Stanford, 1981. 126 pp.

Gerard Chaliand. *Rapport sur la Resistance Afghane.* Berger-Levrault, Paris, 1981. 161 pp.

These new books all have a common theme in the present crisis in Afghanistan, but they have quite distinct perspectives, and indeed different aims. Their various authors – American, British, Indian or French – see Afghan society and history from often contrasting angles; they adopt varying political standpoints which colour their books, making for a rich diversity of assessments, but nothing approaching a consensus of views. The different aims of these books are evident; from a background to Afghan society and history (Griffiths), a description of contemporary events (Newells), an analysis of the guerilla resistance (Chaliand) to the pattern of Soviet foreign policy in Afghanistan (Arnold), and finally a collection of essays on international aspects of the crisis by Indian academics (Misra).

None of these books is long or detailed; rather they are extended essays. It is the Newells' *The Struggle for Afghanistan* which is the most obviously useful single book for the public, being a generally excellent "short overview for the general reader". This reader, it should be added, is certainly American, and considerations of US policy, past and future, towards the region are an outstanding feature of the book. A sketch of Afghan society and history is aided by fine photographs. In a suggestive section on the rise and fall of the

Afghan monarchy and the "new democracy", we are left in no doubt as to the causes of disillusionment and failure. The Newells write that "the dual challenge of managing the growth of the economy and broadening the political system proved to be more than the government and the new educated class could handle".

It is the rise to power in 1978 of the Marxist regime in Kabul, and the development of popular resistance into civil war, followed in 1980 by the nationwide struggle against Soviet occupation, which form the core of the book; it aims to prove that this was a genuinely popular and spontaneous movement, fuelled by real grievances as well as by traditional urges for independence or autonomy from Kabul, among the tribes and ethnic communities of the regions. The Newells are frank in their admiration for the *mujahidin* (Islamic fighters, or guerillas) and their "gallant naivete" – which is certainly more attractive from a long distance. The authors are sometimes at a disadvantage here, minimizing or ignoring the complexities and ambiguities of Afghan exile politics in Pakistan and Iran, as well as inside Afghanistan.

The Newells make many penetrating observations on foreign policies towards Afghanistan, deploring the irrelevance and rhetoric of world reactions to Soviet invasion and occupation. Yet they believe that advantage can be taken, by the USA in particular, of this first unambiguous act of Soviet aggression in Asia, which is seriously denting the Soviet image as a peace-loving state in Third World circles. Can US foreign policy in Asia take the initiative now – gaining influence and prestige in Third World circles, while at the same time helping Afghanistan to regain independence? It was Iran's revolution which overturned US influence in the region, and still undercutting it, the Newells argue, is the force of Islamic revivalism, rather than communism. Not only the Muslim bloc of states, but also India, would be happy at withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan, and the USA should do all it can to work along with India to achieve this aim, at the same time forging a new and less unequal relationship with Asian states more suited to this dangerous decade.

The Newells make a strong case for realignments in US foreign policy for Asia, by which *rapprochement* between the USA and the states of South Asia, as well as of the Middle East, can be helped on. They rightly insist that Washington should try to end the long period of poor relations with India, giving due weight to Indian views and sensibilities, and treating India at last with the respect its size and importance in Asia surely deserve. However, since their book was written, it is quite clear that neither in Washington nor in New Delhi are official circles open to bold new ideas; President Reagan and Mrs. Gandhi came into office in 1980 both determined to pursue

foreign policies which they have advocated in opposition – making a *rapprochement* between India and the USA difficult to imagine.

The book argues that the Afghan people's struggle – like all liberation struggles involving guerilla warfare – requires large quantities of aid from outside (in which the USA should lead the way), if it is to have a chance of eventually succeeding against the Soviet military machine. The Newells' firm belief that Afghan resistance will continue to give serious problems to Soviet occupation forces has been borne out during the past two years of fighting. Foreign weaponry and ammunition has reached some regions of Afghanistan, albeit in smaller quantities and different categories of weapons than hoped for by Afghan nationalists.

In *Afghanistan: Key to a Continent*, John Griffiths has written a background book, in which Afghan politics are interpreted almost exclusively through history. National and racial characteristics of the Afghans figure largely here, together with a wealth of personal observations and anecdotes about modern Afghan society. Often this method yields shrewd and telling points on trends in Afghan society, information which is both relevant and not explored elsewhere. Yet the very artlessness and forthright style of Griffiths' book can give readers a false impression of superficiality. He attempts to cover too much ground in a short book, and inevitably certain vital themes are skimped – notably contemporary events, about which the author is seemingly poorly informed. It is the Afghanistan of the monarchy, traditional and slowly evolving, which Griffiths puts over well; even basic facts, let alone interpretations of events, of the period since 1978 are often either inaccurate or only partly true.

There is another aspect of Griffiths' book which is less than satisfying – the impracticality of a number of proposed means of solving the Afghan crisis. "A phased (Soviet) withdrawal and transfer of power to Afghan forces" is even more clearly impossible in 1982 than when written, with the further disintegration of the Afghan army. A suggested coalition Government to be led by Babrak Karmal and Sayed Ahmed Gailani is among the least feasible ways out of the crisis. When the author does not indulge his touching British faith in political compromise, he makes more sense. He writes that Russia alone can determine what is to happen in Afghanistan – and believes that she will stay and fight on, having no real option of withdrawal.

Any political attraction for Western and other states that aiding the guerilla struggle may have, writes Griffiths, must be weighed against the moral dilemma of backing the bigotry of mullahs and fundamentalist Muslim reactionaries who are against all liberal Western principles, as well as fighting Soviet expansionism. He does, however, recognize the "fundamental principle of a people's right to determine

the pattern of their lives without external military interference". Griffiths appears to have mixed views on the merits and dangers of external aid for the Afghan guerilla resistance, and looks to an eventual negotiated settlement which could lead to withdrawal of Soviet forces and peace in Afghanistan. The framework for any such settlement would undoubtedly be favourable to Soviet interests – acknowledging what Griffiths rightly declares has been a fact since 1960 – "Afghanistan is basically within the sphere of Russian influence". In spite of this sobering thought, Griffiths is confident of an "innate Afghan spirit of independence", which will, he believes, continue to produce Afghan rulers of all shades who "are above all nationalists who cherish their country's independence".

Afghanistan in Crisis, edited by K. P. Misra, is a collection of essays by Indian political scientists of the Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. It shows how sharply divided is the Indian establishment on assessing or trying to resolve the Afghan crisis, reflecting no doubt divisions within the Indian public as a whole. There is plenty of comment and analysis on Indian relations with China, Pakistan and the USA, on India's "special relationship" with the USSR – but remarkably little of value on Afghanistan itself. Indian views are significant and worth attention, partly because India is the main regional power, but also because its close links with the USSR and India's place in the non-aligned movement could give India a valuable role in solving the crisis. It is all the more a pity, then, that its seven essays are highly uneven in interest and objectivity, and that its exhaustive bibliography of mainly ephemeral press articles takes up a full fifth of a slim book. First impressions that this is a poorly produced (and overpriced) book are confirmed by casual printing, resulting in many errors and some howlers (such as "great flowers" for "great Powers").

This said, the book does give Indian reactions to the international crisis which are often provocatively different to those heard in Western Europe, the USA or in other Asian countries. At their best, the essays are incisive, objective and well informed, very different from others in the collection. Few would disagree with Professor Bimal Prasad's judgement that "the Afghan crisis has presented India with the most difficult situation it has had to face in the external sphere since the Bangladesh crisis of 1971". From it, states the same specialist, could arise "a conflagration of unforeseeable dimensions", unless it is resolved quickly by Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan.

Naturally, the quality of India's response is a central issue. The writers tend to be uncritical of their own Government, though finding plenty of fault with those of others. India's response, it is agreed, has been "quite mature and sophisticated", although there is

forthright criticism of early statements by Mrs. Gandhi's new Government, early on in 1980, which "created an impression in certain circles that India was blind to the dangers posed by the Soviet intervention and was indirectly seeking to justify it". In an impartial discussion of the United Nations' role, potential and past, Professor K.P. Saksena observes drily that India had abandoned its independent approach, and to a certain extent repudiated the very concept of non-alignment, by the remarkable bias shown in favour of the USSR in UN debates in January 1980, after the Soviet intervention. Saksena believes that there is still potential for a UN peace-keeping role in Afghanistan, which will prove its value when (or if) "a time may come when the Soviet forces will look for a face-saving device for disengaging themselves".

There is a general belief among the Indian writers that India can play a big part in defusing the crisis, and should use all its influence over the USSR, as well as within the non-aligned movement, to achieve a compromise solution. What precise nature such a settlement might take is, however, only airily discussed. Predictably enough, with more idealism than practical sense, a model is proposed on the lines of European neighbours of the USSR; Finland and Austria, for example, are quoted as "technically limited sovereignties flourishing with great freedom in political, economic and intellectual spheres". On the motives of the Soviet intervention, though, agreement is quite impossible, with the Indian specialists broadly placed in two opposed camps; those critical (in varying degree) of Soviet adventurism in South Asia, who insist that Afghan independence should be restored, and secondly, those who refuse to believe that any act of the USSR can reasonably be criticized at all. From this second pro-Moscow camp come some interesting views on the nature of the crisis. At its most extreme, this pins all the blame on the USA and China, with Pakistan: "The Soviet Union had in all probability walked into a trap laid by its adversaries".

To more than one of these New Delhi specialists Afghanistan is apparently little more than that "pleasant and remote country" where the "Afghan tribals" run wild. There is absolutely no awareness of the extent of popular resistance within the country, or of the extent of destruction and chaos which has resulted in the world's biggest refugee problem. The book is disappointing, on the whole, and all the more so because more could fairly have been expected, if it had been edited with more discrimination.

Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion in Perspective is by Anthony Arnold, a former US intelligence officer in Afghanistan. It takes the emergence of the Soviet state in 1919 as the starting point for a study of Soviet-Afghan relations, the more detailed part of which

deals with the recent period since the Second World War. Arnold detects a consistent pattern of Soviet aggression – first by economic penetration, then political subversion and finally military invasion and occupation. He does not doubt the Soviet hand behind many coups or plots in Afghanistan over the past sixty years, even when the linkage to the Soviet embassy in Kabul is ambiguous or obscure.

There are many telling points in this analysis of Afghan politics and foreign relations. But it is surely made less persuasive than it otherwise would be, for that part of the public which has not formed definite views over the rights and wrongs of Afghanistan, by this evident bias. Can the USSR seriously be held responsible for virtually the entire course of developments leading to the present disaster? Arnold does not consider the real limits to Soviet influence over Afghan left-wing politicians, either before or after the 1973 and 1978 coups in Kabul. They were by no means simply stooges or puppets of the Russians, as the deaths of Taraki and Amin amply indicate, and the ambiguities of their relationship with Moscow, as well as with each other, are largely ignored here.

From 1978 on, writes Arnold, events unfolded with a certain inevitability. Soviet miscalculations as to the extent of internal Afghan resistance to their occupation, as well as international disapproval, have been costly, but have led to no change of policy. Arnold finds little to criticize in US policy during the last decade, declaring that US refusal to give military aid to Afghan insurgents against the Taraki and Amin regimes was a correct decision. Now, though, Soviet occupation and the nationwide opposition have widened US options to the point where US intervention – and that of other states – is no longer so sensitive. Indeed, claims Arnold, military aid to the Afghan resistance is the most effective means of keeping up pressure for Soviet withdrawal and any future Afghan independence. Arnold rejects any direct US involvement in the guerilla war, by advisers or troops, but he demands that Afghan guerillas should be equipped by the USA with all the sophisticated weapons necessary to end the Soviet forces' total control of the air, and to make the struggle less uneven.

In other spheres, too, Arnold identifies ways of helping the Afghans regain freedom. The propaganda war could be helped by immediate release of classified intelligence information on internal Afghan matters, bringing awareness of the full tragedy the war is bringing to ordinary Afghans, as well as of the popular character of the opposition. He claims that the Russians need have no genuine fears as to their own country's security in withdrawing from Afghanistan, and that the USA "has no interest in seeing Afghanistan revert to anything but its traditional role as a nationally free, truly non-

aligned and independent country".

In the French book, *Rapport sur la Resistance Afghane*, Gerard Chaliand casts an experienced eye over the Afghan guerilla scene, comparing and contrasting it with other Third World liberation struggles. Although the actual text is brief – little more than an expanded version of his earlier articles in the press at the end of 1980, as far as the guerilla scene is concerned – Chaliand raises vital questions, often overlooked elsewhere. There are also valuable maps and a chronology, together with a critical bibliography and appendix – all adding to the value of this book.

Chaliand notes great strengths but also weaknesses in the Afghan opposition. Unparallelled popular support for the Afghan resistance within Afghanistan sets it apart from other liberation movements, which often started (or even won out) with very limited popular backing. Afghan *mujahidin* have courage and tenacity against overwhelming odds, he writes, but they will need much more than these if their resistance is to inflict really heavy losses on the Soviet occupation forces, and finally perhaps make the Russians rethink their strategy in Afghanistan. In arms, supplies of ammunition (let alone of food, etc.), the Afghan *mujahidin* are much worse off than other liberation movements. Moreover, there are serious deficiencies of leadership and organization, besides endemic disunity of tribes and parties. None of the leaders among the diverse opposition groups appears to have a global strategy, a good knowledge of Soviet aims or methods or an appreciation of the international situation. Even more serious is the lack of local cadres of coordinating and directing popular resistance, which, Chaliand writes, is absolutely vital for guerilla movements fighting over a longer period. The very traditionalism of Afghan society, which gives the will to continue fighting against foreign invaders, hinders the emergence of capable, educated leaders to replace the traditional rural elites, writes Chaliand – though here, certainly, changes have taken place since the book was written.

Soviet strategy in Afghanistan has been shrewd, ruthless and quite effective. They have sent not a vast, expensive and largely irrelevant expeditionary force of half a million men (like the French in Algeria or the Americans in Vietnam), but instead a small army, a minimal contingent, fit to control cities and highways. Chaliand states that Soviet policy is deliberately "generating refugees" into Pakistan and Iran, and getting villagers into the cities, so that they can be better controlled. In depopulating border regions, and laying vicious anti-personnel mines, guerilla operations are inevitably made more difficult by the lack of friendly villages. Eventually the Soviet aim may be to create a *cordon sanitaire*, a no-mans-land as wide as possible

around the borders. Chaliand concludes on a sober note that the Russians will probably stay in Afghanistan just as long as is necessary to make it into a puppet state like Outer Mongolia on its eastern borders – but that it is possible to make such an occupation infinitely more costly than it is now to the Russians, by aiding the internal resistance through a level of equipment comparable to that enjoyed by other liberation movements in the Third World.

Finally, brief notice should be given to three other relevant books recently published. Louis Dupree's *Afghanistan* (Princeton U. P. paperback, 1980, $9.95) is a well-known and remarkable book of encyclopaedic scope and size, first published in 1973. It is inevitably an historical work, with a bare 25 pages to spare for fundamental changes over the past decade. Dupree asked at the end of an all too brief postscript: "If Afghanistan is the Rhineland of the early 1980's, will Pakistan and Iran be its Austria and Sudetenland?"

This dramatic question is addressed directly in Selig Harrison's *In Afghanistan's Shadow; Baluch Nationalism and Soviet Temptations*, (New York/Washington, Carnegie, 1981, $12). It is a fascinating account of Baluchi nationalism, with all its implications for regional stability. Harrison takes Baluchi grievances and aspirations more seriously than have other outside observers – indeed, he possibly exaggerates them in the process, by accepting as proven wild or rhetorical statements by Baluchi leaders. While Harrison dismisses the idea of a communist plot, he does identify widespread pro-Soviet views: "American strategists should tread very warily", he urges, trying to be a force for compromise in Islamabad and Tehran over Baluch autonomy. The alternative is national disintegration, he warns.

The Truth About Afghanistan (Moscow, Novosti Press Agency, 1980, £0.40) is a dazzling example of officialdom's capacity for distortion of that elusive quality, truth. It has a charm all its own, in spite of a turgid style. It will convince few who are not already convinced of the purity of Soviet motives in sending an expeditionary force into Afghanistan, because the level of argument is very low. Awkward facts are omitted or sidestepped – there is not even a hint of the USSR's total financial and military support of the so-called "CIA agent" Hafizullah Amin right up to the end of 1979. Nor is there any credibility in the "theory" that the US ambassador to Kabul, Adolph Dubs, was actually murdered by US agents, or that American and Chinese instructors in Pakistani bases in 1978/79 were teaching apt Afghan pupils "the art of killing, looting and raping". This booklet is in fact an obvious travesty of the truth about Afghanistan. And it is a sobering thought that its nominal price, at under a dollar, means that it alone of the books reviewed is within easy reach of any one interested in what is happening over there in Afghanistan.

Book Reviews

A. Grigorenko. *A Kogda My Vernemsia . . .* Crimea Foundation, New York, 1977. 210 pp.

A. Grigorenko. *Emel.* Crimea Foundation, New York, 1978. 64pp.

M. Serdar (Ed.). *Shest' Dnei. "Belaia Kniga". Sudebnyi Protsess Il'l Gabaia I Mustafy Dzhemileva.* Crimea Foundation, New York, 1980. 451 pp.

The three publications reviewed here complement each other – almost to the point of forming a triptic which offers the reader a comprehensive picture of the "Djemilev case" within the context of the national movement of the Crimean Tatars.

A Kogda My Vernemsia (And When We Return) is Andrei Grigorenko's first major contribution to the literature of dissent. The book enjoys another "first" – it is the first publication of the National Center of the Crimean Tatars. The title of the book represents, in fact, a line from "Port-Arthur", a Tatar song of the Russo-Japanese War period. There are two dominant feelings in this song: grief and hope; the grief of those young men who had to leave their native Crimea to fight a war in the Far East, and the hope of the same men that they would soon return to their homes. "Port-Arthur" is forbidden today. One doesn't have to look too far for an explanation. The song may be old but there isn't anything old or outdated about its message; in fact, if anything, it dramatizes the hopes of the Crimeans to return to a homeland from which they have been excluded.

A. Grigorenko's book is dedicated to this very issue. The struggle of the Crimean Tatars to return to their homeland is presented through the life story of their young leader, Mustafa Djemilev. The first chapter, reviewing some of the basic facts of the deportation, is useful as a background for Djemilev's involvement in the "national cause" and for setting in a proper perspective the series of fabricated charges which led to the arrests, prison and labour camp terms which Djemilev experienced between 1962 and 1976.

Aside from Djemilev's personal odyssey, what is of interest in this book is his account of the events of the spring of 1962 – the birth of the "Union of the Crimean Tatar Young for the Return to the Homeland". Equally interesting is the documentary evidence compiled by Grigorenko which speaks of the end of the isolation of "national dissent": a link seems to have emerged between the "national movement" and the "democratic movement" and a call for help and support launched to the democratic world, to world opinion.

The declarations of the Crimean Tatars to the foreign press, TV and radio, the appeals of leading Russian dissidents such as P. Grigorenko and A. Sakharov in support of Djemilev, are valuable documentary evidence for the study of the evolution of the Crimean "national movement". The author of this book, for the sake of accuracy, however, should perhaps be viewed as its editor. For, far

from contributing an insightful analysis of his own, A. Grigorenko limited his task to providing connecting narrative bridges between various sets of documents. This is regrettable, since as an "insider" of the "democratic movement" he had the potential, at least in the hopes of the reader, to provide a sophisticated discussion of the "national movement" of the Crimean Tatars within the context of the "democratic movement".

The publication of *Emel (The Aspiration)* in 1978 is the result of the successful efforts of the Crimea Foundation to present to its readers the first issue (Jan/Feb 1976) of the Tatar *samizdat* journal bearing the same name.

This is a journal (as specified in its subtitle) of articles and documents regarding the history, literature, and culture of the Crimean Tatars, their movement for the restoration of national equality in USSR. The title page carries the motto: "Truth, Truth, and only the Truth". For its next page, as a credo and a statement of the goals of the journal, the underground editors of *Emel* have chosen an excerpt from A. Latifzade's poem, *The Aspiration*, which ends with the following lines:

> To give body and soul
> For Freedom's sake:
> How beautiful is
> This last Aspiration.

Before commenting on the content of the journal, a note on its graphic presentation is in order. The covers of *Emel* are plain, light blue. The front cover is simple, if not severe: the title, number and year of the issue are lined in the middle of the page, with the publisher and place of publication centred at the bottom. There is more than this to the cover of *Emel*, however. The two signs on the upper right- and left-hand corners, closely resembling the capital letter T, have more than a humble decorative purpose. They represent the *tamga* – coat of arms – of the Crimean Khanate and against the light blue background they recreate the flag of the Khanate. I looked for a note from the editor, hoping to find out whether the Crimea Foundation was only faithful to the symbolism of the *samizdat Emel* in choosing this cover or contributed with a symbolism of its own. Unfortunately I found no answer to my question. Assuming, however, that it is the *samizdat Emel* cover that is being faithfully reproduced here, and on reflecting over Latifzade's poem on the second page, one is impressed by the deep sense of history and commitment to the national heritage of those who produced the journal by underground means.

Emel is not a voluminous journal – 64 pages altogether. Its goals are stated in a brief introductory note which emphasizes the commitment "to safeguard the little which is left of the national heritage", and to aspire to becoming "an equal member of the Great Community of the Peoples of the World".

None of the articles in this issue are signed, and understandably so. They are not even initialled. The only exception is D. Khalich's declaration regarding her treatment, and the treatment of her entire family when they attempted to move to the Crimea in the Spring of 1974. Equally interesting in this issue are: the article on the 31st anniversary of the deportation of the Crimeans, the note on the attitude of the Crimean Tatars toward A. Sakharov as a recipient of the 1975 Nobel Peace Prize, and the statement in support of M. Djemilev's hunger strike. In the opinion of this reviewer, however, by far the most interesting of all materials presented in this issue of *Emel* is the 36-page essay entitled "The National Movement of the Crimean-Tatars for the Period of 1957–1975". Far from being a self-gratifying song of praise, oblivious of any shortcomings, it provides a critical analysis of the movement, and a rather detailed discussion of

the roots of the crisis which, in the opinion of the author, has characterized the movement since 1969. There is criticism of a "national aristocracy" – those morally weak members of the national intelligentsia who, joining the "establishment", severed their ties with their own people and their problems. There is criticism of the shortsightedness of the leaders of the movement for having failed to adopt the best long-term strategy. But there is also hope and a call for help. The author of this essay is not an isolationist. In his concluding remarks, he calls upon the United Nations and other international organizations to support more actively and effectively the movement of the Crimean Tatars to return to their homeland. *Emel* is of value not only as a journal contributing to the study of the Crimean Tatar "issue" but as the first Muslim *samizdat* journal.

As a *samizdat* "publication", *Shest' Dnei* became known to readers in the Soviet Union in 1972. The present edition, published under the auspices of the Crimea Foundation, represents, however, more than just the English translation of the 1972 volume. *Shet' Dnei* offers the reader more than the title promises. It does not limit itself to the six-day trial of Il'ya Gabai and Mustafa Djemilev, both of whom were accused of activities aimed at undermining the Soviet regime for their part in the struggle of the Crimean Tatars to regain the right to return to their homeland, the Crimea.

The brief but relevant introduction, as well as the postscripts which flank the materials on the Gabay-Djemilev case presented in this volume, provide the reader with the background, the context, within which trial materials acquire a new meaning and coherence. Notes about Mustafa Ragulov and Musa Mamut who chose to end their lives to protest at eviction from their native Crimea, far from being superfluous, aid the reader in understanding Djemilev's own commitment and resilience.

The 225-page transcript of the six-day trial is preceded by the "White Book" which contains, among other documents, the prosecution's statement, a list of the documents contained in the 20 volumes of materials (some 6044 pages) on the Gabay-Djemilev case, protocols, and testimonies of witnesses. *Shet' Dnei* is one of the most comprehensive volumes of materials on trials of Soviet dissidents. As such, it is valuable not only to the students of Soviet dissent, and nationality problems, but to those of Soviet law and legal procedures as well.

Ayse Rorlich

Peter Hopkirk. *Foreign Devils on the Silk Road.* John Murray, London, 1980. 252 pp.

As it title suggests, *Foreign Devils on the Silk Road* is a popular analysis of archaeological treasure hunts to western China and not a scholarly treatise, although I would hesitate to discount the amount or the quality of Peter Hopkirk's research. His account brings together in a highly synthetic and readable package the successes and misadventures of the greatest non-Chinese explorer-treasure hunters of Eastern Turkestan: the Swede Sven Hedin, the Hungarian-Englishmen Sir Mark Aurel Stein, the Germans Albert Grunwedel, Albert von Le Coq, and Theodor Bartus, the Frenchman Paul Pelliot, the emissaries of Japan's Count Kozui Otani, and the American Langdon Warner. Hopkirk assumes correctly that today's reader, weary of the paucity of romantic true-to-life adventure stories and of the tedious analyses of contemporary "social

scientists", will find the exploits of these men alluring fare indeed, just as the explorers themselves fell victim to the allure of unknown civilizations along the periphery of the mysterious and dangerous Takla Makan, Lop and Gobi deserts.

Hopkirk stresses the imperial dimension to archaeological excavations at this place and time, when European nations and, to a lesser extent, Japan competed openly for the national honour they expected to achieve from being the first to discover a new trove of ancient frescoes, manuscripts, or other relics and, as was often the case, from removing these treasures from their place of origin for study by Western scholars and display in Western museums. From time to time, Hopkirk recounts the personal and professional animosity of the archaeologists for one another and for one another's methods. One can easily imagine that these were very real sentiments indeed, given the constant overlap of expeditions from different nations and the repeated excavations by different men of sites from which some treasure had been removed, often clumsily, or with little regard for that which remained. And while the fire of "exploration for exploration's sake" may have burned somewhat brighter in those days – perhaps because so much of the world was still undiscovered – Hopkirk observes that even scholar-explorers of Stein's calibre fought a continuous battle to secure funding for their expeditions despite quite spectacular track records and the real pleasure their governments took from advertising the explorers' finds as a national achievement. Often, in fact, the cost to the taxpayer of artifacts themselves was insignificant. For example, Stein returned with 24 cases of important manuscripts from the Tun-huang library and several others filled with paintings, embroideries and other relics for which he paid the paltry sum of £130.

There can be no question but that Eastern Turkestan was thoroughly plundered by these men, particularly by Stein, von Le Coq, and Pelliot, and that the Chinese today are justifiably indignant at having had a sizeable chunk of the archaeological wealth of this region removed by "foreign devils". Hopkirk faces the moral issue – indeed it permeates the entire book – without taking sides. He recalls the anger of the Chinese over the shameless removal of important frescoes from the Caves of the Thousand Buddhas and from Bezeklik, which I, too, observed to have been left with gaping holes in the facades and the integrity of the artistic design sundered. Still, Hopkirk correctly argues that the many important relics that were not removed by Stein and his contemporaries have fared badly over the years at the hands of local inhabitants, marauding bands, and, I suspect, Red Guards.

Stein and the others rationalized that they were, in fact, saving these priceless relics for posterity, for even in their time the work of vandals was all too evident. The American Langdon Warner, who was one of the last on the scene, was particularly appalled by the damage wrought by his colleagues, local vandals and a large group of Cossack soldiers, who had been interned for six months in the Tun-huang caves. He wrote his wife:

> My job is to break my neck to rescue and preserve anything and everything I can from this quick ruin. It has been stable enough for centuries, but the end is in sight now . . . . As for the morals of such vandalism I would strip the place bare without a flicker. Who knows when Chinese troops may be quartered here as the Russians were? And, worse still, how long before the Mohameddan rebellion that everyone expects? In 20 years this place won't be worth a visit . . .

While it is unclear if other explorers suffered the same moral pangs as Warner (and Hopkirk implies that von Le Coq, in particular, did not), all save Grunwadel opted to send the relics home rather than to leave them in place.

The dilemma persists. Had the "foreign devils" not removed many of the best examples, might they too have been destroyed or severely damaged by capricious or malevolent local forces? Almost certainly, I believe, but then a large part of von Le Coq's collection, housed at the famour Ethnological Museum of Berlin, was destroyed by the Allied bombing in World War II. Where is the justice, where the morality? Hopkirk wisely avoids answering this question, pausing only to reflect that some Western museums, and the British Museum in particular, for various reasons, cannot display all the treasures from the expeditions' incredibly fruitful bounty. He writes:

> There is a strong case, it could be argued, for a museum returning to the country of origin all antiquities – like these – which it has no prospect of putting on display.

The case is indeed a strong one, and it should be debated by all concerned.

Perhaps the most interesting part of *Foreign Devils on the Silk Road* is the last chapter, in which Hopkirk recounts his search for the current locations of the Silk Road treasures. As noted above, Hopkirk strongly criticizes the British Museum for its failure to display an unimaginably rich and important collection to full advantage or in its entirety, preferring to relegate it to packing cases in the basement at Bloomsbury. Hopkirk's detective work took him successfully to India, Japan, the Soviet Union, the United States, Taiwan, South Korea, Sweden, Finland, East and West Germany, France and China; to more than thirty institutions; and to large collections in London, Berlin and Delhi (where one would expect to find them), and Seoul (where one would not), and to smaller collectons in the Cernushchi Museum in Paris and the Nelson Gallery in Kansas. One sizeable German collection of Turkestan sculpture eluded Hopkirk's examination, although he apparently knows where it is. Deposited in a special security bunker at the Berlin Zoo, a large consignment of von Le Coq's masterpieces was removed by the onrushing Soviet troops in 1945. While European paintings obtained in this way have long since been returned to West Germany by the Russians, the Turkestani collections remain in Russian hands and are yet to be acknowledged, much less displayed. Hopkirk speculates that the Russians may be holding these treasures to bargain away in some future negotiation with Germany or China. I would speculate that Soviet Central Asian specialists would find these relics of consuming interest in their own investigations into the distant past, and I wonder if the contents of the purloined crates have ever been examined by them.

If Hopkirk's book has any serious weakness it is the brevity of some of the chapters and the treatment given to some important actors. I would have liked a bit more on Count Otani for example. Furthermore, Hopkirk's excuse for not treating Russian expeditions more thoroughly is that the Russians never seemed to get off the mark, despite enormous advantages accruing from their geographic position. This may be true but somehow this explanation strikes me as a bit thin, for Russia possessed some splendid Orientalists at this time.

However, this may be expecting too much from a popular work whose author has in the event wrestled with considerable success with a large subject demanding uncommon research and linguistic skills.

Foreign Devils is no substitute for the writings of the explorers themselves nor does Hopkirk intend it to be. He has appended an excellent bibliography of essential sources in European languages for those with specific inquiries. The book contains several excellent maps and many superb photographs, for which the publisher is to be commended, as well as a good index.

Foreign Devils on the Silk Road will be useful to those seeking a general

knowledge of the subject, as well as to those possessing more specific knowledge who require a painless glance at the whole canvas. While some parts of *Foreign Devils* are well known, others are not. Hopkirk skillfully blends the parts into an engaging whole. I recommend saving the book for a long evening before the fire, for two pipes at least.

S. Enders Wimbush

Muriel Atkin. *Russia and Iran 1780-1828*. University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, Minnesota, 1980.

Russia's expansion into the Caucasus during the late 18th and early 19th centuries became a subject of concern for Asian powers, whose territories were threatened by Russia's rapidly shifting frontier, and for European powers, whose leaders watched with unease the growth of the Russian empire. The penetration of Catherine the Great's armies into the borderlands between Russia and Iran in the 1780s and 1790s transformed the Muscovite pattern of annexing sparsely populated territories contiguous to Russia's core. Pursuing Peter the Great's goal of limiting Ottoman control over the southern and western shores of the Caspian, Catherine embarked upon an imperial conquest of prosperous settlements in remote areas of the eastern Caucasus. Catherine instilled in her successors the Western rationale for colonial acquisition – that of bringing enlightenment and civilization to barbaric peoples – and her early victories in the border areas reinforced Russian pretensions to imperial honour. Tsars Paul and Alexander I continued to apply military and diplomatic pressure upon Iran's newly founded Qajar dynasty to accept Russia's right to the disputed borderlands. The Qajars, however, considered it a point of honour to defend these lands, which were formely possessed by the Safavi shahs, against encroachment. Russia and Persia fought two wars in the early part of the 19th Century, and in 1828, the treaty of Turkmanchai brought the Russian empire significant territorial, political, and commercial concessions. It foreshadowed the character of tsarist ambitions in Asia for the next half century and launched the Russians into the "Great Game" with the British over the territories lying between their empires.

The motives for Russian expansion into the eastern Caucasus between 1780 and 1828, the problems of Russian colonial administration, the policies of the Qajars toward Russia, and the effects of Russia's imperial acquisition upon the European balance of power deserve scholarly attention. Indeed, each one of these topics merits extensive research in its own right. Little has been written about them either by Western, Persian, or by Soviet historians examining this period. John Baddeley, in *The Russian Conquest of the Caucasus* (1908) treats the early struggle for Transcaucasia only in his opening chapters; Boris Nolde's *La Formation de l'Empire Russe* (1952) stops at Paul's annexation of Georgia in 1800; B. H. Sumner's *Peter the Great and the Ottoman Empire* (1965), while providing an invaluable background to the study of Russian foreign policy in the Near East, concentrates on 17th Century diplomacy and Russian interests in Constantinople; George F. Jewsbury's *The Russian Annexation of Bessarabia 1774-1828* (1976) also covers only Russo-Turkish affairs. Finally, Robert Ingram's excellent work, *The Beginnings of the Great Game in Asia 1828-1834* (1979) devotes an all too short introductory chapter to the role of Persia in

British and Russian diplomacy from 1801 to 1828. Persian historians have yet to study in detail the impact of European influences on Iran during this time, and Soviet scholarship, though informative about particular episodes in Russian expansion, suffers from bias and ambivalence on the subject.

In her recent book, *Russia and Iran 1780-1828*, Muriel Atkin tries to fill the gaps in our understanding "of some of the critical issues of the formative period of Russo-Iranian relations: the motives for and methods of Russian expansion in the eastern Caucasus and the responses of the Iranian government and the inhabitants of the disputed territories" (p. 11). Ms. Atkin's is a difficult task which is complicated by the large scope of her inquiry. The book opens with a short introduction to Russo-Persian relations from the 15th to the mid-18th centuries, continues with a topical treatment of Iranian history, Russian policy toward Iran and the Caucasian borderlands, and the two Russo-Persian wars, and concludes with a brief discussion of Iran's diplomacy with Russia, Britain, and France during and immediately following the Napoleonic era.

Unfortunately, Ms. Atkin has tried to do too much. She has undertaken an examination of a vast and largely unexplored subject over a period of nearly 50 years. An analysis of Russian foreign policy unquestionably requires a discussion of the historical context in which policy is made; however, in Ms. Atkin's study, the delicate distinctions between the subject of the inquiry and the historical background are obscured by her inclusion of information about matters which are beyond the scope of her analysis. As the reader is forced to absorb in quick succession selected episodes in Russian and Persian history, military campaigns, and social customs of the time, the purpose of the research becomes unclear. The result is an absence of focus, a certain discontinuity, and, arguably, a trivialization of the subject. As her documentation and extensive bibliography show, Ms. Atkin has examined many valuable archival materials in her research. These materials, perhaps, could have been put to better use either in a straightforward historical account of Russo-Persian diplomatic relations, or in an analysis of Russia's institutional responses to the administrative challenges of imperial expansion.

Ms. Atkin proposes that the motives for Russian expansion do not merit much explanation. "Expansion was good because it made states stronger" (p. 22), she writes, paraphrasing an imaginary 18th century European statesman. Russia's special interest in building a colonial empire lay "in an ambition to acquire territory that would serve as the equivalent of the overseas colonies of western Europe. These colonies would enrich Russia and perhaps serve also as a badge of Russia's membership in the circle of great civilized powers" (p. 24). Catherine chose the Caucasus as her target for the same reasons which influenced Peter: firstly, a desire to eliminate "the Turkish threat to Russian security" (p. 25); secondly, her perception of an "apparent similarity between Iran's political fragmentation at the beginning and end of the century and, therefore, the likelihood of easy Russian success against a weak opponent" (p. 7). However, the years between Peter's death and Catherine's accession brought significant changes in Russian thinking about the empire's place among the European powers, and Ms. Atkin argues that unlike Peter, Catherine justified colonial expansion less on grounds of strategic importance than on those of imperial prerogative. The rationale which Catherine provided for her policy of conquest stressed Russia's obligations to protect Georgia against the tyranny of the Ottoman overlord, Aqa Mohammad Khan, her duty to establish justice in territories which were claimed by St. Petersburg but which were then under the control of the Porte, and her ability to offer the inhabitants of the northern Iranian provinces the advantages of an enlightened code of laws.

Ms. Atkin correctly attributes the shift in the justifications for imperial expansion to Catherine's (and later, Paul's and Alexander's) adoption of Western attitudes toward empire building. But her analysis does not give sufficient attention to the effects of European responses – as reflected in Russia's diplomatic relations with Britain and with France – upon Russian ambitions in Iran.

Indeed, Ms. Atkin is particularly unclear about the impact of the Napoleonic wars on Russian policy in the borderlands. In her discussion of Alexander's efforts to draw a strategically defensible frontier between Russia and Iran, she states that "it is striking how little the major foreign policy concerns of the Napoleonic era affected Russia's actions in the eastern Caucasus or its relations with Iran" (p. 62). Yet, in describing the origins of the first Russo-Iranian conflict, she argues that "the Napoleonic wars also affected the war in the Caucasus, since Russia participated directly in those gruelling contests while France and Britain tried to manipulate Iran" (p. 92). Clarification of this point would be essential in any consideration either of European attempts – British in particular – to contain Russian expansion, or of their effects upon Russian perceptions of the limits of tsarist colonial policy.

Both Britain and France strengthened their involvement in Iranian affairs during the Napoleonic era. French diplomats eyed Iran as a strategic corridor to India, a view which the British, ever-conscious of the vulnerability of their Indian possessions, were determined to invalidate by securing control over Persia. Britain and France, therefore, were both eager to form alliances with Iran in the first Russo-Persian conflict during those times when one or the other power was at war with Russia in Europe. Their respective interests in allying themselves with Iran, Ms. Atkin argues, originated in "reasons of their own that were quite different from Iran's reasons for being at war with Russia. Therefore, both countries encouraged the shah to continue the war and rendered military assistance only so long as such actions coincided with their interests in Europe" (p. 165). Ms. Atkin, then, implies that Britain and France were concerned about the effects of Russian penetration into Iran only insofar as such penetration affected the European balance of power.

While it is clear that Britain and France did try to influence Iran in ways that would benefit their respective positions in continental diplomacy both during and after the Napoleonic wars, this explanation of their policies toward Iran is incomplete. It fails to take into account changes in the scope of international diplomacy arising from European colonial expansion in Asia. Ms. Atkin's suggestion that, in the early years of the 19th Century, Britain considered Persia only within the context of the European balance of power, denies a British recognition of Persia's strategic importance to a defence of India against Russian encroachment. Ms. Atkin argues that, with the possible exception of Paul's abortive mission to India, Russia possessed no designs to invade the subcontinent during this period, and that Britain's Asian empire remained unthreatened by Russian expansion into the borderlands. However, Russia's imperial conquests in the Caucasus, and later in Central Asia, persistently affected Britain's strategies for the defence of her Indian empire. The British saw a need to establish a satisfactory frontier for a buffer zone in the Near East that would separate the international systems of Europe and India. Before the treaty of Turkmanchai in 1828, this frontier was set at the river Arras and the fortresses of Yerevan and Nakhjavan in the eastern Caucasus, and extended to the Indus. Britain sought to ensure the stability of this buffer zone at first by attempting to establish a protectorate over Persia, and later through exertion of control over the policies of the Qajars. Ms. Atkin's treatment of the role of external diplomatic constraints limiting Russian expansion in the eastern Caucasus omits this aspect of

Great Power competition.

Nor does Ms. Atkin's analysis give sufficient weight to the question of the internal constraints on expansion resulting from the problems of colonial administration. In her description of the events leading to the stabilization of the Russo-Persian frontier in 1828, she neglects to consider the discrepancy between the Russian state's military ability to expand and its administrative capability to govern its new holdings effectively. While this question might not have appeared relevant to Russian policy-makers in the early stages of conquest, when military victory in the Caucasus was uncertain and communications between St. Petersburg and local officials were poor, it could not have been entirely ignored at the time that Alexander I was experimenting with constitutional, federalist, and national self-determinist solutions to the problems of managing the Russian empire.

Russia and Iran 1780-1828 does not succeed in fulfilling the goals of Ms. Atkin's research. It provides extensive documentation for further analysis of Russo-Persian relations. The significance of her account of Russian motives in the eastern Caucasus is diminished through Ms. Atkin's failure to accord due emphasis to European efforts at containing Russian expansion. A more satisfactory account would need to define Iran's place within the wider strategic and political context of international diplomacy in the early 19th Century.

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Vainshtein, Sevyan. *Nomads of South Siberia: The Pastoral Economies of Tuva.* Ed. and with introduction by Caroline Humphrey. Translated by Michael Colenso. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980. x + 289 pp., illustrations, map, plates, tables. $39.50 cloth.

The Cambridge Studies in Social Anthropology series has made an excellent choice in its selection for translation and publication of Sevyan Vainshtein's *Istoricheskaia etnografiia Tuvintsev. Problemy kochegovo khoziaistva* (Ethnographic History of the Tuvinians. Problems of the Nomadic Economy) (Moscow: Nauka, 1972). S. I. Vainshtein has focused his research since the 1950s on the Tuvinians and Kets. He now ranks as the leading Soviet specialist on these peoples. His present work combines his knowledge gained from over twenty years of research in archival sources with extensive field work in Tuva, and use of the best of the often excellent work done by pre-Revolutionary ethnographers. Especially important is his use of the rare 1931 census material, which represents information assembled before the time of collectivization and thus before social and economic relations of the 19th century had been drastically altered. The combination of all of this information with a lucid discussion make this a fine scholarly work whose details would be of interest to anyone studying Siberia.

Vainshtein's book seeks to discover and define the "ethnic-cultural types" in late 19th and early 20th century Tuva, and to throw light on the connection of elements of this culture with neighbouring or earlier cultural forms. To do this, Vainshtein discusses various elements of nomadism; these include agriculture, hunting, fishing, gathering, herding, and crafts. His work on the histories

and origins in Eurasia of reindeer herding and the riding saddle with stirrups is particularly interesting. Perhaps most important and thought-provoking is his discussion of pre-Russian agriculture and irrigation techniques, made all the more interesting as many Soviet scholars deny or fail to mention pre-Russian agriculture. Finally, Vainshtein provides a goldmine of linguistic material that will be of interest to a variety of Siberian specialists.

The English edition includes a chapter on social relations that did not appear in the Russian original. In it he discusses the 19th and 20th centuries' Manchu administrative structure that overlaid Tuvinian culture until 1911. He also provides a brief discussion of the clan structure. As with many of the other topics in this work, perhaps the most useful and potentially controversial element of this discussion is the cross-cultural information. For example, he relates the relatively small Tuvinian family size at the turn of the century to a similar trend at the same time in Kalmyk, Kazakh, Kirghiz, and Mongol families. This and other references like it, open up a wide range of economic and social questions.

Dr. Humphrey's introduction provides a statement and evaluation of Vainshtein's theories, some discussion of Soviet historiography on nomadism, and a useful discussion of other works available on the Tuvinian area in Western languages. She also extends and speculates on other meanings of Vainshtein's theories. When she does this, however, she is careful to distinguish her ideas from Vainshtein's.

Unfortunately, the text of the Cambridge Studies in Social Anthropology edition does not always display the strengths of the original work to their best advantage. The general problem from which many of the smaller ones stem concerns the English edition's confusion over which audience it serves. The original is obviously aimed at a specialized group of Russian-speaking anthropologists, ethnographers, and historians. The translation of this work makes it available to those who dod not read Russian, but does not necessarily widen its appeal beyond the fairly narrow range of scholars interested in Siberia or its peoples. Any person then who would be interested in this book would also have been interested in the entire original.

Recently, many edited works have had to undergo significant cuts in length, particularly due to the economics of printing at this time. But one must object when the deletions become so severe that the value of the original is damaged, or some useful or necessary explanatory material is lost. Dr. Humphrey has deleted not only sentences and paragraphs, but entire sections from almost every chapter. These actions lead to a loss of footnote material, thesis statements without all of the supporting information, and confusion over the importance of some of the bibliographical sources.

Perhaps the best example of the impact of the editing can be seen in her treatment of Vainshtein's excellent chapter on nomadic transportation. An entire section on the origins and development of the saddle with stirrups was deleted. The appearance of the saddle with stirrups revolutionized the nomadic economy, social relations, and warfare. The impact of the changes it brought cannot be underestimated. The increased control of the horse gave the rider advantages in hunting and herding which affected the economy and thus the social relations, and the increased control of the horse by the nomads played no small part in the outcomes of clashes between them and societies without this advantage. Thus the absence of material on this subject hampers a full understanding of the sources of changes in the Tuvinian cultures. This is not the only case. Another striking example of the impact of editing can be found in the chapter on appropriative economic forms, where the historical material and segments of the dis-

cussion on gathering were left out.

Not inconsistent with other decision made are the decisions to eliminate line drawings and information from tables, and add plates. The original Russian version had 27 very informative line drawings. The new edition has reduced that number to four. These fine drawings, including those of the evolution of the saddle, agricultural implements, and travel apparatus, would have been of interest to many readers. The line drawings have been replaced by nine plates, all of dubious value. This precious space could have been used to include more of the original line drawings. This is not to say that the English edition has nothing new of value in it. It has a fine translation by Michael Colenso. Vainshtein's chapter on social relations was noted above. Also, it provides a much needed subject index which, added to the name index already present, makes all aspects of this work readily accessible.

The translation into English of Vainshtein's important work is of value despite its real drawbacks, but I appeal to editors and publishers to consider their audiences more carefully and try to include more of the original in edited works.

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